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From 1992 until 1995, Morocco and the European Union (EU) were in negotiations for 
an Association Agreement as part of a regional initiative, the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (or “Barcelona process”). The free trade provisions of the agreement seemed 
unfavorable for Morocco: they largely excluded agriculture, and, therefore, many 
products in which Morocco could have made significant gains, they opened the 
Moroccan market to competition from EU non-agricultural products (Morocco had 
achieved equivalent access to EU markets decades earlier), and EU funding for Moroccan 
company upgrading fell far short of expectations. This research sought to determine how 
the respective political systems of Morocco and the European Union led to the EU 
proposing, and Morocco accepting, a sub-optimal agreement. These issues were explored 
through recorded and transcribed interviews with key Moroccan and EU players, and 
through document analysis, and the resulting data were analyzed primarily in terms of 
Putnam’s two-level game model of international negotiation.  
 
The principal findings are that Morocco may have achieved a better free trade deal had it 
been an open and democratic system during the period of negotiations. The closed and 
elitist nature of the Moroccan negotiation and ratification process meant that the official 
negotiating position did not account for the full range of interests affected by trade 
liberalization, and that the hand of the Moroccan negotiators in advocating even that less 
demanding position could not be strengthened by the threat of ratification failure – the 
prospect that dissident groups might reject the final agreement in Parliament, in a 
referendum, or in the streets. The European Union negotiation and ratification process, 
although open and democratic, was skewed by the lack of significant participation by 
most member States. Only France, Spain and Italy participated intensively, a situation 
that ensured the protection of powerful national lobbies (primarily Spanish farmers and 
fishermen) at the expense of Morocco and of EU economic development objectives for 
North Africa. The convergence of minimal participation in Morocco and significant but 
wholly inadequate participation in the European Union led to an agreement favoring 
narrow European sectoral interests at the expense of the broader vision of the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Reflections and Expected Findings on Trade Liberalization 
between Morocco and the European Union 
 
 
 
In early May 2002, at the Ministry of Finance in Rabat, Morocco, a meeting was held 
between a visiting delegation of U.S. trade officials and the representatives of numerous 
Moroccan businesses and locally-based American companies, including the author. The 
purpose of the meeting was to obtain feedback on the possibility of a bilateral free trade 
agreement (FTA) that would, in general terms, be similar to the U.S./Jordan FTA that had 
taken effect at the end of the previous year. Following introductory remarks by Finance 
Minister Fathallah Oualalou, and an outline of the U.S. vision of free trade by the leader 
of the visiting delegation, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Catherine Novelli, the 
assembled business people were asked for their reaction.  
 
U.S. company representatives were predictably outspoken in their support for free trade, 
but reaction on the Moroccan side was considerably more reserved. Several officials of 
the Moroccan Employers Federation (CGEM) stated their support for free trade, but went 
on to express serious concerns about the ability of Moroccan firms to withstand 
heightened competition, satisfy U.S. norms and standards, and break into the U.S. export 
market. The wariness of the Moroccan speakers did not delay the subsequent decision to 
open negotiations for an FTA, but it did cause some surprise amongst members of the 
U.S. delegation. The origins of the Moroccan reticence can be traced back seven years to 
an earlier free trade experience with the European Union, which is by far Morocco’s 
largest trading partner. 
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The Morocco/EU FTA: A sub-optimal agreement for both parties 
 
Between 1992 and 1995, Morocco had negotiated a wide-ranging Association Agreement 
with the European Union (EU) that included a free trade agreement to be phased in over a 
12-year period, from 1998 to 2010. Due to delays in ratification by the member States of 
the EU, the implementation period actually began in 2000 and will end in 2012. Both 
accords were part of a wider EU attempt to promote the economic prosperity and stability 
of the Middle East and North Africa region that was launched at the Barcelona 
Conference in late 1995. The Morocco/EU FTA largely excludes agriculture – one of the 
sectors in which Morocco could most benefit from selective trade liberalization – as well 
as the services sector, and even at the early stage of its implementation prevailing in 
2002, the accord had shaken the free trade commitment of the Moroccan business 
community. 
 
At the time that negotiations for the Morocco/EU FTA began, there was relatively little 
awareness within governmental circles and the business community of the possible extent 
of negative short and medium term impacts of free trade: the failure of uncompetitive 
firms and the resulting economic and social dislocation. There were also unrealistic 
expectations about the amount of financial aid that the EU would devote to upgrading the 
Moroccan economy and businesses in advance of free trade, and about the ability of 
small and medium-sized firms (often family-owned) to recognize the need for upgrading 
and accept the resulting external involvement in their affairs. The negotiation and signing 
of the agreement launched an ongoing public and academic debate on the costs and 
benefits of free trade, and the inevitability of substantial damage in the short term quickly 
became apparent. Further, although such damage is an inevitable initial consequence of 
any trade liberalization, the Morocco/EU agreement in particular increasingly appeared 
to be a poor deal for Morocco due to the minimal agricultural concessions. In the seven 
years since the signing of the accord, it had also become clear that EU funding for 
Moroccan company upgrading has been only a fraction of what the Moroccan 
government and private sector thought necessary – and that many of the funds allocated 
were never disbursed due to a range of factors. These included bureaucratic delays within 
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the EU, inadequate coordination and promotion of upgrading schemes, resistance by 
family-owned firms to external sources of finance and transparency requirements, and the 
non-viability of many submitted applications. Further, available funding covered only 
diagnostic studies and the drafting of company upgrading plans, not the acquisition of 
any extra equipment and staffing that the plan might necessitate. As a result of the 
various obstacles, little progress had been made in preparing the Moroccan economy for 
trade liberalization, and the situation was essentially unchanged even as the first tariff 
eliminations on EU imports with local equivalents took effect in 2003. 
 
 
Most Moroccan business leaders and members of the political elite had by then fully 
understood the likely costs of free trade and the fact that they would have to rise to the 
challenge largely on their own. The realization had come as a shock to many operators. 
That is why, even in 2002 at an early stage of implementation of the Morocco/EU accord, 
this historic economic opening was regarded with considerable fear and even bitterness 
by some players, especially among the vulnerable small-and-medium-sized businesses 
that account for approximately 90% of all firms. This was the economic and 
psychological context in which Catherine Novelli and her delegation of trade officials 
met with local business representatives, and their experience clearly illustrates the 
ongoing impact of the Morocco/EU free trade agreement on Moroccan trade relations 
with non-EU commercial partners. That impact may have been substantially deepened by 
the Royal appointment, in early July 2002, of Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Taieb Fassi 
Fihri as lead negotiator for the Morocco/U.S. FTA. It was Fassi Fihri who led the 
Moroccan delegation in free trade and Association Agreement talks with the European 
Union in the early to mid 1990s.  
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Low political participation and authoritarian ratification processes as determinants of 
international negotiation outcome 
 
Why, then, did Morocco accept a disadvantageous free trade arrangement at all? And 
why did the European Union propose terms that seem to at least partially contradict its 
stated aim of fostering economic prosperity and stability in the Maghreb region 
(Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) and beyond? This work is the story of how a voluntary lack 
of participation in a democratic political system (the European Union) can skew the 
negotiating offer of a party in talks for an international agreement, and of how a lack of 
participation imposed by an authoritarian political system (Morocco) can not only skew 
the negotiating offer but also greatly weaken the negotiator’s hand by making the 
eventual ratification of the agreement appear easy. The key to understanding these 
phenomena lies in the political systems that generate them, and, more specifically, in the 
nature of international agreement ratification in authoritarian States. More attention will 
be devoted to the authoritarian case (Morocco), since it has little presence in the existing 
literature, but this is very much a tale of two polities and of their deficiencies – 
deficiencies that ultimately prove to be similar, despite differences of degree and 
systemic context. 
 
The principal findings of this study are that Morocco may have been able to achieve a 
better free trade deal in the 1996 Association Agreement signed in the wake of the 
Barcelona Declaration had it been an open and democratic system during the period of 
negotiations, the early to mid-1990s. The closed and elitist nature of the Moroccan 
negotiation and ratification process meant that the official negotiating position did not 
account for the full range of interests affected by trade liberalization, and that the hand of 
the Moroccan negotiators in advocating even that less demanding position could not be 
strengthened by the threat of ratification failure – the prospect that dissident groups might 
reject the final agreement in Parliament, in a referendum, or in the streets. The European 
Union negotiation and ratification process, although open and democratic in nature, was 
skewed by the voluntary lack of significant participation by most of the then 15 member 
States. Only France, Spain and Italy participated intensively, a situation that ensured the 
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protection of powerful national lobbies (primarily Spanish farmers and fishermen) at the 
expense of Morocco and of the Barcelona Declaration economic development objectives 
for the Maghreb. Other member States, which might have weighed in on behalf of the 
broader interests of the EU and Morocco, were largely absent, and their occasional 
interventions were often merely attempts to mollify their own sectoral lobbies. The 
convergence of minimal participation in Morocco and significant but wholly inadequate 
participation on the European Union side led to an agreement favoring narrow European 
sectoral interests at the expense of the broader vision behind the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership. 
 
In addition to the question of political participation and its impact on international 
agreements, the study presents a rich vein of strikingly honest testimony from the key 
players on both sides of the negotiations concerning their views on trade liberalization, 
the strengths and weaknesses of the Euro-Med partnership, and the political and personal 
power-plays that impacted the talks. The role of the Morocco/EU fisheries accord and of 
Moroccan and European pressure groups is also discussed, and the picture that emerges 
brings to life a number of previous findings in the international negotiation literature.   
 
The regional importance of Morocco and the domestic impact of free trade 
 
Morocco is strategically important for the political and economic security of Western 
Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. The country occupies a strategic geographic 
position, 14 kilometers south of Spain and the rest of the European Union, immediately 
to the north of sub-Saharan Africa, and on the western corner of the greater Maghreb 
(Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya). The Moroccan business and political 
elite has close ties to both France and the Middle East, and the Moroccan monarchy has 
played a longstanding and significant role in the Middle East peace process. A key gas 
pipeline feeding Southern Europe passes through Moroccan territory from the oil and gas 
fields of neighboring Algeria, and the Moroccan coastal fisheries were the operational 
zone of a large Spanish and Portuguese fishing fleet until the expiration of the most 
recent Morocco/EU fisheries agreement in late 1999. Perhaps more importantly, in the 
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wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the relatively stable political 
evolution of the Kingdom contrasts sharply with Islamist violence and political unrest 
elsewhere in North Africa and the Middle East.  
 
Yet the strategic value of Morocco lies not only in the strengths enumerated above, but 
also in several less positive phenomena that have frequently soured relations with the 
European Union. Increasing flows of illegal immigrants, which include both Moroccans 
leaving home and sub-Saharan Africans using Morocco as a transit point, have caused 
great tension within the EU and particularly in Spain, where the anger has been deepened 
by other bilateral disputes relating to the Sahara, the two Spanish enclaves in northern 
Morocco, and drug trafficking. Spain has accused Morocco of laxity in controlling illegal 
immigration, and, if true, that would hardly be surprising. Emigration allows many 
people who have little future in Morocco because of chronic unemployment to achieve 
what is often a higher standard of living in Europe, thus removing a potential source of 
domestic political discontent. Once settled in Europe, many immigrants send remittances 
to their families in Morocco, generating annual foreign exchange earnings in excess of $3 
billion. Any serious attempt to reduce illegal immigration flows without addressing the 
root causes of the problem would therefore clearly run counter to the domestic political 
interests of the Moroccan State, and would only become probable in the event of a 
dramatic increase in external political pressure on the issue. Western Europe is also the 
primary market for the large quantities of cannabis grown in the impoverished northern 
regions of Morocco, where the promotion of alternative crops appears to have made little 
progress. Here again, any serious crackdown by the Moroccan authorities would seem 
likely to result in social unrest and increased illegal immigration flows unless legal 
alternative sources of income can be found.  
 
Although illegal immigration and drug trafficking are a source of tension between 
Morocco and the EU, the fact remains that Morocco is in a relatively strong economic 
position to achieve the higher levels of development that would reduce those problems 
and also consolidate domestic political stability. In that sense, diplomatic problems such 
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as those discussed above can be recast as powerful negotiating arguments for increased 
development aid.   
 
Free trade and the Association Agreement with the European Union is intended to 
strengthen Morocco in support of its actual and potential strategic value, and it was 
negotiated within the framework of the EU Mediterranean partnership, which covers 12 
southern Mediterranean nations ranging from Morocco to Israel and Jordan. Both Algeria 
and Tunisia have Association Agreements with the EU that are very similar to that of 
Morocco, both in general terms and, in the case of Tunisia, with respect to free trade. 
However, while the longer-term benefits of trade liberalization are clear, there is a real 
danger that the short and medium-term shock of open competition will produce negative 
socio-economic impacts. The minimization of social and economic dislocation during the 
transitional period depends on effective business upgrading – which has clearly not yet 
been achieved in Morocco – and excellent strategic planning, as well as substantial new 
foreign direct investment. As stated earlier, the free trade agreement signed between 
Morocco and the EU appears to be a poor deal for Morocco: it largely excludes 
agriculture and, therefore, many of the products in which significant gains could have 
been made in a liberalized environment, and it did not provide for adequate upgrading 
funds – be they European or Moroccan in origin – or the efficient delivery mechanisms 
needed to back them up. As a result of these deficiencies, and the failure of Morocco to 
effectively compensate for them, Morocco has been unable to take advantage of one key 
aspect of the FTA, the “back-loaded” nature of the tariff elimination schedule. This 
timetable provided for the rapid abolition of tariffs on imported capital goods, raw 
materials, and goods with no local equivalent, thereby lowering the input costs of many 
Moroccan industries and giving them time to apply the savings (plus any available 
additional funding) to productivity and quality upgrading in preparation for the removal 
of tariffs on competing imports. The final phase of the liberalization process began only 
after these “friendly” tariff reductions were complete, and it is being implemented much 
more gradually.  
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All in all, there is good reason for concern regarding the short and medium-term impact 
of trade liberalization on a nation that is already facing an alarming level of poverty and 
unemployment, especially given the risk that any deterioration in socio-economic 
conditions could be instrumentalized by extremist groups and feed into political violence. 
Should such instability arise, any initial adverse impact of trade liberalization would not 
be its root cause, but might well constitute a proximate cause – a catalyst for latent 
discontent generated by a complex set of problems that long predate trade liberalization 
itself. These concerns highlight the critical importance of understanding why the 
Morocco/EU free trade and Association Agreement was sub-optimal, how Morocco and 
the EU might have achieved a better deal, and how other countries in a similar position to 
Morocco might do so in the future.  
 
The research questions 
 
It is clear that the Morocco/EU free trade and Association Agreement has great 
significance for both wider Moroccan trade relations and domestic socio-economic 
welfare, which in turn influences the political stability of a nation that has considerable 
regional geopolitical importance. Given that free trade has inevitable short and medium-
term costs that are exacerbated, in the Moroccan case, by the exclusion of services, the 
minimal nature of agricultural concessions, and an already fragile socio-economic 
situation, the following research questions seem relevant: 
 
1. Why did Morocco decide to open its economy through a free trade and Association 
Agreement? 
2. Why was the European Union chosen as a partner? 
3. How did the respective political systems of Morocco and the European Union lead to 
the EU proposing, and Morocco accepting, a sub-optimal agreement, and how could 
the problems identified be avoided in the future? 
4. To what extent were the negotiations influenced by:  
(a) domestic economic and political interests  
(b) international relations 
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(c) leadership preferences 
(d) the formulation of Moroccan and European negotiating strategy and the 
respective international agreement ratification processes, and  
(e) the parallel issue of the Morocco/EU fisheries agreements? 
 
These issues will be explored through document analysis and interviews with key 
Moroccan and EU players, and the resulting data will be analyzed in terms of several 
aspects of negotiation theory (including the impact of bureaucratic politics on 
negotiations, the strength of weak States, and Habeeb’s model of power in negotiations) 
and in terms of Putnam’s two-level game model of international negotiation. The latter 
theory holds that the negotiators of international agreements (level 1) must operate under 
the constraints imposed by the interests of the other international parties and their 
capacity to deliver on any agreement, but also under the constraints imposed by the need 
to obtain ratification of any agreement at the domestic level (level 2). This approach is 
presented in detail in a later chapter.  
 
The research questions are important from an empirical perspective because they could 
yield valuable insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the Moroccan and European 
Union negotiating strategies, as well as recommendations for improvement, and those 
insights may be applicable to less-developed countries (LDCs) other than Morocco 
attempting to enter or associate more closely with established trading blocs characterized 
by a much higher level of development. The research questions are important from a 
theoretical perspective because one of the theories applied, Putnam’s two-level game 
conception of international negotiations, was developed in the context of advanced 
industrial states governed by representative democracy, and its application to Morocco, 
an authoritarian monarchy at the time of the FTA negotiations with the EU, will provide 
useful insights into how interest advocacy and treaty ratification work in such a state and 
into how Putnam’s model could be extended to that case more generally. Further, 
determining why the European Union proposed, and Morocco agreed to, a free trade deal 
that is unnecessarily damaging to Morocco in the short-to-medium term may shed new 
light on the less predictable ways in which domestic political interests shape (or fail to 
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shape) international negotiations. Such insight would move us beyond Putnam’s two-
level game model, in that the two-level game is concerned with identifying various types 
and levels of influences on negotiations but not concerned with linking specific types of 
influences with specific negotiation outcomes. The latter task falls to theories dealing 
with political and bureaucratic leadership as well as the differing roles of the various 
economic actors. 
 
 
The expected findings 
 
The first expected finding is that the European Union proposed a free trade agreement 
that was unnecessarily disadvantageous to Morocco under the influence of sectoral 
pressure groups seeking to protect their interests. 
 
The second expected finding is that Morocco accepted an unnecessarily disadvantageous 
free trade agreement under the combined influence of:   
(1) an elite/business coalition that stood to gain from the deal and had 
extraordinary influence over the decision-making process, and  
(2) a generalized belief among the political elite that Morocco could not afford to 
be excluded from the longer-term development benefits of trade liberalization 
– whatever the short-to-medium term costs – and that existing patterns of 
trade and cultural relations made Western Europe the inevitable partner.   
 
Ronald Rogowski, in his 1989 work Commerce and Coalitions, demonstrates the impact 
of comparative advantage on the political reactions to free trade in a given economy. 
Basing his analysis on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which found that trade 
liberalization benefits the owners of abundant factors of production and harms the owners 
of scarce factors, Rogowski profiles the possible factor allocations in a given economy 
and the consequent political reaction to liberalization. His treatment of the Moroccan 
case – abundant land and labor but relatively scarce capital – is as follows: 
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“In a capital-poor economy with abundant land and labor, change in exposure to 
trade… mobilizes a coalition of red and green… Expanding trade… benefits 
farmers and workers but harms capitalists; and the mass coalition – or, where 
agriculture is dominated by a few large landowners, a coalition of gentry and 
labor – pursues a wider franchise, free trade, and a general disempowerment of 
capital.” (1989, p. 15). 
 
So, given the impact of comparative advantage on reactions to free trade outlined by 
Rogowski, and given that Morocco is a country of abundant land and labor but relatively 
scarce capital, free trade should be supported by farmers and workers but opposed by 
capital (not only because the scarcity of capital limits the export benefits and heightens 
the import vulnerability resulting from tariff removal, but also because some existing 
capital enjoys rentier or monopoly situations based on non-tariff barriers that are 
threatened by liberalization). Yet the free trade agreement as signed largely excludes the 
Moroccan agriculture sector, which accounts for up to 50% of the workforce, thus 
apparently eliminating one source of support for free trade (farmers) and half of another 
(workers) except for those few agricultural employees capable of transferring easily to 
other sectors. As for the owners of capital, who are supposed to oppose free trade in these 
circumstances, they (or at least the most influential among them) seem to have been 
instrumental in supporting the agreement.  
 
The situation is, of course, much more complex than this initial portrait would suggest. 
We have described free trade as being in the interests of Moroccan farmers and of the 40-
50% of labor that works the land, but it would be more accurate to limit the statement to 
those farmers (and related workers) whose products would be competitive for export 
under free trade, such as citrus fruit, olives, fresh tomatoes, sardines, and capers. 
Moroccan cereal producers would actually suffer under free trade, due to very low yields 
caused by drought, lack of technology, and inadequate farm size, and cereals account for 
a large part of the agricultural workforce. Red and white meat producers would also be at 
risk, although lower costs for imported animal feeds would at least partially reduce the 
competitiveness gap. On this basis, there would be a split in the agricultural sector 
(among both farmers and workers) between supporters and opponents of free trade. It 
seems that agricultural operators (both likely free trade winners and losers) were very 
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active in seeking a role in the decision-making process because of a belief that 
substantially increased access to European agricultural markets might be possible, and 
fears that access could even be reduced for some products. Now, this leaves the 50% of 
labor that is in the non-agricultural sectors and was therefore clearly going to be affected 
by the FTA. This group, as an abundant factor of production, should support the FTA 
according to Rogowski, but this is thrown into question by the fact that Morocco had 
already enjoyed essentially free access to EU non-agricultural markets for decades prior 
to the FTA, thanks to the association agreements that preceded it. In other words, the 
potential export benefits of free trade had already been made available, and the main 
innovation of the FTA was to remove customs duties on EU products competing locally 
with Moroccan equivalents (although inputs imported from the EU were also exempted). 
On the whole, then, this group might actually be expected to oppose the FTA, in 
contradiction with the general case of Rogowski.  
 
As for the owners of capital, they, or at least their political leaders, seem to have 
supported the agreement, despite the prediction that it would disadvantage them as a 
relatively scarce factor of production – and this is the genuine contradiction at the center 
of debate. I suspect that the key to this apparent paradox lies in (1) distinguishing 
between capital owners based on how free trade will impact on the particular lines of 
products in which they deal, and (2) the way in which capital owners are represented in 
the Moroccan political system.  
 
In general, the Rogowski theory does not seem to hold up well in the Moroccan context, 
but this is essentially because the FTA with the European Union is not a complete 
bilateral FTA at all, but rather a partial and unilateral FTA: an agreement that largely 
excludes agriculture and liberalizes non-agricultural trade essentially for the EU alone 
and not also Morocco, which had already obtained that access. Nevertheless, the 
Rogowski perspective greatly helps in the identification of some of the relevant interest 
groups and their expected rational behavior patterns. 
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It seems that Morocco may have accepted the free trade deal because an elite coalition 
standing to gain from free trade, or seeing it as an economic imperative in the national 
interest, had control of political decision-making, negotiation strategy, and the 
ratification process to the exclusion of factions that stood to lose. The idea is plausible, 
given the strong tendency for members of the political elite to capitalize on their position 
through business dealings, and given the differential impact of import barrier abolition: 
businesses that pay tariffs on raw materials imported from Western Europe and are not 
threatened by cheaper or better European substitute products should favor free trade, 
whereas businesses relying on local materials and vulnerable to Western European 
substitutes should be opposed to it. The former category might include many of the larger 
Moroccan corporations that have already integrated advanced technology and 
sophisticated marketing and quality control procedures, as well as smaller firms sourcing 
inputs from the EU and able to withstand competition. 
 
Another factor in Morocco’s decision may simply have been a perception that there were 
no viable alternatives to further integration into the world economy, and that free trade 
held at least some attraction given (1) the already quite advanced implementation by 
Morocco of the World Bank/IMF liberalization agenda, and (2) the prospect of longer-
term gains from competition-generated productivity increases and foreign direct 
investment. The strength of Morocco’s cultural and economic ties to Western Europe 
would then have made the EU an obvious choice as a free trade partner.  
 
The methodology used in this study is detailed in the next chapter, chapter two, which is 
followed by an outline of the theoretical framework drawn from the negotiation literature 
to be applied to the case at hand, the free trade and Association Agreement talks between 
Morocco and the European Union. Two subsequent chapters (chapters four and five) 
present a broad overview of relations between the EU and both Morocco and the 
Maghreb in the recent past, since those relations point to a number of likely influences on 
the approach taken by the two parties to the negotiations. These possible influences range 
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from past cultural and economic ties, and the dynamic initiated by the eastward 
expansion of the Union, to the pressures of migration, the role of the Maghreb as an 
energy supplier to the EU, drug trafficking and terrorism. Chapter six offers an analysis 
of the Moroccan elite structure, which is essential to understanding how different societal 
groups interact, how information is managed, and the current state of Moroccan 
entrepreneurship. All of these factors are of critical importance to Moroccan negotiating 
behavior. Chapter seven presents the testimony of key players in the negotiations, both 
Moroccan and European, chapter eight analyses the data in terms of the theoretical 
framework, and chapter nine offers a range of conclusions.  
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
Methodology 
 
 
The bulk of the field research took place in 2003 and 2004 in Morocco, Belgium and 
France, and focused on three main sources of data as follows:  
1. Interviews with Moroccan free trade negotiators and policymakers designed to (a) 
gather data on the research questions, and (b) identify other key interviewees or 
sources of information, including representatives or position papers of interest groups 
that played an important role in the process (such as trade unions, civil society groups, 
the academic community, and businesses); 
2. Interviews with EU free trade negotiators and policymakers designed to (a) gather 
data on the research questions, and (b) identify other key interviewees or sources of 
information, including representatives or position papers of interest groups that played 
an important role in the process (such as farmer groups, trade unions, civil society 
groups, the academic community, and businesses);  
3. The gathering of additional secondary data (including documents, academic studies 
and newspaper reports).  
 
Most interviews were tape-recorded, and these were transcribed and analyzed in terms of 
(1) the various themes and sub-themes apparent in the responses to each question or 
cluster of questions, and (2) the theoretical framework and expected findings of the 
study. Certain respondents answered selected questions by email, and this method was 
also used when supplementary information was necessary after face-to-face interviews; 
one interview was conducted by telephone, and written notes were taken in that case. 
Interviews were conducted in French, with one exception, and the quotations featured in 
the dissertation were translated by the author. To ensure maximum disclosure, interviews 
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were conducted on the basis of anonymity, and informants were identified in the 
dissertation only by their role or interest group or governmental affiliation. At the 
beginning of each face-to-face interview, the subject was asked to read a text explaining 
the identity of the researcher, the nature of the research, the intention to tape record the 
interview (with consent), and the fact that respondents would remain anonymous. All 
respondents agreed to the recording of the interview. The same information was provided 
in initial emails and faxes sent prior to the scheduling of interviews. The research 
protocol was approved by the University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board. 
 
The decision to begin with interviews of free trade negotiators and policymakers reflects 
a desire to give priority to those most closely involved in the negotiations, which are the 
main focus of the study. The intention was to solicit recommendations of further contacts 
and information sources during those initial interviews and then fan out from the center 
in pursuit of other relevant testimony. It had been anticipated that a greater number of 
interviews would be conducted than the 13 that finally took place, but it quickly became 
clear that the range of key players on either side of the Mediterranean was very limited. 
Interviewees consistently named the same individuals when asked to identify the drivers 
of the process, and it was those same names that were most often cited in contemporary 
newspaper reports.   
 
Two interview questionnaires were developed (see appendix), one for Moroccan 
respondents and one for European respondents, although the two versions are largely 
identical. Both versions focus on the formal and informal role of the interviewees in the 
Association Agreement negotiations, their perception of the FTA component and the 
motivations of the two parties in signing it, and the way in which various interest groups 
affected the outcome. Specifically, the questionnaires were designed in four parts. 
 
Section A focuses on the role of the interviewee in the negotiations, since that 
information has a bearing on the credibility that can be accorded to the data obtained, and 
a distinction was made between formal and informal roles. An interview subject asked 
simply what role he or she played in the talks may answer “none,” on the assumption that 
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the question refers to an official role, when in fact the informal role played may have 
been considerable. Separate questions were asked concerning the role of the interviewee 
in soliciting a free trade and Association Agreement, as opposed to participating in the 
negotiations, since the former does not necessarily presuppose the latter.  
 
Section B is composed of three very general questions regarding the meaning of the free 
trade agreement in the eyes of the respondent and its perceived strengths and weaknesses. 
These questions were intended to reveal the interviewee’s personal assessment of the 
significance, costs and benefits of the accord, as distinct from his or her evaluation of the 
attitudes and actions of other people or groups.  
 
Section C seeks interviewee opinion on why their party sought an agreement; why the 
agreement was sought with the other party as opposed to any other; why the EU omitted 
services and largely omitted agriculture from the agreement and Morocco accepted these 
omissions; why, overall, Morocco accepted the agreement despite its disadvantages; and 
how the fisheries agreement negotiations influenced the Association Agreement talks. 
This section, which focuses more on the State perspective, attempts to identify the 
motivations of the two parties, Morocco and the EU, in entering into a new phase of their 
partnership.  
 
Section D focuses on the interest group or civil society perspective, and attempts to 
identify the winners and losers of the agreement, their representatives, the formal and 
informal procedures used in the negotiations, how interest group representatives tried to 
advance their positions in that context, and with what results. The final two questions in 
this section look at how interest group activity translated into constraints on negotiators 
at Level I (the international negotiating table) and who, on each side, had the power to 
modify that party’s negotiating position in response to interest group and other 
constraints.  
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Section E concludes the interview by prompting respondents to raise any issues 
considered important that have not already been covered, and to suggest other potential 
interviewees and sources of documentary evidence. 
 
All of these questions, taken together, were expected to generate an image of the national 
and international (Level II and Level I) landscape of Morocco and the European Union at 
the time of the Association Agreement and fisheries agreement talks. This image was 
expected to be sufficiently detailed as to permit a credible analysis of the expected 
research findings. In some interviews, the questions of section A prompted the 
respondent to make a lengthy opening statement that included detailed answers to certain 
questions that had not yet been asked, and these questions were subsequently omitted to 
avoid repetition and focus the discussion on the outstanding issues.  
 
Interviews were conducted seven or eight years after the end of the negotiations under 
study (1991-1995), and interviewees might have been expected to have forgotten some 
details of the sequence of events. In fact, they appeared to have a clear recollection of all 
but trivial aspects, and the passage of time seemed to encourage disclosure: what had 
been a highly political and controversial episode now seemed more a matter of historical 
interest on which open commentary carried fewer potential consequences. The anonymity 
granted to the interviewees was another key factor in ensuring maximal openness and 
honesty in their responses. A substantial body of secondary evidence from the period 
under study, including documents, academic studies and newspaper reports, was 
incorporated into the research, and acts as a check on any interviewee testimony that may 
have been affected by the shortcomings of human memory or the subjectivity inherent in 
any human perspective.  
 
 CHAPTER THREE 
 
The Theoretical Framework: A Brief Analysis of Negotiation 
 
 
This chapter is intended to provide a theoretical framework for analyzing the Moroccan 
political decision-making and negotiating processes that resulted in the EU/Morocco free 
trade accord. Putnam’s two-level game model (see chapter one) is presented and 
discussed. The chapter will also present a series of potentially useful insights from the 
negotiation literature, including the impact of bureaucratic politics on negotiations (P. 
Terrence Hopmann, 1996, The Negotiating Process and the Resolution of International 
Conflicts), and Habeeb’s model of power in negotiations (Habeeb, 1988, Power and 
Tactics in International Negotiation).  
 
Putnam and the two-level game 
 
Putnam (1988) conceived of international negotiations as a two-level game. The national 
level is characterized by intense competition between political actors who seek power by 
building coalitions of domestic interest groups, while at the international level, in 
negotiations, governments seek to satisfy domestic pressures and obtain the best possible 
deal on the issue at hand, given the state of international relations. The national political 
leader interacts, on the international level, with his foreign counterparts and his own 
advisors, and on the national level with party and parliamentary actors, interest group 
representatives, and again with his own advisors. An action that may be rational for the 
national leader at the international level may be dangerous to his political survival at 
home, and in that case he/she is caught between the desire for a more favorable 
international agreement (or the avoidance of negotiation failure) and the need to maintain 
domestic political support. But as Putnam says, “on occasion, clever players will spot a 
move on one board that will trigger realignments on other boards, enabling them to 
achieve otherwise unattainable objectives” (p. 434). The instrument by which the 
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national political leader triggers this realignment and reconciles the two levels of 
interests, national and international, is the process of agreement ratification.  
 
Even assuming that initial Level II (domestic) discussions take place to determine the 
Level I (international) negotiating position, as well as broad parameters for compromise, 
and further, that consultation with domestic interests occurs throughout the negotiations, 
any Level I agreement must ultimately be ratified (without amendment) at Level II. 
Putnam defines ratification as “any decision-process at Level II that is required to 
endorse or implement a Level I agreement, whether formally or informally” (p. 436); he 
stresses that ratification may include, in addition to parliamentary approval, the accord of 
bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social classes, or public opinion, and that this need 
not occur in a democratic context. The need for Level II ratification requires that any 
Level I agreement fall within the Level II “win-set”, defined as “the set of all possible 
Level I agreements that would gain the necessary majority among the constituents when 
simply voted up or down” (p. 437).  
 
This gives rise to two important observations. First, since Level I agreements must lie in 
the overlap between the Level II win-sets of the various negotiators and the preferences 
of the various national leaders in order to be successful (ratified), larger win-sets 
facilitate agreement. Yet even if an agreement lies in the win-set of all parties, Level II 
ratification may still fail: this is “involuntary defection” (from the negotiator 
perspective), as opposed to “voluntary defection” (deliberate free ridership on collective 
action); the latter phenomenon is less likely if all parties have an ongoing relationship 
and thus expect to negotiate again (pp. 437-439, 456-459). The second observation about 
win-sets is that larger win-sets, as perceived by the other parties at Level I, will generate 
increased expectations that concessions will be made in light of the apparent extra room 
for maneuver. Smaller perceived win-sets, in contrast, strengthen a negotiating position 
since the ability to compromise seems much reduced (pp. 440-441); it is reminiscent of 
the strength of weak states argument, recast as the strength of weak negotiators.  
 
Putnam holds that win-set size is determined by:  
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(1) Level II preferences and coalitions (as a function of actors’ perceived cost of no-
agreement, their relative influence and propensity to lobby, and their willingness 
to trade-off across multiple issues),  
(2) Level II institutions (the difficulty of ratification requirements as reflected in 
minimum majorities, the level of party discipline and authoritarianism, etc.), and  
(3) Level I negotiator strategies (the use of side-payments and general domestic 
political popularity [“generic good will”] to increase the possibility of 
ratification) (pp. 441-452). 
 
The fact that Level I negotiators often have a poor knowledge of the domestic politics of 
other parties (and thus the size of their win-set) allows those parties to exaggerate the 
smallness of their win-set in hopes of getting a better deal, but it may also lead to fears 
that they will be unable to deliver on the agreement reached (pp. 452-453). In contrast, 
“entrenched” authoritarian regimes are held to be in a weaker negotiating position due to 
their perceived greater ability to obtain ratification (larger win-set)(p. 449). Governments 
may also try to “restructure” each other’s win-sets through lobbying and aid packages, or 
by creating international pressures (such as the policy momentum generated by a summit 
meeting) that “reverberate” in domestic politics and allow an agreement to be ratified 
where before it could not have been (assuming that there is no backlash against the 
international pressure) (pp. 454-456). Synergistic linkages (trade-offs across different 
issue areas) are thought likely to multiply with increased economic interdependence, 
which in turn increases the range of possible trade offs (pp. 447-448). 
 
A major research project based on Putnam’s work (Evans et al. 1993) provided some 
useful elaborations, including discussion of a 1986 trade dispute in which the U.S. forced 
the EU to abandon proposed restrictions on American feed grain shipments. The 
restrictions were supported by France, but the U.S. undermined French influence on the 
wider EU position by using threats of retaliation against a carefully chosen set of 
agricultural products that were dear to other EU member States (Evans et al. 1993, pp. 3-
4). On a theoretical level, the authors identified three main sources of domestic political 
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influence in the relevant literature: (1) social influence expressed through legislatures, 
interest groups, elections and public opinion; (2) State-centered influence originating 
with administrators and policymakers in the executive branch; and (3) State-society 
influence expressed through the institutions (educational, representative and 
administrative) that link State and society (p. 6). The subsequent discussion of how 
leaders with strong preferences might manipulate such domestic interests, along with 
institutional structures and information flows, brings us closer to the type of non-
democratic system that prevailed in Morocco in the mid 1990s. One possibility is that a 
leader might achieve ratification for a provision that is outside the win-set by linking it to 
a separate and highly popular measure. Another is that the leader may actually alter the 
domestic ratification process or the institutional structures that participate in it, 
manipulate or conceal information, and use side-payments, all with the objective of 
achieving ratification in the face of opposition. The extent to which this is possible will 
be partly determined by whether or not the costs and benefits of an agreement are 
concentrated on certain groups and by whether or not those groups are well-informed and 
well-organized (pp. 24-26).   
 
In a crucial finding, Evans et al. conclude that their case studies show little evidence for 
the view that low levels of enfranchisement (authoritarianism) are associated with a 
broad win-set (easy ratification – or imposition – of Level I agreements). Instead, the 
small elite that dominates an authoritarian State appears to be very homogenous and 
difficult to split or manipulate in the event that an agreement runs counter to its interests. 
Even when several factions exist within such an elite, its limited size and diversity seem 
to make coalition-building and compromise difficult. Indeed, one possible motivation for 
an international agreement is to restructure such domestic interests and increase the 
potential for reform (pp. 415-416), and free trade can certainly be expected to transform 
Moroccan economic interests. The finding that limited participation may actually make 
ratification more difficult has also been observed in the democratic context. In her study 
of agricultural policy reform in the European Community, Lee Ann Patterson concludes 
that “the power and diversity of interest groups affect outcome. The more heterogeneous 
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the interests represented in a negotiation, the easier it is to make substantive reforms.” 
(Patterson 1997, p. 161).    
 
Although Putnam specifically states that his model is not limited to democratic contexts, 
his examples are mainly drawn from such cases (the 1978 Bonn summit, the Tokyo 
Round GATT negotiations), and most subsequent research based on the two-level game 
has shown the same bias. It would therefore be of interest to explore the application of 
the theory to an authoritarian system such as Morocco in the mid 1990s, and to answer 
such questions as the following: 
(1) To what extent did domestic interests diverge from the leader/negotiator’s 
independent interests, in Morocco and the EU, relative to the free trade agreement 
and the wider Association Agreement of which it is part? 
(2) Can a ratification process be identified in a country where electoral and 
parliamentary politics were without legitimacy and where power originates in a 
complicated set of royal, religious, military and elite interactions? 
(3) What were the key domestic interest groups in the EU and Morocco relative to the 
free trade agreement, what were their positions, and how did their positions – 
both real and perceived – influence negotiations? 
(4) Are “entrenched” authoritarian regimes really in a weaker negotiating position 
due to their perceived greater ability to obtain ratification, as Putnam suggests (p. 
449), or is the situation more complex? 
(5) What are the implications of the analysis for future Moroccan negotiating 
strategy? 
 
Upon initial consideration, it appears that the EU win-set in free trade negotiations (the 
range of agreements that are ratifiable at member State level) is severely limited by the 
diametrically opposed interests of Southern member States and Northern member States 
relative to both of the key Moroccan demands: agricultural free trade and major financial 
assistance (Southern member States favoring financial aid over agricultural concessions, 
and Northern member States favoring the reverse). On the face of it, nothing involving 
significant concessions can get ratified, so there is essentially no EU win-set for any 
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agreement very favorable to Morocco. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that the initial 
free trade agreement signed in 1995 seems, from the Moroccan perspective, to involve 
considerable short and medium-term costs in return for relatively distant long-term gains. 
Yet the EU member States are deeply concerned by the prospect of further illegal 
immigration and drug flows from North Africa, Islamist terrorism, and regional 
instability, and these fears highlight the potential cost of no-agreement, or an agreement 
very unfavorable to Morocco. This may be why the EU has signed the initial free trade 
deals with Morocco and Tunisia, and, more importantly, why it increased financial aid 
and agreed that a review of the agricultural provisions would occur during the 
agreement’s implementation period. Morocco has several bargaining chips in trade 
negotiations: access to its fisheries (although restructuring of the European fleets in 
response to prolonged exclusion from Moroccan waters may neutralize this issue in the 
long term), political stability, the importance of expanding trade and investment to reduce 
migration and drug flows, and colonial ties to France and Spain associated with 
substantial direct investment. Morocco may be able to use these strategic assets to widen 
the EU win-set, and, given that southern member States of the EU have much more at 
stake in the Maghreb than their northern counterparts, it is in the south that any widening 
of the EU win-set would seem most likely. 
 
Bureaucratic politics and public opinion 
 
Bureaucratic politics and the socio-economic cleavages that contribute to it are a key part 
of the two-level game, but they are also the focus of a substantial academic literature in 
their own right. Although rational theories of negotiation have generally regarded States 
as autonomous actors with clearly defined national interests that are unrelated to the 
preferences of any particular group, class, or officeholder (Hoppmann 1996, p. 153), 
other researchers contest the very existence of such a collective set of objectives: 
 
Rather, the State operates within the context of competition among branches 
of government, among agencies of the executive branch, and in the midst of 
political and class conflicts that divide the larger society… Each of these 
groups develops its own rationality, often based on specific interests of the 
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group rather than the general interest of the State. As a result, the State as a 
whole operates at best on the basis of “the principle of bounded rationality.” 
In this case, its preferences reflect the net outcome of a process of 
bargaining and compromise within the government to arrive at policy 
decisions, often without explicit agreement upon goals, but rather on the 
basis of a lowest common denominator of agreement about specific decisions 
(Hopmann 1996, pp. 153-154).  
 
This vision of bureaucratic and interest group politics may be very appropriate in the case 
of the European Union, which is divided between north and south over the balance of 
financial aid and market access in its partnership with the Maghreb and is under great 
pressure from the farm lobby. This perspective also opens the door to better 
understanding the convoluted and opaque processes of decision-making and ratification 
in authoritarian nations like the Morocco of the mid-1990s. 
 
Kaarbo, in her essay on bureaucratic power politics in foreign policy, warns of the need 
to distinguish between power and influence. She defines power as based on control over 
resources and formal position in the bureaucracy, whereas influence is affected by “more 
fluid factors such as will, skill, personal relations, others’ perceptions, and by particular 
strategies that bureaucratic players employ to exploit or bypass the existing power 
structures” (Kaarbo 1998, p. 76). As Hopmann points out, the struggle among the 
competing factions of the State, based on narrow – and not national – self-interest, is 
constrained by a range of factors, of which one of the most important is public opinion 
(which can be considered tributary of the “political and class conflicts that divide the 
larger society”)(p. 153). In his study of public opinion as a domestic constraint in the 
Anglo-Irish peace process, Trumbore (1998, pp. 548-550) found that three factors were 
of central importance in determining the impact of public opinion on international 
negotiations. They were:  
 
(1) Public preferences (which act as a constraint if they run contrary to leadership 
preferences). The impact of public preferences may be strongest at the outset of 
negotiations, at which point they will already have made certain positions less 
politically viable and others more so. In other words, they “establish the outer 
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boundaries of the Level I win-set by defining the range of agreements likely to 
win Level II ratification.”  
(2) Issue intensity (issues that generate more intense public interest and emotion are 
also subject to a greater constraining force of public preferences). Issue intensity 
is determined by the extent to which the costs and benefits of a given negotiating 
position are concentrated on certain groups (high intensity) or spread more evenly 
across the population (low intensity). Variations in issue intensity can be 
achieved through strategic manipulations in which information is withheld or 
presented differently in order to change the public perception of the cost/benefit 
distribution. 
(3) Ratification power (which can act as a restraint, either directly or indirectly). 
Direct ratification power is exemplified by referenda, while indirect ratification 
power amounts to the threat of electoral retribution for unpopular negotiation 
outcomes – a threat that can only be effective in the case of high-intensity issues.   
 
Public preferences and issue intensity are clearly more relevant in the EU context than in 
the Moroccan context in the case of Euro-Moroccan free trade. Nevertheless, if “public 
preferences and issue intensity” is altered to become “bureaucratic factional preferences 
and issue intensity,” then the same dynamic should be identifiable in the Moroccan 
power structure. Ratification power is much more difficult to define for Morocco, as 
discussed earlier, and for that very reason it constitutes a point of interest in the study. 
 
Habeeb’s model of power in negotiations includes aggregate structural power (total 
resources and capabilities across all issues), issue-specific structural power (resources 
and capabilities relative to the specific issue), and tactical or behavioral power (the 
ability to use power resources to attain objectives)(Habeeb 1988, pp. 14-26). In the case 
of Morocco/EU relations, these categories allow us to differentiate between the overall 
balance of power (which is dominated by the EU) and certain issues on which Morocco 
has unusual influence (fisheries, immigration, drugs, etc.). A lack of behavioral power on 
the part of Morocco might explain a failure to capitalize on that influence; for example, 
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the apparent Moroccan leverage in fisheries negotiations being offset by the need to 
obtain an overall EU Association Agreement that brought the wider balance of power 
into play. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
A Recent History of Relations between the Maghreb  
and the European Union 
 
 
 
The relationship between Morocco and the European Union is a relationship fraught with 
controversy but driven forward by the mutual needs and desires of the two partners. 
These mutual needs and desires revolve around issues of market access, economic 
reform, energy resources, development aid, political stability and reform, national 
identity and territorial boundaries, drug flows, and immigration. Those issues, in turn, are 
the key to the economic, political and military security of the western Mediterranean 
region. This chapter looks at the context of the Morocco-EU relationship: the economic 
and security relations between the “core” Maghreb region (Morocco, Algeria and 
Tunisia) and the European Union. It draws on a range of American and European 
academic studies (including journal articles and contributions to edited volumes), 
European Union policy papers and statistical summaries, World Bank, IMF and OECD 
reports, articles from specialized non-academic publications such as Jeune Afrique, and 
The Middle East, and articles from the generalist press (including both independent and 
political party-affiliated titles). The references also include reports from a Moroccan 
investment bank, several research centers, government agencies such as the Moroccan 
Foreign Exchange Service and the Tunisian Central Bank, and the French Press Agency 
(AFP). A few of the authors cited have strong political affiliations: Fathallah Oualalou is 
an economics professor and Moroccan socialist party activist who became a long-serving 
Minister of Finance; Habib Ben Yahia is a former Tunisian Foreign Minister; and 
Mohammed Ben El Hassan Alaoui became King of Morocco in 1999 as Mohammed VI. 
The following chapter turns to a detailed analysis of Morocco’s relationship with the 
Union, and attempts to answer some critical questions about the future of this 
partnership-in-progress. 
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ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE 
MAGHREB 
 
The modern economic relationships of both Morocco and the Maghreb with the European 
Union long predate the signing of the Treaty of Rome that established what is now the 
EU in 1957. These relationships were forged in the colonial era, a time when major 
European powers developed, exploited, and often oppressed the nations of North Africa. 
The Treaty of Rome recognized the close links between France and its former colonies in 
a protocol authorizing the French Republic to maintain preferential trading arrangements 
with Morocco and Tunisia, notwithstanding the then European Economic Community’s 
customs union regulations. Both countries sought association agreements with the 
Community beginning in 1963, and, six years later, accords were signed to facilitate an 
eventual free trade zone by opening the European market to most Moroccan and Tunisian 
industrial products and by granting special access for certain agricultural products. 
Morocco and Tunisia were not required to reciprocate, but merely to comply strictly with 
any specified quotas (Khader 1992, pp. 73-76; Sid Ahmed 1993, p. 772). 
 
Beginning with the 1972 Paris summit, the Community attempted to adopt a globally 
consistent and balanced approach to dealings with the Mediterranean basin countries. 
Renewed negotiations between the Community on the one hand, and Morocco, Algeria 
and Tunisia on the other, began the following year and ended in the April 1976 
cooperation accords. The accords granted free access to Community markets for 
industrial goods from all three countries, although they were later unexpectedly diluted 
by the imposition of quotas in the case of textiles and footwear, and certain agricultural 
products were hit by supplementary seasonal restrictions, tariffs, and other obstacles. The 
imposed “voluntary” export restrictions on manufactured products, in particular, 
discouraged investment in precisely those sectors in which the Maghreb countries had the 
greatest potential. The Maghreb nations, for their part, were again required only to extend 
“most favored nation” trading status to the European Union. They also received a 
separate dispensation allowing them to export products partly manufactured or processed 
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elsewhere to Europe (Khader 1992, pp. 73-76; Sid Ahmed 1993, p. 772; Habeeb 1993, 
pp. 209-210).  
 
From 1977 to 1987 Maghrebi industrial and agricultural exports to Europe increased, but 
not as much as hoped, due to world recession, the “voluntary” textile quota reductions 
imposed because of a European textile crisis, and the lack of new product development in 
the Maghreb. Agricultural exports were also affected by the Union’s enlargement to 
include Spain and Portugal, a move which rendered the Union nearly self-sufficient in 
most agricultural products and especially those in which the Maghreb is most 
competitive. Quota regimes proved to be quite flexible, with provision for the advance 
use of future quota, the deferment of unused quota, and limited quota transfers between 
different types of goods. Overall, though, the decade saw an erosion of preferential 
treatment for the Maghreb relative to other non-Union countries (Khader 1992, pp. 73-
76; Sid Ahmed 1993, p. 772). 
 
European Union financial aid to the Maghreb (including European Investment Bank 
loans) increased progressively after the 1976 accords, rising from €339 million (1976-81) 
to €489 million (1981-86), €787 million (1986-91), and €1167 million (1991-95). The 
latter aid plan was the first to be approved under the Revised Mediterranean Policy, and it 
shifted the focus from infrastructure and rural development to economic and structural 
reforms, regional cooperation, and the environment. Morocco was the leading recipient 
of aid across the four financial protocols, with an allocation of €1091 million, compared 
to €949 million for Algeria and €742 million for Tunisia. But although financial flows 
increased over the period, the composition of the aid had begun to swing sharply away 
from grants in favor of loans, and overall levels of support still fell far short of needs. The 
aid had also been criticized for often being delivered via European businesses and 
consultancies and thus not encouraging capacity building in the Maghreb. The system of 
financial protocols ended with the Barcelona Declaration and the signing of 
comprehensive association agreements, and was replaced by the first MEDA program 
(1995-99). This program allocated €1248 million (excluding EIB loans) to the Maghreb, 
including €656 million for Morocco and €428 million for Tunisia, but the disbursement 
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rate was only 26% due to procedural and regulatory problems, the slowness of reform in 
the Maghreb countries, and partial accounting of longer-term projects that extended 
beyond the timeframe of MEDA I. A second MEDA program was instituted for the 
period 2000-2004, with an initial allocation of €5.35 billion for all 12 Mediterranean 
partner countries, contingent on a series of reform measures. These included domestic 
market liberalization, infrastructure improvements, small business development, 
improved social services, democratization, and real progress in regional trade and 
cooperation. The Maghreb share of MEDA II funding was €677 million for Morocco, 
€329 million for Tunisia, and €233 million for Algeria. Of the total, €1239 million, some 
€835 million was disbursed (67%). In the period 1995-2004, eight Mediterranean 
countries received €3.25 billion under the MEDA program, whereas eight central and 
eastern European countries received €19.9 billion in preparation for their accession to the 
European Union. Over the same period, net FDI flows to the eight Mediterranean 
countries (excluding the Palestinian territories) rose from approximately $1.4 billion per 
year to approximately $4.4 billion per year, for a total of $29.9 billion, while the central 
and eastern European nations received flows rising from approximately $11 billion per 
year to approximately $19 billion per year, for a total of $152.6 billion. The aid statistics 
quoted here exclude assistance for food, emergencies and non-governmental 
organizations. They also exclude financial aid from individual EU member countries, 
among which France has been the leading donor for the Maghreb (Khader 1992, pp. 81-
85; Pigasse 1995, p. 23; Commission of the European Communities 2001, pp. 18-19; 
Commission Européenne 2001; Council of the European Union 2000; Abis 2005, pp. 8, 
11, 16). 
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European Union Aid to the Maghreb 1976-2004 
(commitments in millions of Euros) 
 
Country 1976-95 P
1
P
 1995-99 P
2
P
 2000-2004 P
2
P
 
Morocco 1091 656 677 
Algeria 949 164 233 
Tunisia 742 428 329 
    
TOTAL 2782 1248 1239 
    P1P including EIB loans  P2P excluding EIB loans 
 
As a result of the 1989 Revised Mediterranean Policy, EU aid has increasingly focused 
on grants or loans for the identification, creation and funding of joint ventures between 
Maghrebi companies and EU member State firms. Allocations for these purposes under 
the EC International Investment Partners scheme focused on agriculture and fisheries, 
manufacturing and construction, and primary processing. This initiative was intended to 
draw European companies and their expertise to the Maghreb, thus stimulating private 
and foreign investment, but results were disappointing: the scheme, which was 
abandoned in 2000, had very limited resources, and a lack of publicity meant that many 
potentially interested firms remained unaware of the program. Other forms of aid have 
included a modest risk-capital fund (Khader 1992, pp. 116-118; Schmidt 1993, pp. 392-
393). 
 
The longstanding nature of preferential trade relations and development assistance 
cooperation between the EU and the Maghreb can be construed as evidence for the path 
dependency element of the expected research findings. The path dependency concept 
suggests that for the Moroccan political elite, existing patterns of trade and cultural 
relations made Western Europe the inevitable partner for trade liberalization; in other 
words, that there was a preference for building on existing successful relationships rather 
than risking a foray into less familiar territory. The progressive erosion of EU trade 
preferences for the Maghreb, due to economic conditions in Europe and the advance of 
multilateral trade liberalization (GATT/WTO), may also have played a role in the 
enthusiasm of Maghreb governments for further bilateral liberalization with the EU. Free 
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trade agreements offering greater access to the Maghreb for European goods may have 
been seen as a means of inducing the European Union to restore and/or surpass previous 
levels of market access and development aid, especially given the accession of Eastern 
European States.  
 
The rise and fall of Maghrebi regionalism 
 
In 1989, the formation of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) signaled the latest in a 
succession of attempts to unify the greater Maghreb (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, 
and Mauritania) based on a common religion, geographic proximity, the Arab-Berber 
population mix, and a great deal of shared history and culture. The UMA was primarily 
intended to promote regional political stability in the face of the Western Sahara conflict 
and emerging fundamentalism, and to promote regional trade, but it was also seen as an 
opportunity to increase the Maghreb’s bargaining power with the EU. This increased 
bargaining power was expected to result from two factors: the ability of the unified 
Maghreb to offer access to a larger market, and the potential threat of using that market 
as an alternative to closer integration with the EU. In terms of the two-level game, the 
latter factor would reduce the cost of no-agreement on closer economic relations with the 
EU for the Maghreb and therefore increase pressure on the EU to make concessions. 
Despite these goals, official trade between the Maghreb countries has remained 
negligible at approximately 3% of total Maghrebi foreign trade, even though the 
macroeconomic policies of the core Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) 
have been converging since the UMA was formed because of IMF and World Bank-
sponsored structural adjustment and donor-funded technical assistance programs. 
Informal or “black market” trade, by contrast, is extensive across the region and is 
indicative of underlying economic complementarities in domestic staples (petrol, fruit, 
vegetables) that are obstructed by official trade policy, but any attempt to integrate 
contraband flows into the formal economy remains highly problematic and eminently 
political. The region’s overall economic fragmentation, which is principally a function of 
the insufficient export complementarity of the Maghrebi economies (especially in 
agriculture) and of trade barriers, has been reinforced by political disputes and by a 
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tendency to be in competition for the same European markets (Khader 1992, pp. 55, 64-
70; Oualalou 1996, pp. 90, 122-123; Ben El Hassan Alaoui 1994, pp. 91-97).  
 
On a political level, the UMA quickly found itself divided by the Sahara dispute, the Gulf 
war, Libyan terrorism and the resulting international sanctions, and the Algerian civil war 
(LaFranchi 1993b, p. 9). These divisions were part of a trend of disunity that had seen the 
Maghreb torn by almost 10 major conflicts over territory and regional hegemony in the 
first 30 years of independence (Ben El Hassan Alaoui 1994, pp. 100-114). In 1992 
Morocco essentially broke with the UMA to pursue bilateral arrangements with the EU, 
but continued to participate in UMA activities (White 1996, p. 117). The Kingdom 
seemed to have made the assessment that as the most open regional economy, it was 
better off negotiating without the others (Vandewalle 1996, pp. 95-97). The failure of the 
UMA and the consequent return to bilateral negotiations deeply disturbed some EU 
officials, who feared a neo-colonialist situation in which a giant regional bloc would deal 
with individual Maghreb countries in an even more unequal power relationship than 
would otherwise have prevailed. The basis of this view was expressed forcefully in a 
1991 European Commission memorandum that described the economic regionalism 
symbolized by the UMA as the “congenital vocation” of the EU, an “inescapable 
prerequisite for genuine development and for a reasonably autonomous development,” 
and the vehicle of a “more balanced and more efficient form of cooperation.” Some EU 
officials, though, believed that the Union could not wait for the UMA to build strength 
and that Morocco was best prepared to take the lead (Camier 1991, p. 1; LaFranchi 
1993b, p. 9). 
 
The inability of the UMA to create a unified regional market, which could have drawn 
greater concessions from the European Union in negotiations or constituted an alternative 
trading bloc in the event of negotiation failure, effectively eliminated the most likely rival 
to European commercial hegemony. With the Maghreb regional option ruled out, and the 
United States and Middle Eastern options viewed as problematic to the extent that they 
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were considered at all, the EU must have seemed the only viable partner for further trade 
liberalization in the short to medium term. The path dependency element of the expected 
research findings is reinforced by these data. 
 
The European Union on the horns of a dilemma: East or South? 
 
Only since 1985 had the European Union moved towards a truly coordinated North 
African policy by creating a special Mediterranean unit for Maghreb affairs and an 
informal Forum for Regional Cooperation in the Mediterranean. Although EU and 
member State aid to the Maghreb had increased dramatically since 1990 in an effort to 
boost economic growth and stem emigration and drug flows to Europe, the Union was 
divided over the conditionality of aid. Britain and Germany in particular have insisted 
that economic and political reforms be implemented before aid is approved, and this was 
part of a wider North-South split within the EU over where to focus financial assistance. 
Northern member States favored Eastern Europe as the primary aid recipient, while 
France and the southern member States favored North Africa (Vandewalle 1996, pp. 104-
105), with each of the member State groupings being motivated by longstanding colonial 
and cultural ties as well as by more immediate strategic interests. This internal division 
extended to the issue of free trade. Germany, whose agricultural products are not similar 
to those of the Maghreb, was favorable to agricultural free trade but reluctant to invest 
heavily in the Mediterranean. The Southern member States, whose agricultural produce is 
very similar to that of the Maghreb, were determined to continue protecting their farmers 
but were open to the idea of stabilizing the southern Mediterranean through major 
investment (of which the cost would fall disproportionately on the northern member 
States). The combination of these diametrically opposed positions resulted in a European 
Union policy based on the lowest common denominator: inadequate aid and agricultural 
protectionism (Kébabdjian 1995b, p. 14). 
 
The Maghreb countries feared that former Eastern-bloc nations, with their better qualified 
yet still cheap workers and relatively well-developed infrastructure, would attract aid 
money and investment at the expense of North Africa. On the other hand, the East 
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European countries also represent vast new potential markets for North African products, 
products which can compete – at least in some sectors. For example, it was the 
unreliability of East European gas supplies that in part led Western Europe, and 
especially Italy, to greatly expand gas imports from Algeria. Other factors were the 
Maghreb’s proximity and economic need, and both considerations can also be seen as 
competitive advantages (Khader 1992, pp. 121-125; LaFranchi 1993d, p. 11). The 
Maghreb had a Gross Domestic Product of $162 billion in 2004 ($84 billion for Algeria, 
$50 billion for Morocco, and $28 billion for Tunisia), and although that figure alone may 
not be enough to attract large-scale foreign investment, particularly given the obstacles to 
trade between the three countries, Europe’s energy needs may bring significant FDI to 
that sector. Promising oil and gas discoveries in Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria are expected 
to further strengthen Europe’s dependence on Maghrebi energy resources (Sid Ahmed 
1993, pp. 766-767; World Bank 2005). 
 
The internal debate within the European Union over how to deliver assistance to the 
Maghreb (financial support or agricultural concessions), and over the balance to be struck 
between the Southern Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, is likely to have influenced the 
perspective of the Moroccan political elite on free trade with the Union. The European 
dilemma suggested that Morocco and other Maghreb and Southern Mediterranean nations 
were players in a geo-political competition for EU resources in which Eastern European 
States preparing for eventual accession had a natural advantage. It also suggested that 
sought-after agricultural concessions would depend on fully mobilizing traditional 
supporters of Morocco within the EU and making full use of any available bargaining 
chips to win over new advocates. Both dynamics appear to favor the closer integration of 
Morocco within the EU in an effort to maximize the country’s share of Union resources, 
be they market access or outright financial transfers. The international relations factor 
may therefore have heavily influenced the Moroccan decision to proceed with the free 
trade and association agreement with the European Union. 
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An ambitious free trade proposal 
 
The reconfiguration of European Union policy towards the Maghreb that eventually 
formed part of the wider “EuroMed” partnership, a mechanism that remained in the 
ascendant for a decade beginning in 1995, had first been initiated in the early 1990s. A 
European Commission paper dated April 1992, The Future of Relations Between the 
Community and the Maghreb, highlighted the Union’s stake in the region by quoting 
from another Commission report (COM[92] 2000, 11 February 1992) issued the same 
year: 
 
“As with Central and Eastern Europe, the Community also has special 
responsibilities in the Mediterranean region because of its historical and 
geographical ties. Most Mediterranean countries are facing political 
instability, rapid population growth, large movements of population and high 
unemployment. These problems, especially in the case of the Maghreb 
countries, are also our problems – such is their influence on the region’s 
security and the potential migratory pressure on the Community” 
(Commission of the European Communities 1992, p. 4). 
 
The authors of the April 1992 paper call for “a new regional policy that makes due 
allowance for this interdependence” and state that a stable environment for the 
Community must include “the Community’s immediate neighbors, from the Baltic to 
Morocco” (Commission of the European Communities 1992, p. 4). They envision a 
special role for the Maghreb within the wider Mediterranean policy, not only to promote 
stability but also to counterbalance the impact of the expansion to the East: 
 
“Beyond the political message involved, this new concept of Euro-Maghreb 
partnership will also have to have a practical impact in all the appropriate 
fields, the ultimate objective being to establish a Euro-Maghreb economic 
area, with all the attendant political, economic, commercial, psychological 
and cultural implications. The need to offer the Maghreb a long term 
relationship is all the more pressing now that a broader, deeper Community 
is in the offing. The danger is that those who are not immediately involved in 
this process will feel left out if a credible and attractive alternative is not 
proposed” (Commission of the European Communities 1992, p. 5). 
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The paper advocates a “twin-track approach” in which agreements are reached separately 
with each of the three States (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) but with the long term goal 
of the economic integration of those three nations with each other and with the 
Community (Commission of the European Communities 1992, p. 12). There is also a 
bold statement on the integration of the Maghreb into the economy of the European 
Community that may be an example of the sort of rhetoric that was to create unrealistic 
expectations: 
 
“Over and above the trade benefits of arrangements of this kind, and the 
implied economic development potential, the Maghreb is to be clearly 
offered the prospect of being anchored to the Community. This prospect 
should be presented with the necessary impetus and credibility so that it can 
act as a catalyst for business and for the population in general, along the 
lines of the role which the prospect of the single market at the end of 1992 
has played since 1985” (Commission of the European Communities 1992, p. 
21). 
 
The comparison of proposed trade liberalization between the Community and the 
Maghreb to the advent of the Single European Market brought a sharp rebuke from the 
Economic and Social Committee of the European Parliament. In an advisory opinion on 
the Commission paper, issued in September 1992, the committee said that the Maghreb 
as it then stood was “not at all comparable to a European Community that had been in 
existence for nearly 30 years” when the Single European Market was scheduled, and that 
any portrayal of economic integration with Europe in that light would “appear to the 
population and to economic operators more as political agitation than as a genuine 
commitment to Euro-Maghreb integration” (Comité Economique et Social du Parlement 
Européen 1992, p. 21). 
 
In October 1994, with Association Agreement negotiations with Morocco already well 
underway, the EU proposed “a broad economic and security plan for North Africa and 
the Middle East that would create a 40-country free trade area of some 800 million 
people by the year 2010”. The plan had been promoted by France, Italy and Spain to 
counter both United States regional involvement and the enthusiasm of northern member 
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States for Eastern Europe. The Union was, in part, reacting to the consistently central and 
highly publicized role of the United States in resolving regional problems, a role that had 
made Europe appear diplomatically weak by comparison. That image hid the reality 
(according to the EU perspective) that US diplomatic solutions usually depended on 
programs and institutions paid for with EU money (Krause 1994, p. 18). Southern 
member States, for their part, were worried that the Union’s heavy focus on Eastern 
Europe could even result in reductions in their own aid flows (Khader 1992, p. 122). 
 
Nevertheless, the new European Union plan for the region was more than just the 
instrument of a power struggle between the EU and the United States, on the one hand, 
and the southern EU member States and their northern counterparts, on the other. It was 
also the result of an inclusive vision of European integration that had been signaled well 
before the first negotiations began. In a 1991 European Commission memorandum, the 
Mediterranean basin was described as “the natural extension of European integration” 
(the phrase is in bold text in the memorandum) and cooperation with the Maghreb is 
“conceived of as a long term undertaking as evidenced by the indefinite validity of the 
agreements” (a reference to the Association Agreements predating the Barcelona 
Declaration) (Camier 1991, p. 13). 
 
On the 27 PthP and 28 PthP of November 1995, representatives of the 15 EU member States met 
with their counterparts from 11 Mediterranean nations – ranging from Israel and Jordan 
in the Middle East to Morocco and Algeria in North Africa – with the aim of 
operationalizing the “EuroMed” partnership. The result was the Barcelona Declaration, 
which included the following key commitments: 
 
 • Regular and strengthened political dialog to enhance peace and security 
 • Democracy and the rule of law 
 • Respect for human rights 
 • No direct or indirect interference by one country in the internal affairs of another 
 • Cooperation in the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime 
 • Support for the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
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 • Accelerated and sustainable socio-economic development 
 • Progressive implementation of a regional free-trade zone, with industrial product 
flows to be liberalized according to a timetable agreed with each country, but with 
the liberalization of services flows and agricultural products to be subordinated to 
the Common Agricultural Policy, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
 • Adoption of rules of origin and certification, the protection of intellectual property, 
and an economic system based on the free market 
 • Economic and business upgrading coupled with development programs aimed at 
the poorest segments of the population 
 • The promotion of technology transfer and the removal of obstacles to national and 
foreign investment 
 • A “substantial increase in EU financial assistance to the partner countries” 
(Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1995, pp. 120-147) 
 
Both Morocco and Tunisia signed comprehensive Association Agreements with the EU 
in the months before and after the Barcelona Declaration. The free trade agreement 
contained in the Moroccan accord, which is very similar to its Tunisian counterpart, 
includes the following key features: 
 
 • Continued duty-free access to EU markets for Moroccan industrial goods, subject 
to a surtax on certain goods produced using agricultural inputs that are cheaper in 
Morocco than in the EU. Morocco may also impose a surtax on the same basis for 
certain products. 
 • Tariffs on capital goods imported from the EU were abolished on March 1 PstP, 2000 
 • Tariffs on raw materials, spare parts, and goods with no local equivalent were 
phased out at a rate of 25% per annum from 2000 to 2003 
 • Tariffs on goods with local equivalents will be reduced by 10% per annum from 
2003 to 2012 
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 • The liberalization schedule can be varied in the case of severe difficulties for a 
given product, but no such variation can extend the life of a tariff beyond the 12-
year implementation period 
 • Morocco can restore or increase tariffs of up to 25% for a period not exceeding five 
years in the case of infant industries or sectors in serious difficulty, but no such 
restoration or increase can extend the life of a tariff beyond the 12-year 
implementation period, nor can such measures cover more than 15% of industrial 
imports from the EU 
 • Reference prices applied by Morocco to textile and clothing imported from the EU 
were to be progressively eliminated from 2000 to 2003 
 • Agricultural products are effectively excluded from liberalization, but variations to 
agricultural access provisions can be considered during periodic review processes 
(European Union and Kingdom of Morocco 1996, pp. 148-200; Upline Securities 2000, 
pp. 14-15)  
 
Algeria did not sign its Association Agreement with the European Union until 22 April 
2002, and did not ratify it until March 2005. The agreement, which took effect on 1 
September 2005, immediately removed import tariffs on 2300 EU products (mostly raw 
materials) and provides for the progressive elimination of tariffs on 1100 finished 
industrial products from 2008 to 2014, and on 2000 other consumer goods over a 10 year 
period (Agence France Presse 2005).  
 
Notwithstanding the decision to move forward with liberalization, many stakeholders 
remained skeptical that free trade by 2012 was realistic. Some who favored free trade 
believed that conditions were not yet right. Algerian Cabinet Minister Mohammed Salah 
Dembri claimed that the average annual income differential between North and South 
was so great – US$ 18,000 versus US$ 700 – as to make free trade difficult if not 
impossible (Pigasse 1995, p. 23). A high-ranking French Foreign Ministry official had 
previously described free trade as “the right direction but still a long way off”, and the 
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Moroccan Textile and Clothing Industry Association president had also made his 
reservations public: 
 
“If Europe proposed a free trade zone for tomorrow, I’d have to say no. It would 
be the elephant confronting the fly” (LaFranchi 1993e, p. 11) 
 
Others were opposed outright to a free trade area that they believed would undermine 
national sovereignty and deepen existing social divisions through further worsening 
poverty, which they said had already been exacerbated by structural adjustment (Euzière 
1995, p. 2). A more moderate view held that, in certain sectors where imperfect market 
conditions prevail, free trade is simply not optimal and strategically planned protectionist 
measures can reap major gains. Such measures might also be appropriate for nascent 
industries (Sid Ahmed 1993, pp. 775-776). 
 
Free trade: the econometric evidence 
 
Kébabdjian’s (1995a) econometric simulation of Tunisia’s economy under a free trade 
agreement with the EU found that the benefits to Tunisia would be highly uncertain. The 
simulation evaluated the effects of free trade for various combinations of tariff removal 
and macroeconomic policy, assuming constant public consumption and the removal of all 
European barriers to agricultural products – an offer that is not on the table and is 
unlikely to be made anytime soon. This is, therefore, a best-case scenario.  
 
If free trade is introduced without any accompanying foreign capital influx, and if the 
government does not increase sales tax in an attempt to compensate for lost tariff 
revenue, then a recessive drop in government spending occurs and the overall growth 
generated by free trade is virtually nil (+0.7% total growth), with public finances 
declining sharply. The overall growth is the result of an expansion in some sectors that is 
nearly offset by a decline in others. If free trade is introduced without a foreign capital 
influx, and if the government raises sales tax in an attempt to compensate for lost tariff 
revenue, then the effect is even more recessive: higher prices depress demand and hence 
government revenue and growth. The overall growth generated by free trade is then 
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negative (–1.2% total growth), and becomes more so as sales tax rises. Thus, although it 
is critical to maintain government revenue and spending levels as free trade is introduced, 
attempts to do so by raising taxes will actually be counterproductive. Instead, the 
government must look to an influx of foreign capital as an indirect source of extra tax 
revenue and a motor of growth (a widening of the tax base was apparently not considered 
in this model). As foreign capital inflows rise (Tunisian Dinar 500 million, TD 1000 
million, TD 1500 million), so does total GDP growth (+7.2%, +13.8%, +19.8%). 
Therefore, an unambiguously positive free trade experience for Tunisia assumes both 
large foreign capital inflows and agricultural free trade. Since the free trade agreements 
signed largely exclude agriculture and do not envisage massive EU aid increases, and 
since large private capital inflows can be neither predicted nor assumed, the direct 
benefits of free trade are highly questionable (Kébabdjian 1995a, pp. 753-754, 763-769). 
Further, it is not clear whether the model accounts for the negative growth impacts of 
Maghrebi business failures caused by direct European competition, as distinct from 
failures caused by the recessive demand impacts of lower government spending or higher 
taxes.  
 
An econometric simulation for Morocco – similar to the Tunisian model just described 
but more rudimentary – showed a moderately positive growth effect (+1.5% total growth) 
for free trade with the EU alone, and a stronger effect (+2.5% total growth) for a 
complete abolition of all protection. The model assumed agricultural free trade, and the 
growth was generated almost solely in the agricultural and phosphate sectors. Most other 
sectors declined due to the end of protection (Kébabdjian 1995a, pp. 753-754, 763-769). 
A study conducted in 1994 found that Moroccan industry could be divided into three 
groups with respect to its ability to withstand free-trade: 40% would be competitive 
(phosphoric acid, fertilizers, paper, footwear, some food products, and electronic 
equipment), 20% would be competitive after upgrading (cloth, clothing, knitwear, and 
leather), and 40% would be severely affected (cereals, fats, milk products, chemicals, and 
others) (Jaidi 1994). It is important to note, with respect to both econometric models cited 
above, that the fiscal impact of free trade would be much smaller in countries with large 
oil incomes, since lost tariff revenue would constitute a much lower proportion of 
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government income (Oualalou 1996, pp. 90-97, 128). It is thus one of the ironies of the 
situation that although Libya and Algeria were in a stronger fiscal position to enter free 
trade, it was Morocco and Tunisia that pioneered the process given the full range of 
factors. 
 
While it is clear that trade liberalization has significant costs, and that the costs generally 
long precede the benefits, it cannot be overemphasized that the studies presented here – 
that project a bleak image of free trade – are static in nature. They estimate the 
mechanical effect on growth of lost tariff revenue and compensatory tax increases or 
spending cuts, and of FDI inflows, as well as the net effect of lower input costs and 
heightened competition from imported finished products on the different economic 
sectors. What they do not show is the dynamic benefits of trade liberalization: a more 
efficient allocation of resources, competition-generated productivity increases, and 
technology transfer, inter alia. Such phenomena are much harder to quantify and model, 
and they evolve over a much longer timeframe than the negative consequences of 
liberalization. 
 
A free trade agreement covering only non-agricultural products represents little direct 
gain for the Maghreb, because European markets were already largely open to the 
region’s industrial goods. Furthermore, the often heavily protected Maghrebi industrial 
markets will be opened to advanced European competition, but the regional economies 
will still be prevented from exploiting their competitive strength in a range of agricultural 
crops (Kébabdjian 1995a, pp. 753-754, 763-769). The main benefits of free trade will be 
indirect: a resource allocation more in line with comparative advantage, competition-
generated productivity increases, and technology transfer. The result is likely to be 
positive in the longer-term, but it is likely to be preceded by a lengthy and painful 
readjustment in the short and medium-term that will involve considerable business failure 
and worsened unemployment and poverty. The potential social and political 
consequences of such an economic shock have profound implications for the regional 
political economy, and they highlight the critical importance of Moroccan government 
economic reforms, of EU aid – in cash and in kind – and of private foreign investment in 
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cushioning the blow. Large-scale inflows have not yet been forthcoming, either as loans 
and grants or in the form of improved agricultural access or FDI. In fact, foreign 
investment in general remains low despite advanced structural adjustment, reasonably 
cheap labor, and improvements in the business environment (LaFranchi 1993e, p. 10; 
Talha 1993, pp. 932-934; Fontagné and Péridy 1997, pp. 83-84). FDI flows are also 
volatile, in the sense of being closely correlated with privatizations and government 
concession tenders, and the investment more often takes the form of equity stakes in 
existing ventures than the creation of new activities generating a significant number of 
jobs. 
 
Within the Maghreb, the Moroccan case became unique – at least temporarily – with the 
signing in 2004 of a free trade agreement with the United States that covers agriculture 
(and services). For Morocco, then, the short to medium term disruption in non-
agricultural sectors caused by the European Union and United States accords will be 
followed by a long term reconfiguration of the agriculture sector, given the agricultural 
provisions of the Morocco/United States agreement. Those provisions will impact only 
after unprecedented, lengthy transition periods ranging from 15 to 25 years for sensitive 
products, and the cereals sector, which accounts for the largest share of agricultural 
employment, will remain protected indefinitely. The lengthy transition could allow 
Morocco to reap some initial benefits from non-agricultural liberalization before facing 
the agricultural challenge, and it also provides a window of opportunity for far-reaching 
agricultural reform, but this advantage depends on bold and decisive action by the 
Moroccan government, in partnership with the private sector and international donors, to 
implement unpopular reforms that successive past administrations have sought to avoid. 
 
One recent study that attempted to measure the initial impact of the EU Association 
Agreements on signatory country exports found that Moroccan exports to the United 
Kingdom and Spain had surged in the period 1991 through 2002, but that exports to most 
other EU countries declined. Tunisian exports to France, Italy, Belgium and Spain 
improved substantially, while exports to Germany receded (Söderling 2005, pp. 12-15). 
However, the improved export performances of both countries with respect to certain EU 
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member States was largely explained by rising textile and clothing sales. Since a large 
proportion of Moroccan textile and clothing exports take place under temporary 
admission customs duty exemptions (imported fabric is promptly re-exported to the 
country of origin after processing), the increase does not much reflect the reduced tariffs 
on EU-sourced inputs that had resulted from the association and free trade agreements 
during the period under study. Perhaps the most significant finding of the Söderling 
analysis is that Morocco and Tunisia are significantly under-exporting to the United 
States compared to their potential (pp. 11-12, 18, 20). 
 
The fact that the Moroccan and other Maghreb governments proceeded with free trade 
agreements with the European Union, despite research and empirical evidence that the 
costs would impact well in advance of the benefits, suggests that elite leadership 
preferences for closer integration with Europe had much greater influence than domestic 
economic and political interests threatened by liberalization. It appears that the respective 
leaderships of the Maghreb countries were either prepared to pay the political price of 
transitional socio-economic damage, or believed themselves to be effectively insulated 
from the political consequences of such damage and therefore accorded them relatively 
little weight in deciding their course of action. 
 
SECURITY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE 
MAGHREB: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY ASPECTS 
 
The fall of communism and economic difficulties in Europe have refocused European 
security concerns on political and financial issues. Although potential military threats 
have not been forgotten, much attention is now focused on the protection of national 
identity and living standards in the face of perceived threats (Vandewalle 1996, pp. 97-
98). The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks have complicated the situation by blurring 
the line between social and political issues such as immigration, on the one hand, and 
military security concerns such as terrorism, on the other. 
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Migration 
 
One perceived threat to European political and economic security is emigration from the 
Maghreb to the European Union countries. Maghrebi immigrants in Europe are often 
perceived both as a political threat to national identity – because of their different 
religious and cultural heritage – and as an economic threat to the employment prospects 
of host country nationals. This fear reaction, often combined with outright racism, has 
been especially strong in France. A 1990 French opinion poll showed that 60% of 
respondents associated Islam with violence and 71% associated it with fanaticism. A few 
months earlier, a controversy over allowing Muslim schoolgirls to wear the hijab 
(Islamic head scarf) had highlighted the gulf between strongly secular conceptions of 
French identity and the population’s growing cultural and religious diversity (Spencer 
1993, pp. 53-54). This sort of racial tension has fueled extremist right-wing movements 
such as the National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen, who shocked France by surviving the 
first round of the 2002 presidential election – a result that is only partly explained by 
severe vote-splitting on the left of the political spectrum. Mr. Le Pen was defeated by 
incumbent President Jacques Chirac (with 82% of the vote) in the second round, but the 
very fact that he had reached that point was symbolic of hardening attitudes. For the 
immigrants, Islam is not only their religion but also an affirmation of their cultural 
identity in a foreign land; yet for many Europeans, it is poorly understood and seems 
distinctly menacing. The latter perception has been reinforced by the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks, the May 2003 Casablanca bombings, and the March 2004 Madrid 
bombings in which a number of Moroccan nationals appear to have been involved. The 
Tunisian Secretary of State for International Cooperation, Salah Hannachi, speaking in 
1993, well before the turbulence of the early 21 PstP century, put it bluntly: 
 
“In Europe, the advancing sentiment is that the Maghreb is a very foreign, even 
hostile world... and that we’re back in the era of war between the cross and the 
crescent” (LaFranchi 1993a, p. 4; 1993f, p. 13). 
 
The rise of anti-immigrant sentiment across Europe had been linked to increasing 
unemployment within immigrant ranks. Known for their hard work and industriousness 
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during past periods of economic growth, Maghrebi immigrants have been hit desperately 
hard by recession and job loss. Immigrants without jobs may seem to have lost their 
social utility in the eyes of host country nationals, and worse, to be in competition with 
them for jobs. Immigrants thus undergo a “social delegitimization” (Khader 1992, pp. 
182-183). French Maghreb specialist Rémy Leveau has questioned whether France has 
any compelling interest in further immigration, and has suggested that the country no 
longer needs immigrants for manual labor, yet French demographers predict a Europe-
wide 30% labor shortfall in exactly that area of work by 2025 (Joffé 1994, p. 35; 
LaFranchi 1993a, p. 4). Nevertheless, European efforts to slow immigration continue, 
and are focusing on the economic development of North Africa as a means of reducing 
the attractiveness of out-migration (Ben Yahia 1991, p. 35). 
 
While immigration may be a matter of both political and economic security for Europe, 
its importance in the Maghreb is more clearly economic. Maghrebi immigrants in Europe 
send money home to their families, and by 1990 these worker remittances had reached 
nearly $2 billion for Morocco alone and approximately $3 billion across the Maghreb. 
Figures for 2004 are $4.1 billion for Morocco and $1.32 billion for Tunisia; the official 
figure for Algeria peaked in 2000 at $151 million, but this amount was thought to 
represent only 5% of actual transfers, which might therefore be estimated at up to $3 
billion (Khader 1992, pp. 112-114; Courbage 1994, p. 75; Pfeifer 1996, p. 63; Office des 
Changes du Royaume du Maroc 2005; International Monetary Fund 2002, p. 34; 
Libération 2002, p. 5; El Moudjahid 2002, Banque Centrale de Tunisie 2005, p. 146).  
 
Immigration has also had an impact on Maghrebi political security. First, it has acted as a 
safety valve by reducing the unemployed population and therefore social conflict and 
political dissent. This role is not to be underestimated, since a large proportion of the 
Maghrebi population is both young and unemployed – a politically volatile combination 
(Vandewalle 1996, p. 106; IC Publications 1995, p. 7). Second, Maghrebi emigrants act 
as non-traditional opinion leaders for those who remain – they raise family consumption 
levels and economic expectations through their remittances, and they often assimilate 
relatively liberal western attitudes toward gender relations, reproduction, and family life 
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that are then popularized by their prestige. Such major shifts in attitudes and expectations 
could fuel political dissent and protest if the government fails to satisfy them (Courbage 
1994, pp. 76-79). Thus, the domestic political impacts of Maghrebi emigration are dual 
and potentially contradictory. 
 
Questions of migration may seem remote from the motivations of Maghreb governments 
and the EU in negotiating free trade agreements, but in fact, the presence of a large 
population of Maghreb expatriates in Europe may have played an important role in the 
decision of both parties to move forward. For the European Union, it may have seemed 
that the prosperity that trade liberalization is supposed to deliver to North Africa could 
reduce migratory pressures and their political and socio-economic consequences for 
member States, while for Maghreb governments, the expatriates represent a significant 
cultural and economic link to Europe that militates in favor of closer ties. 
 
Energy resources 
 
One of the European Union’s economic security interests on its Southern flank is the 
increasing dependence of several member States on North African oil and gas imports – 
especially from Algeria. Italian natural gas dependence on Algeria was estimated at 32% 
in 2004, that of Greece at approximately 30% in 2003, and that of Spain at 57% in 2002 
following the construction of a gas pipeline running from Algeria to Spain via Morocco 
in 1996. The European Union as a whole (EU 15) imported 26% of its natural gas from 
Algeria and Libya in 2001, and that figure could reach 40% by 2020. North Africa 
accounted for 17% of European oil imports in 2001 (split approximately two-to-one 
between Libya and Algeria for the EU 15) and 12.7% of total European oil consumption. 
Libya supplied 12% of Spanish oil imports and 24% of Italian oil imports in 2004. The 
United States is also heavily involved in energy resource exploitation in the region, with 
a number of major oil companies active in Algeria. The Algerian oil and gas sector 
attracted approximately $10 billion of investment in recent years, according to a 
statement in 2002 by Energy and Mines minister Chakib Khelil, allowing the country to 
double gas exports and boost oil production capacity. (Joffé 1994, pp. 22-23; LaFranchi 
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1993d, p. 11; Cohen 1996, p. 1; author’s calculations based on BP 2002, pp. 10, 18, 25, 
28; Elfetouaki 2002, p. 27; U.S. Department of Energy 2005).  
 
A 1996 European Union study predicted that North African gas production would 
increase dramatically, and that despite rising domestic demand generated by population 
growth, the region would “become increasingly important as a supplier of gas to 
Southern Europe through the development of new export capacity” (Directorate General 
for Energy 1996, p. 8). Five years later, an EU green paper on energy supply noted that 
Europe’s increasing demand for imported natural gas “will confirm the need for strong 
political and physical links to North Africa and Russia, and increase the attraction of 
suitable pipeline links to the Middle East and Central Asia” (European Commission 
2001, p. 83). 
 
The Algeria-Morocco-Spain gas pipeline, completed in November 1996, was constructed 
by a Spanish-Algerian joint venture for $850 million and covers 527 kilometers in 
Algeria, 545km in Morocco, 43km in the Strait of Gibraltar, and 156km in Spain. It has a 
capacity of approximately 10 billion cubic meters, with the possibility of extension to 20 
billion cubic meters, and Morocco receives transit royalty payments of between 6% and 
7% of gas value, payable in cash or in kind. The former option has prevailed to date, but 
a combined cycle electricity plant built recently at Tahaddart (Northern Morocco) is 
fueled by gas from the Euro-Maghreb pipeline. The new plant will help alleviate the 
dependence of the Moroccan national grid on expensive coal and on hydroelectric dams 
that are vulnerable to drought. Thus, the gas pipeline has increased not only European 
dependence on the Maghreb, but also Moroccan dependence on Algerian resources 
(Elfetouaki 2002, p. 27; Zerah 1996, p. 29). 
 
The significance and increasing importance of Maghreb oil and gas exports for the 
European Union would clearly have been a factor in the European decision to pursue free 
trade and association agreements with the region as a whole, although it would not have 
constituted a bargaining chip for either Morocco or Tunisia: Morocco has discovered no 
oil to date (although intensive exploration is ongoing) and has little gas, while Tunisia 
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has only limited oil and gas resources used for domestic consumption. Algeria, on the 
other hand, is a major producer and exporter, although there seems to be no evidence that 
it has achieved higher levels of EU development assistance as a result. This may be 
attributable to inadequate progress on economic reform by a government still recovering 
from the crisis of the early and mid 1990s: absent a bold, successful economic reform 
program, Algeria may have been unable to leverage its role as energy supplier to Europe 
in negotiations. Algeria has, of course, been able to accumulate huge foreign exchange 
reserves due to rising oil and gas prices, and is devoting a considerable proportion of 
these funds to infrastructure development initiatives. Further progress on economic 
reform may also enhance the capacity of the government to extract favors from the EU.  
 
Cultural hegemony 
 
Cultural hegemony is a political security issue that has to some extent strained relations 
between the Maghreb and the EU. North Africa is awash in European and Western 
cultural images diffused via television, film, books and cassettes. These images of 
affluence and prosperity are easily accessible to most people, but not so the financial 
resources necessary to make the images a personal reality. An elite that can afford to 
participate in the Western lifestyle shown on television has turned toward Europe, while 
the frustration of the rest has turned into disgust and has fed into a resurgence of 
traditional values and fundamentalist Islam. Increased religious radicalism, in turn, has 
the potential to destabilize regional governments based on more open and secular 
worldviews. While North Africa is saturated in images of Europe, the reverse does not 
hold true. European exposure to Maghrebi culture is weak, and this has allowed negative 
stereotypes to prevail despite the presence in Europe of a large Maghrebi population 
(LaFranchi 1993f, p. 12; 1993g, p. 12). 
 
Military threats 
 
Although military security has been a less pressing concern since the Soviet Union 
collapsed, several regional North African conflicts continue to influence relations with 
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the European Union and its member States. The Moroccan takeover of the Western 
Sahara in 1975 after the Spanish withdrawal, a takeover which occurred despite a World 
Court opinion generally interpreted outside Morocco as having rejected Moroccan 
sovereignty, led to a protracted and costly war with the Algerian-backed Polisario Front. 
The armed conflict waned in the late 1980s as Algeria’s internal problems prevented it 
from maintaining support for the Polisario, but disagreements between the two sides 
continued to stall the planned UN-supervised referendum on the future of the territory. 
Mediation efforts by former US Secretary of State James Baker during 1997 briefly 
appeared to revive prospects of a referendum, but progress on voter identification 
continued to be slow and eventually again stalled. Morocco subsequently offered to grant 
limited autonomy to the Sahara within Moroccan sovereignty, but the proposal was 
rejected by the other parties. The Western Sahara issue remained a live one, however, 
given the major troop deployments in the region and its impact on Maghreb economic 
integration. Even in the event of a definitive end to the Western Sahara conflict, the 
international political standoff might simply be transformed into domestic turbulence as 
large numbers of demobilized soldiers returned to an economy unable to absorb them 
(Joffé 1994, pp. 25-26; Spencer 1993, p. 58). 
 
Two Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla, have also been the cause 
of conflict – in this case diplomatic. Morocco demands the return of the enclaves, but 
Spain refuses, out of a reluctance to concede territory, and perhaps also because Spanish 
army officers, who serve there on a rotating basis, receive special financial benefits for an 
enclave posting. The Spanish armed forces remain influential in Spanish politics and are 
thought to be reluctant to surrender what amounts to a North African sinecure. The local 
population, for its part, is largely unwilling to accept the loss of EU membership and 
related passport and financial benefits that would result from transfer to Morocco. Even 
the late Moroccan King Hassan II found the occupied status of the enclaves useful as a 
nationalist rallying cry, and it has long been suspected that Morocco has agreed not to 
seriously challenge Spain on the issue in return for official Spanish neutrality on the 
Western Sahara and the allocation of development funds to Northern Morocco. There is, 
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however, no direct evidence for this hypothesis (Soudan 1994a, pp. 30-31; Cardenas 
1996, pp. 120-122, 126-131).  
 
Mounting tension between Rabat and the conservative Spanish government of José Maria 
Aznar exploded into a diplomatic crisis on October 27, 2001, with the recall of the 
Moroccan Ambassador to Spain and a reciprocal gesture by Madrid. Although Spain 
complained that Morocco had failed to give the reasons for its decision, it appears that 
relations had been soured by at least five major and longstanding issues of conflict: 
Spanish sympathies for the Polisario movement and Saharan independence, illegal 
immigration, drug trafficking, the non-renewal of the Morocco/EU fisheries agreement, 
and poor Spanish treatment of Moroccan immigrants. The mutual absence of contact at 
the ambassadorial level continued, with neither country prepared to break the stalemate, 
and was then eclipsed in July 2002 by a military confrontation over a tiny uninhabited 
island off the coast of Morocco. A group of Moroccan police officers planted two flags 
on the island of Tourah (also known as Layla to the Moroccans and Perejil to the 
Spanish), which is claimed by Spain despite an apparent lack of evidence for Spanish 
sovereignty. The Moroccan forces were quickly dislodged by an impressive but surreal 
display of Spanish military power, and it required the intervention of the U.S. Secretary 
of State to obtain a Spanish withdrawal and a return to the status quo ante. The initial EU 
support for the Spanish position, which was quickly replaced by a more neutral statement 
after angry protests from France and other member States, appears to have undermined 
the credibility of EU diplomacy in the Maghreb. Morocco and Spain decided to return 
their respective ambassadors to their posts in February 2003, and bilateral relations 
greatly improved after the election of the socialist government of José Luis Rodriguez 
Zapatero in 2004, but the principal issues of contention were still outstanding.   
 
The Algerian conflict, a struggle between Islamic extremists and the military regime that 
canceled the near-certain election victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in 1992, 
took the form of a bloody, low-intensity civil war for much of the 1990s. More than 
150,000 people, many of them civilians, may have been killed during the most intense 
years of this conflict, and for some time, there were real fears that an extremist takeover 
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could destabilize neighboring governments and spark a new wave of emigration to 
Europe (Tempest 1993, p. D3). Algerian terrorist attacks in France and at home, as well 
as the 1994 Islamist hijacking of a French airliner in Algiers, placed real strain on trans-
Mediterranean relations. More recently, a government amnesty convinced many Islamist 
guerillas to surrender, and the number of skirmishes, civilian massacres, and bombings 
has greatly diminished. Nevertheless, sporadic Islamist violence persists, and since 2001 
there has been widespread civil unrest centered on the Berber-dominated Kabylie region, 
where the protest movement seeks greater recognition for Berber culture and better 
treatment from the government and security forces. The Algerian army has also faced 
allegations that it secretly perpetrated many of the civilian massacres blamed on the 
Islamists in order to justify its predominant role in Algerian politics. It denies the 
allegations.  
 
The 1980-87 war between Libya and Chad over the disputed Aouzou strip resulted in 
heavy military support for the Chadian government from both France and the United 
States. After Libya’s military defeat, Morocco and Algeria played a diplomatic role in 
persuading Libya to take the issue to the World Court for resolution, although Libya 
continued its interference in other forms (Joffé 1994, pp. 27-28).  
 
The range of military conflicts outlined, past and present, reflects both transient and 
longstanding difficulties in relations within or between the Maghreb countries or between 
a given Maghreb country and an EU member State. One factor driving the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership of the EU was surely the desire to increase the political and 
economic cohesion of the area and thereby avoid the militarization of political disputes. 
The European Union had its genesis in the post-World War II imperative to prevent any 
recurrence of that catastrophic event, so it is easy to understand European support for the 
structures of economic cooperation and diplomatic collegiality in the Southern 
Mediterranean.  
 
  
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
A Recent History of Relations between Morocco  
and the European Union 
 
 
 
Morocco is the most open of the Maghreb economies, having pursued reform with 
relatively greater enthusiasm. It has worked hard to capitalize on that status by portraying 
itself as “the Mexico of Europe”, and has sought much closer ties to the European Union 
– even going so far as to formally apply for membership in 1987 on the basis of strong 
cultural and trade relations and the progress achieved in economic liberalization and 
democratic reforms. The application was effectively rejected on the grounds that 
Morocco is not geographically a European State, but it had served its purpose of 
highlighting the Kingdom’s status and ambitions (Bahaijoub 1993, pp. 239-240). This 
chapter offers a detailed analysis of the relationship between Morocco and the European 
Union, drawing on a range of American academic studies (including journal articles and 
contributions to edited volumes), the experience of the author, articles from specialized 
non-academic publications such as Jeune Afrique, the Moroccan economic daily 
l’Economiste, and the French publication Le Monde Diplomatique, a background paper 
of the Tunisian-American Chamber of Commerce, and the trade and FDI statistics of the 
Moroccan Foreign Exchange Service. One of the authors cited has a high-profile political 
role: Hicham Ben Abdallah Al Alaoui is a nephew of the late King Hassan II and a 
political analyst whose support for the reform of governance in the Middle East and 
North Africa has often strained his relations with the Moroccan royal family.  
 
Trade flows and foreign investment 
 
The first phase of contemporary Morocco-EU relations lasted from 1969 to 1976, and 
took the form of an association agreement providing for open access to European markets 
for Moroccan industrial goods. This advantage was offset by heavy restrictions on citrus 
fruit and vegetables. The second phase of relations began in 1976 with a cooperation 
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accord that included large-scale technical and financial assistance, commercial treaties, 
and social policies for Moroccan immigrants in Europe. These accords were extended in 
1988 with the exemption of Moroccan agricultural products from the Common 
Agricultural Policy reference price, but agricultural exports were still subject to harsh 
quotas and seasonal limitations. The third phase, one of “partnership”, began emerging in 
the early 1990s. Partnership with the European Union seemed a natural move for 
Morocco, since 60% of its exports went to the Union during the 1980s and 50% of its 
imports originated there. These figures had risen to 73% and 54% by 2004, and in that 
year Morocco’s major EU trading partner was France, with 23% of total foreign trade, 
followed by Spain (14%) and Italy (6%) (White 1996, pp. 111-120; Amrani 1995, p. 25). 
 
MOROCCAN FOREIGN TRADE BY LEADING REGIONS AND COUNTRIES IN 2004 
 
Partner Imports (%) Exports (%) Total Trade (%) 
European Union 15 54.3 73.3 61.0 
Asia 18.2 8.5 14.7 
Americas 10.0 8.3 9.4 
Africa 4.0 4.2 4.1 
Oceania 0.3 0.8 0.4 
Others 13.2 4.9 10.4 
 
Country Imports (%) Exports (%) Total Trade (%) 
France 17.9 33.1 23.3 
Spain 12.0 17.4 14.0 
Italy 6.6 4.7 5.9 
Great Britain 3.3 7.7 4.9 
Germany 6.0 3.1 4.9 
United States 4.1 4.1 4.1 
 
Source: Office des Changes du Royaume du Maroc (web site), Balance Commerciale 2004. 
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TOP 10 MOROCCAN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS IN TRADE WITH THE EU IN 2004 
$1 = DH 8.75 on 20 July 2006 
 
Import Product 
Value 
(million DH) 
 
% 
 
Export Product 
Value 
(million DH) 
 
% 
Fabric 6584 7.8 Clothing 18059 28.5 
Misc Machinery  3749 4.4 Knitwear 7449 11.8 
Chemicals 3222 3.8 Electronic Components 5545 8.8 
Petro-gas, hydrocarbons 2783 3.3 Electrical cabling 3362 5.3 
Plastics 2425 2.9 Shellfish 2041 3.2 
Tourism vehicles 2294 2.7 Phosphoric acid 1867 3.0 
Diesel and fuel oil 2113 2.5 Tinned fish 1730 2.7 
Medicine 1781 2.1 Natur. & chem. fertilizers 1525 2.4 
Paper & cardboard 1695 2.0 Shoes 1409 2.2 
Electrical cabling 1512 1.8 Fish (fresh, smoked…) 1223 1.9 
        
Total Imports from EU 84,843  Total Exports to EU 63271  
        
Source: Office des Changes du Royaume du Maroc (web site), Balance Commerciale 2004.  
 
One of Morocco’s most immediate and pressing needs is to attract private foreign 
investment, both to pursue social development objectives and to prepare the economy for 
free trade with Europe. The following table shows that in investment, as in trade, the 
dominance of the EU member States is remarkable. 
 
 
TOP 5 SOURCES OF FDI IN MOROCC0 
2000-2004 
TOP 5 BENEFICIARY SECTORS OF FDI 
IN MOROCC0 2000-2004 
$1 = DH 8.75 on 20 July 2006 
 
Country 
Value 
(Billion DH) 
 
% 
 
Sector 
Value 
(Billion DH) 
 
% 
France 39.16 52 Telecommunications 29.36 39 
Spain  20.46 27 Industry 24.93 33 
Portugal 2.57 3 Property and Real Estate 6.93 9 
United States 2.29 3 Other Services 3.80 5 
Great Britain 1.83 2 Commerce 3.11 4 
          
Total (all countries) 76.1  Total (all sectors) 76.1  
 
Source: Office des Changes du Royaume du Maroc (web site), Balance Commerciale 2004. 
 
The longstanding European domination of Moroccan trade and investment could not have 
failed to heavily influence the choice of the European Union as the partner for further 
trade liberalization, and it lies behind the path dependency concept advanced to partially 
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explain the course taken by the Moroccan political leadership. The choice of the EU had 
its costs in terms of foregone or delayed trade diversification, but also its advantages: 
Morocco knew its negotiating partner well, and there were relatively many shared 
interests and issues on which to build a negotiating strategy. The Morocco/EU fisheries 
agreement was among them. 
 
 
Human rights, fishing fleets, and the Barcelona Declaration 
 
In 1990, the French author Gilles Perrault published a book, Notre Ami le Roi (Our 
Friend the King), detailing alleged human rights abuses by the Moroccan State. Perrault’s 
allegations drew much publicity, his book was banned in Morocco, and, in 1991, the 
green and socialist bloc in the European Parliament (EP) began to lead criticism of 
Morocco’s human rights record. The EP linked an impending renewal of Morocco’s 
financial aid package to progress on human rights, and King Hassan responded by 
releasing a number of political prisoners. King Juan Carlos of Spain visited Morocco in 
July, and was followed in December by a European Parliament delegation that evaluated 
the human rights situation as satisfactory. Despite this, in January 1992, the EP canceled 
Morocco’s aid, citing human rights violations and inadequate cooperation in organizing 
the UN-sponsored Western Sahara referendum. Morocco responded by renouncing the 
aid package and closing its coastal fishing waters to Europe, with devastating effects on 
the Spanish and Portuguese fleets and up to 100,000 related workers. It also began to 
undermine the European Parliament by appealing to the European Commission, which 
was known to view Morocco’s human rights record as no worse than that of many other 
aid recipients, and by enlisting the support of Southern member States. Those States had 
both an immediate and a long-term reason to support Morocco’s position – they needed 
to put the fishing fleet back to work in the short term, and also to ensure Morocco’s 
longer-term financial stability by restoring aid. The European Parliament ultimately 
reinstated Morocco’s aid package and the fisheries agreement was renewed with 
increased compensation for Morocco (White 1996, pp. 121-125). This episode of extreme 
turbulence in Euro-Moroccan relations is a revealing demonstration of the interaction 
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between political and economic issues that in principle are unrelated but that unfailingly 
become intimately related in times of crisis, when nations seize on any available 
instrument of reprisal. The muffled echo of these crisis-driven interactions can be 
detected in the Euro-Moroccan negotiations for the free trade and association agreement, 
although in that context, it was the prospect of greater or lesser financial aid or market or 
resource access that influenced the parties rather than actual and total withdrawal of aid 
or access.  
 
During 1992, the European Union began seeking a stronger framework for its relations 
with non-member Mediterranean States, a process that eventually led to the Barcelona 
Declaration of 1995 and Association Agreements with the three core Maghreb countries. 
Morocco was the first country to open negotiations for an Association Agreement, with 
the first rounds of talks occurring between May and October 1992. In December of that 
year, the European Commission approved draft negotiation instructions setting out the 
key features of the proposed agreement, and the instructions were subsequently debated 
and approved, in December 1993, by the Council of Ministers. The Moroccan response, 
contained in a February 1994 memorandum, was one of disappointment: the EU proposal 
offered no agricultural concessions, did not cover non-tariff barriers to trade, and offered 
financial assistance that Morocco considered inadequate. Rabat submitted a counter-
proposal that went much further on all counts, and was expecting a point-by-point 
response from Brussels, but the Commission simply stated that it could go no further and 
suggested that any problems could be resolved during negotiations in the first half of 
1994. The attempt by the Commission to secure the opening of negotiations was quickly 
overshadowed by the mid-term review of the 1992-1996 fisheries agreement, during 
which Morocco demanded a reduction of EU fishing activity in its waters and ultimately 
secured a shortening of the accord by one year. From that time onwards, Morocco sought 
to negotiate the proposed Association Agreement before discussing any new fisheries 
accord in the hope of leveraging its marine resources, while the EU insisted that the 
fisheries agreement be dealt with first (Damis 1998, pp. 96-100).   
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July 1994 saw the release of most of Morocco’s political prisoners as part of Hassan II’s 
ongoing efforts to establish the country’s credentials as a democratic society (Soudan 
1994b, pp. 10-11). This, and other signs of greater openness, seemed clearly influenced 
by a desire to strengthen ties to the EU, but the political progress was soon followed by 
an economic setback. In January 1995, a transitional trade agreement between Morocco 
and the EU, which was necessary to ensure compliance with the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), heralded the end of the few European access preferences 
enjoyed by Moroccan agricultural products under the 1976 Cooperation Agreement. 
Moroccan agricultural products became subject to high minimum entry prices, stringent 
quotas equivalent to only about half of potential Moroccan exports, and seasonal 
restrictions. Morocco reacted by formally linking European market access for Moroccan 
agricultural products to European access to Moroccan coastal fishing waters, prompting 
the European Union representative in Morocco, Marc Pierini, to lament that if Union 
member State relations had ever been so badly poisoned by sectoral disputes then the 
construction of Europe would never have progressed as far as it had. Yet Morocco was 
simply using its fisheries leverage in the same way as the European Parliament had used 
its financial leverage to encourage progress on human rights (Amrani 1995, pp. 25-26; 
Damis 1998, pp. 100-102).  
 
The deadlock over the sequence of the Association Agreement and fisheries negotiations 
continued during 1995, as did the impasse over increased Moroccan agricultural exports 
to the EU, a prospect that was severely limited by the terms of the Common Agricultural 
Policy. The failure to renew the fisheries treaty led to the exclusion of the Spanish and 
Portuguese fleets from Moroccan waters beginning on April 30, for the second time in 
recent years. The EU insistence that there would be no Association Agreement before a 
new fisheries accord finally prevailed, and the negotiation of both deals took place from 
September through November. In the fisheries accord, reached in October, Rabat 
obtained harvest reductions of between 34% and 40%, the offloading of 30% of the 
cephalopod catch in Moroccan ports, and a 25% access fee increase. These significant 
gains nevertheless fell well short of Moroccan objectives. In the Association Agreement, 
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finalized in November, the EU made only minor concessions on agricultural products 
compared to the transitional trade agreement approved in January: an 11% increase in the 
tomato quota, an 11% decrease in the tomato minimum entry price, and a few extra 
weeks of market access for tomatoes, clementines, and oranges. However, the agreement 
did lead to a tripling of EU grant aid to Morocco under the new MEDA program, 
although disbursements were severely delayed by red tape in the first years of 
implementation. The Spanish and Portuguese fishing fleets were back in business after 
six months of crisis exacerbated by a Spanish boycott of Moroccan products (Damis 
1998, pp. 102-109; Zniber 1995, pp. 36-37). Four years later, in late 1999, the new 
accord expired and was not renewed despite intense EU pressure. The Spanish and 
Portuguese fleets were then slated for downsizing and restructuring at enormous expense 
to Brussels, although the plan encountered serious difficulties in the implementation 
phase. In 2005, a substantially scaled-down new fisheries agreement was finally signed, 
prompting complaints from the Moroccan industry that no consultation had taken place. 
 
The amount of funding allocated to Moroccan business upgrading under the new 
Association Agreement was destined to disappoint, although European Commission 
External Relations Directorate official Marc Pierini issued a clear warning in this regard 
at a conference held in December 1996. He told participants that the EU was “not Father 
Christmas” and that funding for the private sector was “top-up assistance… Europe wants 
to offer support, but not to provide massive aid” (Mossadaq 1996). 
 
A new diplomatic initiative and a move toward democratization 
 
Immediately after negotiating the association and fisheries accords in 1995, Morocco was 
hit by a public relations disaster. A leaked report on drug production and trafficking in 
Morocco, commissioned by the EU, accused the country of being the world’s biggest 
marijuana exporter, and included a list of alleged top producers and traffickers that 
featured several high-ranking members of the elite. The leak occurred shortly after 
publication of a World Bank report that described corruption as endemic in Moroccan 
governance, and the combined effect of the corruption and drug allegations led to a 
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massive crack-down on smuggling, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration. Large 
numbers of arrests on smuggling and drugs charges followed, including those of the chief 
of the Customs Service and his predecessor, and torture was allegedly used widely to 
extract information. The consequent trials received enormous media attention (Massou 
1996, pp. 44-45). Domestic reaction to the clean-up campaign was mixed, with many 
Moroccans expressing indignation over the Government’s justification of the crack-down 
by the need to develop economic relations between Morocco and Europe. After suffering 
under corruption for so long, it was a bitter pill for many Moroccans to see action taken 
apparently only at the insistence of a foreign power (Ben Abdallah El Alaoui 1996, p. 6). 
Six years later, debate in the Moroccan media suggested that many commentators regard 
the 1996 “clean-up” campaign as a settling of scores between rival business and political 
networks that claimed a considerable number of innocent victims but ultimately failed to 
achieve its objective. 
 
The apparent crack-down on drugs and illegal immigration heralded a renewed Moroccan 
effort to strengthen its relationship with the European Union, using France as its chief 
advocate. In early April 1996, Crown Prince Mohammed represented Morocco at a Paris 
conference on the Moroccan economy that was also attended by royal advisor André 
Azoulay, the Moroccan Ministers of Finance, Agriculture, and Commerce, various 
Moroccan business leaders, and French Prime Minister Alain Juppé. Also present were 
two French Ministers and European Commissioner Emma Bonino, who had represented 
the Union in fisheries negotiations with Morocco. The conference proved to be, in part, a 
vehicle for the expression of Moroccan concerns over the nature of its future relationship 
with the EU. The Crown Prince emphasized publicly that Morocco’s desire for closer 
relations was a matter of choice rather than necessity, and that the relationship would 
have to be one of equality rather than any form of neo-colonialist economic domination. 
Prime Minister Juppé, for his part, reaffirmed the critical importance of continued 
economic, educational and administrative reform to consolidate Morocco’s structural 
adjustment process. He noted that Morocco could not be expected to achieve such a 
transformation alone (Pigasse 1996a, pp. 22-23).  
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One month later, Hassan II himself arrived in France amid unprecedented media attention 
for his second summit with President Jacques Chirac. The summit’s main outcomes were 
an annual heads-of-government meeting between the two countries similar to those 
between EU member States, a concrete plan for France’s “Year of Morocco” in 1999, a 
cooperative effort to improve the Moroccan education system, a FF 1.5 billion 
development loan, a FF 1 billion debt write-off, and FF 1.2 billion in investment over two 
years to expand the formal economy of cannabis-producing Northern Morocco. It is clear 
that, for Morocco, all roads lead to Brussels – via Paris. Morocco needs France to 
advocate its interests within the European Union and to protect Moroccan immigrants, 
while France needs Morocco’s cooperation on drug trafficking, illegal immigration, 
terrorism, and foreign policy initiatives in North Africa and the Middle East (Pigasse 
1996b, pp. 21-24). 
 
In 1997, Morocco held Parliamentary elections that yielded the customary fragmented 
legislature and were rejected as fraudulent by the major opposition parties. Two Socialist 
Party (USFP) candidates who were declared elected in their respective Casablanca 
constituencies immediately resigned, stating publicly that their seats had been won by 
fundamentalist candidates. Nevertheless, the nationalist Istiqlal Party and the USFP, 
along with their coalition partners of the Koutla (a loose and eclectic grouping of 
political allies), subsequently agreed to a request from King Hassan to form a 
“Government of Change” led by USFP Secretary General Abderrahmane Youssoufi. 
Despite the unprecedented nature of the new government, four key Ministers (Interior, 
Justice, Foreign Affairs, and Islamic Affairs) continued to be appointed directly by the 
King, and the Interior Ministry remained in the hands of the widely disliked Driss Basri, 
whose presence had derailed an earlier bid to bring the opposition into government.  
 
In July 1999, after 38 years in power, Hassan II died of heart failure and his eldest son 
acceded to the throne as King Mohammed VI. In a series of highly symbolic decisions, 
the new King released fundamentalist leader Abdeslam Yassine from house arrest, 
allowed the return of exiled dissidents such as extreme left-wing activist Abraham 
Serfaty, and dismissed Interior Minister Basri in October 1999. Three years later, many 
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commentators felt that these early measures had not been followed by the more 
substantive political and economic reforms that they implied, and this perception 
increased the extent to which the Parliamentary elections of September 2002 – heralded 
as free and fair – were seen as a critical test for the democratization process. The 
government, despite real progress in some policy areas, was widely seen as having failed 
to increase the credibility and power of the Executive branch relative to the Palace 
because of its fragmented nature and an alleged lack of political will. A number of major 
reforms – including a new Labor Code and a compulsory health insurance scheme – were 
not achieved, and the operational budget deficit (excluding privatization revenue) 
widened because public sector hiring increased recurrent expenditure while tariff 
reductions under the Morocco/EU free trade agreement diminished recurrent income. The 
use of privatization revenue to finance the deficit drew criticism regarding the 
sustainability of such an approach. 
 
The elections of September 2002 were held under a system of proportional representation 
(a first in Morocco), used a single ballot paper to reduce fraud, and were closely 
monitored by international observers and by the police. The poll, which at the time was 
generally acknowledged to have been mostly free and fair, has since been the subject of 
allegations that the results were “managed” by agreement between the Royal Palace and 
some political parties. Results gave a plurality to the USFP (but with only 50 seats out of 
325), followed by the Istiqlal (48 seats), the Islamists of the PJD (42), and the 
Rassemblement National des Indépendants (41). Newly formed parties with roots in the 
country’s vibrant civil society fared very poorly: Morocco has seen a multiplication of 
non-governmental organizations and community groups in recent years, a development 
regarded as good news for the democratic transition, but attempts by some of those 
associations to enter electoral politics have so far met with failure. After royal 
consultations with the leaders of the major parties and considerable inter-party 
maneuvering aimed at building a viable coalition, King Mohammed VI surprised 
observers by appointing Interior Minister Driss Jettou as Prime Minister. Mr. Jettou is 
widely regarded as honest and efficient, and his private sector background was thought to 
augur well for economic reform, but his status as a royal appointee with no political party 
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affiliation was interpreted by many analysts as a false note in the democratization 
process. 
 
Efforts to fight corruption – when properly conducted – form part of the business 
environment improvements that are essential to attracting the foreign direct investment 
needed for a successful free trade experience. Democratization reforms play an even 
more fundamental role, since a democratic polity in which international agreements face 
a real prospect of defeat at the ratification stage can use domestic political constraints as 
a powerful argument at the negotiating table. In Morocco, initial moves against 
corruption appear to have been substantially driven by external pressure and a desire to 
cement closer relations with Europe, although this may also be a case of a national 
leadership leveraging external pressure, in the form of an international treaty, to justify 
desired reforms for which it may have been reluctant to accept sole responsibility. The 
Moroccan democratization reforms did not begin until after the conclusion of the free 
trade and association agreement with the EU, so Moroccan negotiators were unable to 
use domestic political constraints as a bargaining chip given the absence of a credible 
ratification process.   
 
 
The United States role 
 
The European Union is not alone in having a vested interest in the future of Morocco. 
Morocco was one of the first countries to recognize the independence of the United 
States, and the two nations share over 200 years of friendship. The United States under 
Bill Clinton placed special emphasis on promoting Morocco as a source of stability and 
economic opportunity in North Africa, in large part to counter Algerian fundamentalism. 
In 1994, US Ambassador to Morocco Marc Ginsberg set out the “four-pillar foundation” 
of US policy toward Morocco: promoting the country as a Middle East peace conciliator 
(a role already familiar to Hassan II), promoting trade (including military equipment 
sales) and US private investment, resolving the Western Sahara dispute, and encouraging 
democratization within Morocco (LaFranchi 1994, p. 7).  
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In 1998, a visit to the region by Undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstat resulted in the 
U.S.-North Africa Economic Partnership (USNAEP, also known as the Eizenstat 
Initiative). This plan can be summarized as an attempt to promote trade between the U.S. 
and North Africa on a regional basis through private sector networking. The main goals 
of the partnership are the promotion of Maghreb economic integration with a leading role 
for the private sector, and structural reforms aimed at improving the business 
environment, encouraging privatization, and achieving greater transparency (Belarbi 
2001, p. VI, in a background paper of the Tunisian-American Chamber of Commerce). 
The USNAEP highlighted the stark contrast between the European and American 
approaches to trade promotion: the European Union makes relatively large financial 
commitments in its trade promotion efforts and tends to work with governments, whereas 
the United States offers relatively less funding and seeks out its partners in the business 
world. The (false) impression that the United States provides minimal financial support 
for its trade liberalization pacts is exacerbated by the fact that EU aid is committed in the 
same treaty that includes trade measures (the Association Agreements), while US 
technical assistance is provided separately through the U.S. Agency for International 
Development, the Middle East Partnership Initiative, the Millennium Challenge Account, 
and other mechanisms. The U.S. preference for sector-wide or economy-wide policy 
support, rather than upgrading funds for individual firms (which can be seen as potential 
competitors for U.S. companies), also reduces the public visibility of American aid. The 
USNAEP appears to have made little impact, largely because it requires close regional 
cooperation among countries that have consistently failed to work together, and it may 
thus have fallen victim to its own laudable ambitions for Maghreb unity. Another factor 
may have been the lack of any one coordinating agency in the region with sole 
responsibility for the program.  
 
In 2002, the United States decided to negotiate a free trade agreement with Morocco that 
would, in general terms, be similar to the accord with Jordan that was already in effect. 
The U.S. government has historically preferred relatively “pure” free trade agreements 
that allow only a minimum of exceptions and that cover both agriculture and services, 
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and this clearly sets it apart from the more restrictive EU model. The decision to seek an 
agreement with Morocco indicated clearly that, even in the absence of a unified market in 
the Maghreb, the U.S. sees strategic value in unfettered trade access to a nation at the 
intersection of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The prospect of U.S. firms using 
Morocco as a platform for duty-free access to the European Union, subject to compliance 
with the local value-added requirements of the Morocco/EU free trade agreement, may be 
considered especially attractive, both for the United States and Morocco. The 
Morocco/U.S. free trade agreement was signed in 2004 and implemented on January 1, 
2006. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Morocco made a clear and conscious economic choice in the 1990s to orient itself 
towards Europe rather than towards the more distant Middle East or a Maghrebi trading 
bloc. Given that a clear majority of its trade is with Europe, and virtually none with the 
other Maghreb countries, this may seem an inevitable choice. It is a decision reinforced 
by the presence of a large and economically important Moroccan population in Europe, 
especially France, and by France’s role as Morocco’s primary aid donor and political 
advocate. Morocco (like Tunisia) signed a free trade agreement with the European Union 
that is phasing in from 2000 to 2012, but the deal largely excludes agricultural products 
and services. The econometric evidence suggests that, in terms of direct benefits, any 
agreement excluding agriculture and unaccompanied by massive financial aid should 
have been rejected. However, the indirect and dynamic benefits of free trade – 
competition-generated productivity increases and private foreign direct investment – can 
radically alter the analysis, although both phenomena are difficult to predict. Morocco’s 
economy has been strengthened by economic restructuring, but it is still substantially 
protected and many firms remain ill-prepared for open competition with established 
European industry that is well-adapted to free trade. There is much to be done in the 
areas of bureaucratic streamlining, capital market reform, private sector management 
skills, new product development, and reorientation of existing products toward the 
European (and now the American) market. Morocco is not alone in this process. It is 
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receiving substantial, if inadequate, aid and investment from Europe and elsewhere, and 
the free trade agreement with the United States should accelerate improvements in the 
business environment and could transform Morocco into a trade platform for Europe and 
the United States. Both European and American companies could produce in Morocco to 
take advantage of the local business environment, and could then export to either the 
European Union or the United States tariff-free providing that the relevant rules of origin 
were satisfied.  
 
Morocco as a priority for the European Union is clearly secondary to Eastern Europe, and 
the psychological distance between the Union and both Morocco and the Maghreb has 
increased because of four factors: first, Algerian fundamentalist terrorism in France and 
at home, followed by North African involvement in Al Qaida operations; second, the 
flow of illegal immigrants and anti-immigrant sentiment in Europe; third, continued drug 
flows from the Maghreb to Europe; and fourth, the economically disastrous shutdowns of 
the Spanish and Portuguese fishing fleets forced by Morocco in recent years, as well as 
diplomatic conflict between Morocco and Spain. The combined impact of these factors 
has been to strain relations and make it more difficult for the European Union to translate 
words into action regarding the Maghreb. As Moroccan political scientist Khalid Naciri 
said: 
 
“It may appear that dialogue is going on between the two shores, but it’s often 
two dialogues that fail to meet. We have never talked so much about our relations 
as we have since the two sides began moving apart”. (LaFranchi 1993b, p. 14). 
 
This statement, made in 1993, seems even more relevant today in the aftermath of the 
September 11 PthP attacks and the leading role apparently played by individuals of North 
African origin in later terrorist plots. Nevertheless, although the latent tension between 
Morocco and the EU does constitute an obstacle to the construction of a true partnership, 
it is unlikely to prevent it. The common bonds and mutual interests of the two sides of the 
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Mediterranean are simply too great, and the very real advances in democratization and 
the business environment in Morocco should help consolidate relations.  
 
  
CHAPTER SIX 
 
Identifying the Moroccan Elites 
 
 
 
The Moroccan elite of the early to mid-1990s was a constellation of social groups that 
was as much criticized as it was ill defined. For the average Moroccan, the elite would 
probably have been defined in terms of extreme wealth, a penchant for Western and 
especially West European culture, and a close relationship with the central source of 
protection and patronage: the Royal Palace. The elite would also have been closely 
associated with the names of certain prominent families. The latter phenomenon reflects 
the extent to which wealth was concentrated in the hands of a very limited number of 
families – many of which had been in the ascendant for generations – in a country that 
was otherwise afflicted by widespread deprivation and a high rate of absolute poverty. 
Yet the popular definition of the elite tells us nothing about the differences in origins and 
interests among its members, and for this we must turn to the academic literature.     
 
Ali Benhaddou, in the 1997 sociological study Maroc: Les élites du royaume (based on 
his French doctoral dissertation), identifies three main types of elite: 
  
The business elite. Within the business elite, which is drawn from the great bourgeois 
families, status is determined by lineage rather than educational qualifications, the 
substantive involvement of non-family members is rejected, and the main goal is the 
acquisition of existing profitable markets rather than the development of new markets or 
the expansion of existing ones (which would require substantial investment and, 
therefore, risk). The business elite is thus generally characterized by a closed, family-
based structure and a rentier mentality. Two company directors quoted by Benhaddou (p. 
57) highlight the process by which each new generation replaces the last: 
 
“I began my professional career in my father’s business. At 20, I was put in 
charge of purchasing, then external finance. Ten years later, I founded a new 
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company in the chemical products sector with my brother and brother-in-
law”. 
 
 
“I come from a wealthy family. My grandfather was a fabric merchant, and 
my father plied the same trade in his youth before buying a textile company. 
Now I run the company with my brothers and cousins”. 
 
Benhaddou’s survey of 131 top managers drawn from the business elite found that 61 had 
the equivalent of a U.S. community college degree (two years of study after the 
university entrance qualification or baccalauréat), 30 held only the baccalauréat, and 40 
had never entered the modern education system at all (although some may have attended 
religious schools). Most of those with some level of education held positions that were 
unrelated to their studies. One 45-year-old company director, who had inherited his 
industrial group, told Benhaddou that he was a graduate of the “school of practical 
experience” and that formal qualifications would have added no value to his commercial 
activities (p. 56). 
 
Another characteristic of the business elite is an insistence on family control and an 
aversion to any external participation in the capital, even when such collaboration would 
clearly be very lucrative. The primary goal of the company is to preserve family wealth 
and collect the returns on family assets, rather than to increase profits through an 
expansion that would require outside investment and thus undermine family control. At 
best, a company may seek external technical assistance in return for a salary rather than 
partial ownership. The CEO of one electrical equipment company explained that school 
had never interested him, but that making money, which did interest him, required ideas. 
He therefore started his business (using family funds) in partnership with two associates, 
a Frenchman and a Spaniard, who added their commercial vision to the Moroccan’s 
capital (pp. 58-60). Benhaddou’s description of Moroccan entrepreneurial timidity is 
lucid: 
 
“Only yesterday, they were fabric wholesalers, craftspeople or civil servants. 
Today, they have become entrepreneurs after noticing various flourishing 
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examples of success and imitating them, but they copy their western 
counterparts without sharing their entrepreneurial spirit… It is generally the 
success of competitors that forces them to act, rather than the spirit of 
capitalism…” (pp. 58-59) 
 
The experience of the author confirms this finding of Benhaddou. The risk aversion that 
permeates the Moroccan economy is plain to see: cafés and public telephone centers have 
sprung up like mushrooms in recent years as capital owners have sought to imitate the 
success of others, often without undertaking basic market research that would have 
highlighted concerns such as market saturation or the local appeal of an imported 
concept. The result is often failure. It would appear that innovation is avoided because it 
involves risk, yet the poorly researched duplication of observed success often proves 
riskier still. At the same time, a genuinely entrepreneurial class of businesspeople has 
been slowly emerging and, although still in the minority, represents an important model 
of alternative behavior. 
 
According to Benhaddou, one of the means by which the business elite attempts to 
preserve its interests is the creation of professional associations, and, since each 
association generally corresponds to a network of family interests, there may be multiple 
associations representing the same overall industry. Benhaddou noted that in the early 
1990s, tinned food producers were represented by as many associations as there were 
products on the market (pickles, capers, olives, etc.) and that there were no less than three 
associations representing soap manufacturers: hard soap, soft soap, and toilet soap. Any 
given president of such an association was often related to numerous counterparts by 
blood or marriage (pp. 62-64).  
 
The business elite is also identified as a category by Saïd Tangeaoui in the key 1993 
sociological study Les entrepreneurs marocains : pouvoir, société et modernité (based on 
his doctoral dissertation). For Tangeaoui, the business elite bases its strategy on five 
types of capital: know-how, income from a business activity, rent derived from land or 
property holdings, political or administrative power, and educational qualifications. The 
business elite is weakened by the rivalry between its two main components, the Soussis 
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(the inhabitants of southern Morocco) and the Fassis (families that are originally from the 
city of Fès), and it is also split between a handful of family-based business empires and a 
vast mass of small and medium-sized firms. Tangeaoui finds a similar disunity amongst 
other elite groups. As a result, lobbying efforts are fragmented and tend to focus on 
relatively narrow interests, with the government or King often called upon to resolve 
disputes that might have been avoided in a more collegial environment. This culture of 
arbitration, encouraged by the dependence on a central source of patronage, extends to 
the response of some large industries to the prospect of increased foreign competition, 
which is often to seek protectionist measures from the government. As Tangeaoui puts it, 
companies faced with greater competition often seek not an economic response 
(modernization and improved quality) but a political response (protection by the 
State)(Tangeaoui 1993, pp. 34, 205, 265-268). Such behavior appears to echo the dual 
relationship that prevailed between the early merchants and the Sultans of Morocco: on 
the one hand, the merchants were dependent on the central authority for the protection of 
their assets against pillaging tribes, and on the other hand, they cooperated with the State 
by undertaking diplomatic missions and managing public finances (pp. 130-131).  
 
The technocratic elite. As defined by Benhaddou, the “technocratic” elite is also drawn 
from the great bourgeois families but has built its influence in the public service and the 
Royal Palace over the generations. Members pass from the elite French schools of public 
administration to the senior civil service and on to the directorships of major private and 
public companies. The key to entering the cycle, above and beyond family origins, is a 
prestigious degree or other type of diploma. The survey data indicate that 44% of the 
technocrats hold qualifications in such fields as civil engineering, mining, or atomic 
engineering, while 36% are graduates of the IEP or the HEC (elite private tertiary 
institutions), and 20% attended the schools of medicine or agricultural engineering. Fully 
89% of the CEOs of major Moroccan companies were hired directly from the senior civil 
service, and 25% of them were Cabinet Ministers, Ministerial Chiefs of Staff, 
ambassadors, provincial governors, or highly-ranked military officers before entering the 
private sector (pp. 71-73). They have a tendency to prefer control to change and 
innovation (p. 79). 
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Benhaddou finds that individual career promotions within the technocratic elite are 
decided at the highest levels, and that what he calls the “diploma aristocrats” seek to 
protect their interests using much the same techniques as the business elite. The latter 
operates as a series of family clans with patriarchal succession, while the former is based 
on a caste system within the civil service and major public and private businesses with 
succession by cooption (p. 76). Yet the similarities between the two groups do not result 
in cooperation between them: 
 
“Like two parallel lines, they lead a completely separate existence. None of 
them engage in the slightest professional cooperation, exchange of economic 
information, or collective action… Confined to their respective 
organizations, they refuse to communicate, not on principle but out of the 
arrogance of power… Because of their different mentalities and 
contradictory interests, they do not constitute a ruling class but rather 
confederations of dominant families”. (pp. 76-77).    
 
For Saïd Tangeaoui, the “techno-bureaucratic bourgeoisie” has arisen from the network 
of patronage and alliances created by the authorities to reinforce the State. Members of 
this group build their influence and contacts in the senior civil service before moving into 
the private sector, where they focus on making money but still regard the State as their 
guarantor and the driving force of economic modernization and management (Tangeaoui 
1993, pp. 269-270).  
 
The political elite. The political elite receives much less attention from Benhaddou than 
the other two groups and it is not a central focus of his study. The politicians have 
effectively been confined to the legislature (which has little power) by the business and 
technocratic elites, which battle each other for the key positions (appointed by the senior 
civil service or the King) to the near-total exclusion of political leaders. The few political 
leaders to reach top civil service positions have generally belonged to conservative 
parties such as the Rassemblement National des Indépendants (RNI) and the Istiqlal, and 
are better known for their family pedigree than for their political affiliation (pp. 80-81). 
Tessler (1982, pp. 63, 67), an American university professor specialized in the region, 
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confirms that political party roles and affiliations are secondary in determining the 
influence of a given politician, although they do structure a considerable amount of elite 
interaction. He finds that political competition within the elite is “one of style rather than 
substance, pertaining to the pursuit of personal gain and not to the accomplishment of a 
political program.”  In the 2002 general elections, a new political party created by former 
Employers Federation President Abderrahim Lahjouji won only two of the 325 
Parliamentary seats, and Lahjouji himself was not elected. Lahjouji’s party was often 
identified with business interests, whether rightly or wrongly, and its poor result 
illustrates the difficulty faced by such interests when they attempt to enter the realm of 
electoral politics as a distinct group in the face of entrenched established parties. 
 
According to Benhaddou, the technocrats have been in the ascendant for the last two 
decades due to the marginalization of the political parties and the failure of the business 
elite to fulfill its capitalist vocation (pp. 116-117).  
 
The origins of the two principal elites can be traced back to several historical and 
hereditary social structures, each of which is considered to possess qualities allowing it to 
play a specific and prestigious social role that confers legitimacy: 
 
1. The chorfa, the descendants of the Prophet Mohammed, who are revered for their 
status and whose direct role of faith healing and blessing is supplemented by an 
indirect political role: the promotion of certain elite individuals or families through 
marriage. Historically, the chorfa were exempt from all taxes and benefited from 
various favors of the State in addition to gifts from the general public. The current 
Alaoui royal dynasty is among the chorfa, a fact that lends great credibility to the 
King’s religious role as Commander of the Faithful (Benhaddou 1997, pp. 17-23). 
Tangeaoui points out that the chorfa, in addition to their spiritual and political roles, 
also own vast tracts of agricultural land and hold sway over a large rural workforce 
(Tangeaoui 1993, pp. 228-229).  
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2. The oulema, the highly trained religious scholars who have emerged as guarantors of 
political and cultural traditionalism and who fill many key posts in the universities and 
the government. It is they who formally proclaim the enthronement of each new King, 
who is both a political and religious leader (Benhaddou 1997, pp. 17-23). 
 
3. The merchants, whose power derives from money and the religious legitimation of 
their economic role. The merchants were historically crucial to the spread of Islam 
because of their contribution to economic growth, which acted as both a beacon of 
success in the eyes of potential converts and a source of funding for wars of 
expansion. Among the sayings of the Prophet Mohammed is this: “the trustworthy 
merchant will be seated in the shadow of the throne of God on the Day of Judgment” 
(Benhaddou 1997, pp. 17-23). 
 
Among 285 leading figures in the fields of administration, politics, economics, and 
management surveyed by Benhaddou in 1990, 53% were of merchant origin and 47% 
were of chorfa or oulema origin (p. 26). One of the key techniques guaranteeing the 
preservation of these lineages was that of intermarriage: among 339 men aged from 30 to 
70 and drawn from the 50 richest families, 17% had married cousins, 69% had married 
within their extended families, and only 15% (mainly those of chorfa origin) had married 
outside their entourage (the partner was a Frenchwoman in half the cases) (p. 28). The 
importance of intermarriage could not be better exemplified than by the following 
statement of a 73 year old entrepreneur: 
 
“I married my first cousin. My eldest son married his paternal cousin and 
my youngest daughter married her first cousin. As the head of the family and 
director of a group of family companies, I decide the focus of their studies 
and their choice of husband or wife. Their education and their marriage 
must contribute to the economic development objectives of our businesses... I 
cannot imagine that any of my daughters would marry beneath our social 
status…” (p. 29). 
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In a stinging rebuke to the mentality of the various elites, Benhaddou surveys their world 
view: 
 
“The men of faith, of administration, and of commerce consider themselves 
destined to play an extraordinary role. Convinced that they have been 
anointed by God, they present themselves as the inventors of the nation and 
the defenders of the faith, of capital, and of civilization. They confuse the 
genealogical history of their families with that of the country, and they 
identify themselves with history and power. They assimilate themselves with 
the State and take on its dignity and authority. Genealogical identity… 
serves as a point of reference for the achievements of the older generations… 
and heralds the qualities of the younger generations, who, because of their 
family origins, rise to the most senior positions without being required to 
prove themselves. The forms taken by this deference to paternalist authority 
range from complete submission, almost a domesticity, through to a vague 
respect and acknowledgement of credibility… it produces men who are 
bereft of all independent judgment and are therefore incapable of influencing 
their own destiny. That destiny is already written.” (pp. 24-25).  
 
In another study of Moroccan elites, Maroc : L’espérance d’Etat moderne, the political 
scientist Abdallah Saaf (who is also a center-left politician and former Education 
Minister) reports the existence of three clearly distinguishable groups within the State 
bureaucracy: civil servants of aristocratic origin, those of merchant origin, and the 
military. He traces most of the aristocratic bureaucrats to the great Andalusian families 
that settled in Morocco in the 14PthP century, and suggests that the merchant classes were 
absorbed into the civil service to fulfill a need for expertise in commerce with the 
European nations. The latter group is credited with a leading contribution to the 
rationalization of the tax system, the customs service, and the army. The bureaucrats 
drawn from the military have held key positions within the royal palace since the pre-
colonial period and have often served as intermediaries between the King and the various 
factions of the elite (Saaf 1999, pp. 28-29). Just as Benhaddou describes a Moroccan elite 
riven by conflict, Saaf finds that the civil service is marked by struggle between the 
groups he identifies, and by alliances through marriage and affiliation with religious 
orders (pp. 36-37). 
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Although Benhaddou apparently sees little sign of renewal within an elite “stricken by 
authoritarianism, favoritism, and corruption” (Benhaddou 1997, p. 222), Abdallah Saaf is 
more optimistic. He sees a decline in “neo-patrimonialism,” a system of authoritarianism 
based on strong personal relationships and weak formal institutions that is destined to 
preserve a ruling elite and in which the leader plays one faction off against another to 
maintain his position. For Saaf, neo-patrimonialism in the Moroccan context is “a 
projection of the family and of patriarchal authority on to the organization of the State 
and the method of government… with the addition of religious legitimation” (Saaf 1999, 
pp. 129-130). He cites growing evidence that the phenomenon is being eroded by strong 
tendencies toward institutionalization, the expansion of judicial power, and 
recentralization. Although large parts of the ruling elite still see themselves as the 
exclusive repository of statesmanship and regard that role as hereditary, the need to 
respond to population growth, increasingly complex social structures, and greater 
professionalism in administrative tasks has reduced the number of officials drawn from 
the great families and led to the rise of younger and more technically skilled managers as 
well as an increase in bureaucratic autonomy (pp. 142-144). Saaf believes that despite 
continuing neo-patrimonial characteristics such as a dominant monarchy and various 
failures to respect democratic institutions since independence, it is “difficult to accept 
that the dominant aspect (of the system) today is non-institutional,” and he points to the 
spread of modern institutions and procedures as well as to the central political importance 
of democratization. The increasing use of the legal system by the public and the 
reduction of discretionary police powers are cited as notable examples. In this mixed and 
evolving environment, the legislator is depicted as a sort of home handyman who brings a 
range of vital improvements to a nation born of neo-patrimonialism (pp. 147-150). 
 
The same move away from neo-patrimonialism is found in the economic realm. Saaf 
identifies three phases in the economic history of post-independence Morocco: in the 
first, the merchants move into industry and then agriculture, while the farmers begin to 
invest in real estate; in the second, professionals such as lawyers and accountants spurn 
the civil service in favor of the private sector. They take advantage of their growing 
wealth and tertiary education to become part-time agricultural entrepreneurs and develop 
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lucrative new market segments such as kiwifruit and roses (one such segment resulted 
from a prohibition on banana imports). In the third phase, young graduates of the 
prestigious engineering schools, who have neither capital nor much commercial 
experience, target sectors (such as information technology) that are out of reach for the 
traditional industrialists and part-time entrepreneurs (pp. 169-171). 
 
“A large part of economic activity now appears to have escaped neo-
patrimonial power. The constraints of the system, its arbitrary and irrational 
aspects, and the obstacles to an authentic market economy that it generates, 
are increasingly unacceptable” (p. 169). 
      
Tangeaoui appears to agree with Saaf’s contention that neo-patrimonialism within the 
public service is meeting with increasing opposition. He identifies two distinct groups 
within the civil service, one rational and modern in its outlook, and the other based on 
highly coded symbolism rooted in personal and family relationships. According to 
Tangeaoui, an increasing number of senior managers are leaving the public sector in a 
quest for greater autonomy and the pursuit of new ideas based in economic rationality. 
Nevertheless, the existence of the two identified worldviews (in both the public and 
private spheres) should not be taken to mean that there is no intermingling of the 
practices in which they result; in fact, very often, both “rational” and patrimonial 
considerations are in play simultaneously, and apparently rational (merit-based) 
processes may hide latent patrimonialism (Tangeaoui 1993, pp. 178-184). Overall, the 
rational approach does appear to be gaining ground, in large part due to the rise of a 
younger generation of public servants and entrepreneurs who are focused on managerial 
and technical skills in addition to the personal relationships so important to their elders. 
This younger generation is distancing itself from the traditional structures and practices 
without breaking away from them altogether, because their influence remains 
considerable (pp. 52-53, 67-69, 88-89). 
 
One of the most striking recent illustrations of the tension between the neo-patrimonial 
world view and its opponents was the anti-contraband campaign of late 1995 and early 
1996, which, according to Ignace Dalle (a former French Press Agency chief in Rabat 
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and prolific researcher on Morocco), was marred by widespread abuses of power, 
arbitrary arrests, and the jailing of innocents alongside the guilty (Dalle 2001, pp. 160-
166). The campaign, which ultimately had to be abandoned after fear paralyzed economic 
activity, is described here by the Employers Federation (CGEM) Director Mouhcine 
Ayouche: 
 
“It began as an entirely political operation run by the Customs Department, 
which rightly believed that there was too much smuggling and illegal activity 
going on. Ali Amor, the Director of the Customs Department, would have 
compromised, but Interior Minister Basri got involved and everything 
changed. What he was basically trying to say was: ‘not just anyone can get 
involved in smuggling’. It was also a political message from the makhzen 
(the central authorities that monitor and constrain the elites) to the 
businesses, which wanted more freedom and were demanding more 
democracy and the rule of law. They had to be put in their place. In 
Morocco, nearly all the rich became wealthy in the recent past and they owe 
their success to the makhzen.” (p. 165)  
 
At the summit of the Moroccan elite structure, and of the makhzen, sits the King. The 
monarch acts as the guarantor of the political order on the basis of his religious 
legitimacy, his ability to confer patronage, and his coercive powers (Tessler 1982, p. 67), 
the latter generally wielded through the powerful Interior Ministry. The central role 
played by the monarchy in creating and maintaining the patrimonial structure of the elites 
is lucidly portrayed by Guy Sorman (a French international affairs analyst) in his recent 
work Les Enfants de Rifaa : musulmans et modernes. Sorman seeks to demonstrate that 
the under-development of most Muslim countries results not from the presence of Islam 
but from the system of government practiced. Malaysia is taken as an example of 
economic success by a Muslim nation, while Morocco is presented as a case in which 
economic stagnation results not from Islam but from a semi-feudal system of 
government. 
 
“The primary reason for the stagnation of Morocco is its feudal structure; 
this ever-strengthening feudalism centered on the monarchy is enough to 
neutralize the social, economic and cultural forces of development. In a 
feudal system, the monarch does not allow competition from other centers of 
power, much less from autonomous groups, and prefers a set of dependents 
 
 81
to a national middle class. This constellation of dependents is characterized 
more by its devotion to the palace than by its economic efficiency.  
 So it was that the King confiscated the colonial lands after 
independence, either for the Crown itself or for redistribution to its clients. It 
was immediately obvious that the main source of wealth in the new Morocco 
would be proximity to the palace and loyalty to the Royal Court, not 
innovation. In the 1960s, this nationalization of the economy could have 
appeared justified, because it was the dominant ideology of the time, 
especially in France: the State was seen as more rational than the market. 
But even after the passing of the fashion, nationalization was strengthened 
by the “Moroccanization” of the economy, which took place in 1973. In the 
name of national sovereignty and productivity, the King forced the last 
remaining foreign investors and the Moroccan Jews out of the economy, and 
this cosmopolitan elite was replaced by the royal family and its network of 
dependents.  
 Senior civil servants and Cabinet Ministers took over the nationalized 
companies in the same way as the Soviet nomenklatura ‘privatized’ State-
owned enterprises in the 1990s. Morocco lost a large part of its 
entrepreneurs in the process – an economic catastrophe for the Kingdom – 
and, since then, a courtesan bourgeoisie has controlled the economy, quickly 
excluding any new local entrepreneur who might undermine its monopoly… 
To reinforce its authority, the monarchy has replaced market dynamics with 
a system of special favors…” (Sorman 2003, pp. 116-118) 
 
 “Corruption is not an accidental phenomenon but a regulating factor within 
the system. Since the enforcement of the law depends on the identity of the 
person to whom it is applied, corruption is an indispensable tactic for 
survival in an environment of subjective rules; without corruption, no project 
big or small would come to fruition. Only the powerful and the captains of 
the courtesan economy can avoid it, since their influence is sufficient to bend 
the rules without paying”. (Sorman 2003, p. 121) 
 
The accession of Mohammed VI in 1999 has given the political role of the monarchy a 
decidedly more democratic and reformist cast, and the replacement of provincial 
governors and an Interior Minister with backgrounds in security and surveillance (a 
control function) by businessmen and technocrats dedicated to economic development (a 
growth function) is highly significant. Political obstacles to entry to the business world 
seem to have lessened at the margins, although significant projects may still encounter 
the pressures described by Sorman. The strengthening of women’s rights through the 
promulgation of a revised Personal Status Code is another symbol of greater openness 
and equity. Nevertheless, the King remains the cornerstone of the elite structure 
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described above, and the apparent desire of Mohammed VI to reduce patrimonial elitism 
in favor of a merit-based approach has placed him under intense pressure from more 
conservative forces. Those same forces are also necessarily in conflict with the broader 
societal drift away from patrimonialism identified by Abdallah Saaf, although the extent 
of their capacity to obstruct the phenomenon remains unclear. 
 
As discussed in the introduction, Ronald Rogowski, in his 1989 work Commerce and 
Coalitions, demonstrated the impact of comparative advantage on the political reactions 
to free trade in a given economy. Basing his analysis on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, 
which found that trade liberalization benefits the owners of abundant factors of 
production and harms the owners of scarce factors, Rogowski profiles the possible factor 
allocations in a given economy and the consequent political reaction to liberalization. His 
treatment of the Moroccan case – abundant land and labor but relatively scarce capital – 
is as follows: 
 
“In a capital-poor economy with abundant land and labor, change in exposure to 
trade… mobilizes a coalition of red and green… Expanding trade… benefits 
farmers and workers but harms capitalists; and the mass coalition – or, where 
agriculture is dominated by a few large landowners, a coalition of gentry and 
labor – pursues a wider franchise, free trade, and a general disempowerment of 
capital.” (1989, p. 15). 
 
The elite categories outlined in this chapter can be linked to Rogowski’s approach based 
on land, labor and capital. The larger-scale farmers, who have access to dam irrigation 
water and thus the ability to grow export crops, could be seen as part of the business elite, 
while the smaller farmers (mostly subsistence) would not figure in any elite group. Trade 
union leaders would be part of the political elite, while the rank and file workers would 
fall outside of the elite structure. The larger capitalists would be in the business and/or 
technocratic elite, the mid-sized capitalists (who would be characterized as small by U.S. 
standards) would be in the mid-level of the business elite, and the small businesspeople 
would be out of the picture. 
 
 
  
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Testimony from Key Stakeholders in Negotiations for the 
Morocco/EU Association and Free Trade Agreement of 1995 
 
 
One of the most striking phenomena to emerge from this research is the very small 
number of key players in the Morocco/European Union trade negotiations on either side 
of the Mediterranean. For Morocco, only four or five government officials can be 
considered to have been influential across the full range of issues, drawn essentially from 
the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Ministries and from the Royal Palace. For the 
European Union, a similar number of European Commission officials wielded equivalent 
influence, and only three member States appear to have been closely and consistently 
involved in the process: France, Spain, and Italy. On both sides, of course, a much larger 
number of public and private sector officials were influential with respect to various 
subsets of the issues under negotiation, but the top-level drivers of the process were very 
few. 
 
The meaning of free trade 
 
Asked to define the meaning of free trade, Moroccan respondents spoke of two main 
themes: a motor of economic reform and integration, and a strengthening of the historic 
relations between Morocco and the European Union. One Moroccan government official 
described the free trade provisions of the Association Agreement as a new phase of a 
process that had already been ongoing for 30 years and that was expected to result in 
increased integration between the two partners across the board: 
 
“I have always considered the progress that we have been making… as a 
sort of transition to something larger and more institutional and more 
balanced. I personally don’t believe that the objective of this process is 
purely mercantile – it wouldn’t make sense – because I’m certain that if we 
were limited to a hard and fast commercial logic of free trade, it wouldn’t be 
Morocco that would gain substantially, it would be the European Union. And 
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I would say the same of any FTA that did not also have political, strategic, 
institutional, cultural and human objectives.” 
 
Another Moroccan government official echoed these sentiments, regretting the limitation 
of the agreement to industrial products due to the unwillingness of the EU to make 
agricultural concessions, and emphasizing that the accord is not an end in and of itself, 
but rather “an initial instrument of economic integration with the European Union that… 
must evolve into a wider integration… including economic relations with other partners.” 
A third Moroccan government official traced the origins of the FTA to the structural 
adjustment program begun in 1983 and cast it as the result of a sovereign decision by 
Morocco to profoundly restructure its economy: 
 
“The form of trade that we had at the time with the European Community… 
was based on the unilateral granting of preferences by Europe. We wanted to 
change from an inward-looking strategy to an outward-looking strategy, we 
knew that the charitable approach of unilateral preferences achieves 
nothing. It doesn’t confer negotiating power relative to the European 
Union.” 
 
A colleague from another Ministry saw the trade liberalization provisions as a way to 
introduce competition and so encourage protected and complacent industries to invest 
and raise product quality. A more skeptical view was adopted by another Moroccan 
government official, who felt that free trade was a misnomer, that trade barriers 
continued to exist and always would, and that the free trade provisions of the Association 
Agreement were simply “an agreement on economic and financial relations, full stop.” 
The Moroccan private sector representatives interviewed saw the FTA as a path to 
greater economic integration between the two partners that would be achieved through a 
process of economic and business upgrading. 
 
The European Union officials interviewed, like their Moroccan counterparts, saw the 
Association Agreements and the FTA component of the Moroccan agreement as a means 
of encouraging reform in the Moroccan economy as well as greater integration between 
the Moroccan and European economies and strengthened political and cultural ties across 
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the Mediterranean. Yet they also saw them as a tool of greater integration between the 
Moroccan and other Southern Mediterranean economies, and as a reaffirmation of the 
place of the Maghreb and the Southern Mediterranean in the European vision as the 
Union expanded to the East. Rivalries between EU member States with interests in the 
region also played a significant role. 
 
One EU official characterized the FTA as an element of the Association Agreements that 
was essential to the credibility and impact of the political provisions of the accords, 
which aimed to create a vast zone of stability and well-being in the Mediterranean, 
including a free trade zone, by 2010. One means to this end was greater economic and 
commercial integration among the Southern Mediterranean countries: 
 
“Given that the Southern Mediterranean countries don’t trade amongst 
themselves… it was very difficult to do a regional deal like Mercosur. So we 
decided that it was better to sign nearly identical North/South agreements 
with each country… and this would lead to integration through provisions 
such as cumulative rules of origin: we were going to promote the integration 
of the South by accepting products that were produced in one country and 
processed in another. Without North/South investment and South/South 
industrial cooperation, it’s no use providing openings for trade, there won’t 
be an increase in trade. Example: the Lomé Convention. The Lomé 
Convention offers preferences like no other agreement… what good has it 
done? What is the trade between the Lomé countries and Europe? Nothing! 
If there’s nothing, you can offer anything you like. It’s very demagogic to say 
‘we’re going to offer free trade’. What’s the point if there’s nothing to 
trade?” 
 
Another EU official was very critical of the Morocco/EU FTA, suggesting that it was not 
real free trade because the Europeans had been much less forthcoming than they should 
have been, and that the Dutch had become as protectionist on cut flowers as the Spanish 
had on tomatoes during the negotiations. He highlighted the EU desire to recognize the 
importance of the Southern Mediterranean States even as it gave priority to Eastern 
neighbors following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and concurred with several 
colleagues that the accord sought to encourage intra-regional trade flows and generate 
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pressure for economic and political reforms in Morocco and the upgrading of Moroccan 
businesses.  
 
Conflicts of interest between EU member States also played a role in the formulation of 
the new Mediterranean policy, according to one senior EU official, who evoked the 
accession of Spain to the European Union in 1986 as a watershed in Mediterranean 
relations. Spanish nationals took over several key EU positions responsible for the 
region, both on the Commission itself and within its permanent staff: 
 
“They discovered that the Mediterranean policy was being run very much in 
the interests of France, taking advantage of the very heavy French presence 
in the Mediterranean and trying not to undermine that presence, which 
meant that there hadn’t been much progress on the Mediterranean policy. 
Which was based on financial protocols… it wasn’t very transparent, and the 
companies of the best-positioned countries were the ones that benefited. The 
Commission didn’t have much involvement, the Community even less.”    
 
   
Strengths and weaknesses of the agreement 
 
Moroccan officials and private sector representatives questioned about the strengths of 
the FTA emphasized its role as a catalyst for accelerated economic reform and greater 
efficiency, but above all they highlighted the social, political and institutional partnership 
referred to in the provisions of the wider Association Agreement. That partnership 
appears to have been seen as the true compensation for the opening of the Moroccan 
market to European competition, given that the European industrial markets were already 
accessible to Morocco, although the prevailing sentiment today is that it has never been 
implemented. EU interviewees rated the strengths of the FTA as first and foremost its 
potential as a catalyst for economic reform and for regional economic integration – both 
between Morocco and the EU and between Morocco and the Maghreb countries – and its 
potential to attract foreign direct investment. Moroccan perceptions of weaknesses in the 
agreement revolve around the non-implementation of the wider partnership promised in 
the Barcelona Declaration, the absence of significant increases in Moroccan access to EU 
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agricultural markets, and the poor record of both the EU and the Moroccan government 
on company upgrading initiatives. EU subjects felt that the main weakness of the accord 
was the failure to achieve its potential strengths: regional economic integration and 
investment promotion.     
 
One Moroccan official identified the key strength of the Association Agreement as being 
the intention stated in the preamble of the Barcelona Declaration to construct a balanced 
partnership including not only free trade but also strategic, political, institutional and 
social considerations. Having said that, the official in question was clearly skeptical 
about the implementation of such provisions: 
 
“I say to myself that one day we will succeed in making the strategic, 
institutional and political aspects of the agreement a reality, just as we did 
with the free trade agreement. This is not yet the case. We talk about a new 
strategic partnership and the Europeans talk of a “new neighborhood” 
policy, and these are concepts that remain theoretical and academic for the 
moment. I’m convinced that if the Europeans ultimately failed to respect the 
informal, indicative commitments they made in the preamble to the 
Barcelona Declaration, the situation would be very serious, because the deal 
would not have been honored… The free trade zone, if it remained a solely 
commercial phenomenon, would not necessarily be to Morocco’s advantage. 
And Morocco would not benefit as much as the Europeans”. 
 
Another Moroccan official felt that the strength of the FTA was to give increased 
visibility to Moroccan  operators, firstly by confirming the existing tariff exemption for 
industrial exports, and secondly by setting a detailed timeline for the elimination of tariffs 
on industrial imports from the EU. Another Moroccan official said that the smaller and 
less developed partner in a free trade arrangement tended to benefit more than the 
“senior” partner, and that Morocco could expect greater economic efficiency and a more 
rational allocation of resources. The FTA was perceived as an external catalyst for 
continued domestic economic reform intended to reduce the prevalence of rentier 
behavior and eliminate special economic privileges, he said. One senior Moroccan 
negotiator indicated that the main benefits of the FTA were increased quotas for certain 
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Moroccan agricultural exports and the development assistance provided by the EU under 
the MEDA program in the form of grants and low-interest loans. 
 
The Moroccan private sector representatives interviewed believed that the FTA would 
contribute to a greater integration of the European and Moroccan economies through a 
process of business upgrading and improvements to the business environment, including 
commercial law and its enforcement.  
 
Asked to identify the weaknesses of the FTA, Moroccan government officials cited, in 
addition to concerns about the implementation of the non-commercial aspects of the 
Association Agreement, the absence of provisions relating to services and the very 
limited concessions on Moroccan agricultural exports. One private sector representative 
was more specific on agriculture, citing tomatoes, flowers, green beans, and courgettes as 
products in which Moroccan export potential is directly limited by the provisions of the 
accord. Another private sector interviewee was harshly critical of the EU for seeking to 
expose the “young and fragile” Moroccan economy to greater competition while 
continuing to heavily subsidize European firms. He lamented the absence of a “vision of 
strategic partnership” and was especially disappointed by both EU and Moroccan 
government efforts to assist Moroccan economic and commercial reform: 
 
“We were talking about free trade over a 10 year period… but the economic 
upgrading process was undefined. And I would say that it’s still not defined 
today, most unfortunately! Businesses or sectors were feeling worried… The 
European Union… had suggested during negotiation the possibility of 
contributing to Moroccan reform efforts, but at the time, the amount of 
funding required was not well quantified and the specifics of the process 
were even less well determined… The European Union took a long long time 
to open an office responsible for the program, which was known as Euro 
Maroc Entreprises, they took three years to launch the program and it 
started with a basic operating budget that was only just enough to pay the 
salaries… I would say that the first three years were wasted years. I feel now 
that the European Union has not really met the expectations of Moroccan 
businesses, to the point that we decided that the reform process should 
become a purely Moroccan concern. The EU representatives… showed us 
the European business upgrading model, which was very attractive, and they 
led us to believe we would get the same treatment, which was not the case. 
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So we would have liked to see the Moroccan government take over the 
upgrading process… it’s in the process of doing so, but very late in the piece, 
because there’s a lack of resources. I understand that, I don’t think it’s a 
question of bad faith, but it’s running very late… it’s only recently that one 
or two company upgrading funds were announced by the Prime Minister and 
they’re still not operational! Eight years have gone by…”. 
 
These criticisms were echoed by a Moroccan government official, who said that the 
government had expected to receive EU funding for business upgrading during the three 
year grace period before the start of tariff elimination on European products with 
Moroccan equivalents. Slow bureaucratic procedures within the EU meant that nothing 
was received in that timeframe, and the Moroccan budget was unable to fill the gap, so 
the upgrading program was delayed, according to the official: 
 
“The weakness was that we didn’t negotiate a deadline for the aid package. 
We could have said to the European Union: ‘not until the aid arrives’… we 
could have gained enormously.” 
 
The extent of assistance was also held to be inadequate: 
 
“The European Union had asked us what aid we required. We prepared a 
report… that was sent to the European Union, but we didn’t receive the 
funding… as requested… It was too little, too late. The Moroccan 
government thought that the EU was going to help and so made no 
budgetary provision for upgrading… Unlike Tunisia, which did release funds 
to begin its restructuring program.” 
 
One senior EU official said that the fundamental strength of the FTA, above and beyond 
the provisions of the Association Agreement relating to economic reform assistance and 
investment promotion, was its role as “shock treatment” in the face of a strong 
protectionist tradition: 
 
“These countries prospered behind heavy trade barriers until the FTA, but 
those barriers never protected them from international competition. In 
Morocco, the emblematic case for reform was the closure of the Thomson 
television set factory. It was a French company assembling television sets 
and they were beaten by the South Koreans; they had to close the factory 
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with its hundreds of jobs. The South Korean televisions were smuggled into 
the country – not on donkey back over the mountains, since South Korea is a 
long way away, but by the container load thanks to bribery. The price 
differential was so great that they could buy as many customs agents as they 
liked, and they got away with it. And all this showed very clearly that 
international competition… was unavoidable”. 
 
Another EU official echoed this analysis of the benefits of the FTA, describing it as 
preparation for a globalizing world, and confirming the inefficacity of trade barriers as an 
alternative: 
 
“The Moroccans were addressing the problem of customs fraud and 
trafficking. They told us: ‘listen… so many goods are getting in without us 
being able to inspect them, why not opt for free trade: problem solved’.”  
 
Asked to identify the weaknesses of the FTA, an EU official emphasized the increasing 
bureaucracy of the European Commission, saying that he would no longer want to work 
there, and that the excessive bureaucracy and monitoring procedures were due to a 
multiplication of lines of accountability: the member States, the European Parliament, the 
Auditing Authority, and the trade unions. He also felt that the increasing number of 
member States led to more extensive conflicts of interest that made the negotiation of 
agreements with a third party much more difficult. One of this interviewee’s colleagues 
was blunt regarding these points: 
 
“My successor wasn’t that interested, he wasn’t an economist and knew 
nothing about the region or the social context. I and another top official left 
almost at the same time, the entire team changed, and the spirit of the place 
just wasn’t the same. Now it’s a new order: four or five years ago… within 
the Commission, the bean counters took control from the political types. Me, 
I have a political orientation, and I think that financial packages are a 
means of achieving certain objectives. I’m not sure that our successors have 
seen it the same way…” 
 
Another failure of the FTA was felt to be the absence of an effective mechanism to 
promote European private investment in countries like Morocco, and several EU officials 
said that the stagnation of that investment had led such countries to seek public European 
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funding to compensate for lost tariff revenue. The Commission had always maintained 
that there was no direct link between MEDA program assistance and lost customs 
receipts, and that direct investment should make up the difference, so the failure of that 
investment to materialize was described by one European interviewee as “somewhat of a 
missing link in the chain”. Another EU subject felt that in the first 10 years of the 
agreement, the Maghreb countries had been increasingly marginalized as private 
investment flooded to eastern European nations, and as the Maghreb failed to increase its 
exports to non-European markets in the same way that many of those eastern European 
nations had done. Yet another EU official also identified the lack of growth in FDI as a 
problem, but laid much of the blame at the door of the Moroccans: 
 
“The foreign direct investment factor didn’t materialize. We perhaps naively 
overestimated the catalytic role that free trade could play, especially with 
this deadline of 2015 (sic) that was too distant for a company that wants to 
invest somewhere, that runs into problems in-country with things as simple 
as going to court to resolve a dispute. And this is a court that’s not like a 
court… here in Europe, there are government rules that are not transparent, 
there’s a lot of bribery, you have to know someone in the system… it was too 
much for us and our projects.” 
 
The same EU official said that the FTA had been weakened because the Moroccans, by 
their own admission (according to the interviewee), had insisted on too much protection 
for their vulnerable sectors and had rejected the European preference for a balanced 
phase-out of tariffs in favor of back-loading (delaying the most potentially damaging 
tariff elimination until the latter part of the implementation period): 
 
“As a result, the deadline for businesses to restructure was too distant to 
incite them to take prompt action. So we missed out on the catalyzing effect 
of friendly external pressure. We didn’t insist on it because it was a 
Moroccan affair and we had no cards up our sleeve to impose a faster 
rhythm…” 
 
The minimal EU concessions on agriculture were also cited by this interviewee, who 
blamed the Spanish agricultural lobby for insisting on export calendars that were 
extremely limited in order to protect Andalusian farmers, especially regarding flowers, 
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strawberries and potatoes. He identified two further weaknesses of the FTA and the wider 
Association Agreement: its failure to sufficiently accelerate democratization in Morocco, 
which was described as falling far short of a constitutional monarchy, and its failure to 
strengthen the economic integration of the Maghreb region. The nature of the dialog that 
occurs in the framework of the agreements also came in for criticism: 
 
“The dialog that takes place is a dialog between civil servants who are 
afraid to make commitments, who have their instructions… it’s formalistic, 
that really struck me. In order to achieve far-reaching reform, it’s not the 
money that’s missing, it’s the will and the understanding… and for that, 
there has to be a dialog between political leaders…” 
 
 
The origins of the free trade agreement and the motivations of the parties 
 
Moroccan officials emphasized the long history of the 1996 Association Agreement and 
FTA, which were the latest in a long line of less far-reaching accords that began in the 
1960s. One interviewee traced the genesis of the FTA to 1983, a watershed year in 
Moroccan economic history marked by the implementation of structural adjustment 
policies (such as tariff and subsidy reduction and debt rescheduling), and to the imminent 
accession of Spain and Portugal to the European Union. For that Moroccan official, the 
trade liberalization begun in coordination with the World Bank in 1983 was intended not 
only to respond to the macro-economic problems for which structural adjustment is 
habitually prescribed, but also to increase Moroccan bargaining power with the EU. 
Portugal and Spain, two countries with an agricultural export profile similar to that of 
Morocco, were already negotiating their accession, and their incorporation in 1986 would 
clearly disadvantage their closest southern neighbor. Morocco, for its part, was preparing 
for membership of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now the World Trade 
Organization) and was involved in exploratory talks with the EU on how to manage the 
impact of Spanish and Portuguese accession on Euro-Moroccan trade. It was during these 
talks, in 1983, that the idea of an FTA was first raised by Morocco. The EU response to 
the Moroccan free trade proposal was initially unenthusiastic, according to the official, 
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and remained so until the controversy surrounding the 1992 European Parliament 
rejection of aid packages for Morocco and Syria due to concern over human rights. 
 
“It was after the rejection of the financial protocol by the European 
Parliament that the European leadership became concerned, because for 
them, Morocco is a cornerstone of their regional strategic relationships: the 
fisheries for the Spanish, the Middle East role, etc. They couldn’t afford to 
isolate a country of such political and geographic importance. Europe was 
looking to restore its relations with Morocco, because Morocco had… 
slammed the door, including with respect to the fisheries issue. The crisis… 
began to be resolved by the revival of the free trade proposal… and this 
coincided with the first terrorist attacks in Europe, especially in France. 
There was a political context – Islamic extremism – and people at the 
Commission began to say… that the best way of fighting terrorism was to 
envisage a great initiative to support the southern Mediterranean and 
reinforce the Middle East peace process, Oslo, etc.” 
 
The suggestion that the EU took up the Moroccan free trade proposal in order to 
restore relations damaged by European Parliament criticism of the Moroccan 
human rights record was denied by one leading EU official, who did not even 
remember the controversy, 13 years later. He did not think that the issue “played 
any role at all in the reflections to propose an FTA with Morocco plus Maghreb… 
and don’t forget, we never did want an FTA with Morocco only, the FTA was part 
of a more strategic approach covering the whole region”. This view appears to be 
corroborated by testimony tracing the advent of European Commission interest in 
the Moroccan free trade proposal to a visit to Rabat by the European Commission 
President, Jacques Delors, in 1991; the first Commission documents on the subject 
also carry that date. What is not in dispute, however, is the Moroccan origin of the 
free trade request, as the Moroccan official just cited recounts: 
 
“And that’s how the idea of free trade began, it wasn’t imposed by Europe, it 
was a Moroccan idea. The historical truth is that we are the architects of the 
end of the neo-colonial era, the end of charity in the form of preferences.”    
 
A senior EU official cited regional prosperity and stability as the primary motivation of 
Brussels in entering negotiations for the Maghreb (and Mediterranean) free trade and 
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Association Agreements, given the small size of the commercial markets involved. He 
also confirmed the Moroccan origins of the FTA proposal, which was quickly pursued by 
Tunisia (Tunisia ultimately signed several months before Morocco), and gave the 
measure of the Moroccan commitment to liberalization 
 
“When we sat down for the first session of the exploratory dialog in May 
1992, the first substantive presentation was that of a senior Moroccan 
official, and he said ‘we want to impose free trade on ourselves as a vector 
of competitiveness’. And he said it with such force and in such a radical way 
that our own people…  from Brussels were shocked. We said ‘be careful, 
you’re going to destroy all your industry.’… We accepted the request while 
taking care to accompany it with a phased tariff elimination schedule, 
exemption clauses, and financial assistance.” 
 
A Moroccan official who was heavily involved in the FTA negotiations from 1992 to 
1995 described the agreement as a joint decision in response to the accession of Spain 
and Portugal, over and above the 1988 adaptation protocols that protected Morocco’s 
traditional agricultural export flows. He also saw the FTA as a mechanism employed by 
the EU to overcome the crisis in its relations with Morocco caused by the 1992 European 
Parliament rejection of the financial protocol. One EU official traced Maghreb 
enthusiasm for free trade to the eastward expansion of the Union and a desire to avoid 
marginalization as the attention of Brussels turned to its future recruits, many of which 
were signing free trade deals as a prelude to accession.  
 
A question regarding the choice of the European Union as free trade partner – a question 
to which the answer may seem obvious given the Moroccan trade profile – nevertheless 
drew a revealing response from one Moroccan official: 
 
“The natural market of Morocco is the European Union! Who are we 
supposed to trade with? Africa? They don’t need the products we 
manufacture… Who are we supposed to trade with? The Maghreb Arab 
Union? There has never been a Maghreb Arab Union! And I can assure you 
that there are at least 150 agreements between Morocco, Algeria and 
Tunisia, and not one of them is enforced. Who are we supposed to trade 
with? The Arab countries? They get everything from the United States!... We 
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didn’t think of the United States because… it (bilateral trade) is not even the 
turnover of a supermarket… ”  
 
Another Moroccan official, the then Commerce and Industry Ministry Secretary General 
Abderazzak Al Mossadaq, told the Moroccan economic daily l’Economiste in 1995 that 
“the free trade zone is an act of faith for reasons of geopolitics, geostrategy, and geo-
whatever-else. We didn’t make a success of the free trade zones with Tunisia and the 
Maghreb Arab Union, but we didn’t ask ourselves why” (Belyazid 1995). 
 
Given the obviously strong motivations on both sides to go through with a free trade 
agreement, and the long history of political and economic ties that lay behind them, it is 
appropriate to wonder why the EU made – and Morocco accepted – an offer that largely 
excluded agriculture and excluded services, and was therefore less likely to achieve the 
highly ambitious goals of the initiative. Moroccan officials interviewed attributed the 
lack of progress on agriculture to the Common Agricultural Policy of the European 
Union, which protects and subsidizes European farmers, but also to the newness of 
agriculture as an international trade negotiation topic. At that time, one Moroccan official 
pointed out, agriculture was being negotiated within the Uruguay Round talks of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for the first time, and it was “new for 
everyone”.  He did not see that as a cause for concern: 
 
“At one point, Morocco would have liked negotiations to include agriculture, 
but frankly, looking back after 10 years, I think that Morocco would 
probably not have been ready to negotiate free trade in agriculture either. 
The agricultural negotiations with the United States (nine years later) 
highlighted the differences, and I think it’s ultimately something that should 
be dealt with from the perspective of strategic development… Ultimately, it 
suited everyone to have an agricultural negotiation that focused not on 
immediate free trade but on a progressive move towards greater reciprocal 
liberalization…” 
 
Nevertheless, if gradual reciprocal concessions were seen as a more feasible option for 
agricultural liberalization, the extent of the concessions granted fell far short of 
expectations. A Moroccan private sector representative complained of restrictive quotas 
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and inflated reference prices on some products (such as tomatoes) of which Morocco 
could export large quantities to the EU, generous quotas and reasonable reference prices 
for other products (such as citrus fruit) for which Moroccan producers often target non-
EU markets in any case, and very limited time periods for the export of certain crops. He 
blamed the unsatisfactory result on Spanish pressure, but also on the absence of 
countervailing pressure from Moroccan producers, who he said were not involved in the 
negotiations by the government. 
 
It should be noted that agro-industrial products were included in the free trade provisions 
of the Morocco/European Union Association Agreement, but any tariff elimination 
applied only to the industrial value-added of the product and not to the agricultural 
inputs. 
 
The fortress aspect of the Common Agricultural Policy was highlighted by an EU 
official, who likened it to the Augusta golf club: 
 
“It’s a system in which members commit to reduce production, to produce 
certain crops and not others, to receive subsidies and to make certain 
contributions. It’s a system closed to outsiders, like a golf club. You’re either 
a member of Augusta or you’re not. If you’re not a member of Augusta, you 
don’t play. You can be invited from time to time, but not often, and you have 
to have a low handicap: we can offer certain agricultural concessions, but 
under the right conditions in terms of quality, packaging, and calibration.” 
 
One EU official strongly defended the agricultural provisions of the agreement as 
conferring improved quotas and export calendars on the Moroccans, but this appears to 
be an isolated viewpoint. Several other EU officials regretted the minimal nature of 
agricultural concessions, and identified competition between similar products from 
southern EU member States and the Maghreb countries as the main reason for them; the 
intention was to protect the farmers of those Mediterranean EU member States from 
North African rivals. This protectionism is nevertheless softened by such practices as the 
occasional Spanish importation of additional Moroccan produce to meet shortfalls in 
local supply, according to one interviewee. Another EU source blamed the Spanish 
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agricultural lobby for insisting on export calendars that were extremely limited in order 
to protect Andalusian farmers, especially with regard to flowers, strawberries and 
potatoes: 
 
“We caved in to Spanish political pressure and the result was a minimal 
offer, and in normal circumstances the Moroccans should not have accepted 
it. They accepted it because there was a Royal vision at the highest levels of 
the State of a closer relationship, and so they said ‘OK, maybe we can’t 
export everything, but we’ll be able to improve on this thanks to the five-year 
revision clause’.” 
 
Above and beyond the question of protectionism, there may have been another, more 
disinterested consideration involved in the lack of European agricultural generosity. 
According to one EU official, the Union is convinced that agriculture does not have a 
large role to play in Moroccan economic development in the medium to long term, due to 
the scarcity of water, recurrent drought, and the water intensive nature of many leading 
cash crops. He acknowledged that this analysis can be seen as a disguised argument for 
protectionism, but felt that it was a genuine and valid belief. 
 
Both Moroccan and European interviewees agreed that the services sector received little 
attention in the FTA because it was a relatively new feature of international trade 
negotiations, and the European Commission was not yet mandated to negotiate in that 
field. One EU official also stated that he and his colleagues were not very aware of the 
potential of the Maghreb countries in the area of services at the time of the negotiations. 
 
 
The negotiations: the State perspective 
 
The genesis of what was to become the Barcelona Declaration and the new generation of 
association and free trade agreements can perhaps be traced to the official visit paid to 
King Hassan II in 1991 by the then European Commission President, Jacques Delors. 
One of the EU officials interviewed, who was destined to play a crucial role in the 
process from that time forward, described the sequence of events: 
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“Upon his return to Brussels, Delors asked me… if we should and could 
enter into a free trade agreement with Morocco. I put together a one page 
memo for Delors during the weekend – that was how we worked back then – 
to say that I found the idea interesting, for Morocco more than for us, but on 
condition that the Union go beyond a bilateral accord to encompass the 
entire Maghreb, so as to create a single, strong, harmonious partner for the 
Union among the three Maghreb countries.” 
 
The one page informal memorandum led to the publication by the Commission of a paper 
on the European Community and the Maghreb countries that proposed a partnership with 
the three nations, and it was this initial vision that formed the basis of exploratory 
discussions with Tunisia, Morocco (beginning in May 1992), and, much later and at a 
lower level of commitment, Algeria. In the meantime, on January 17 PthP, 1992, the 
European Parliament had rejected the fourth EU/Morocco financial protocol due to 
concerns over human rights abuses, and diplomatic crisis was in the air. The negotiating 
mandate of the Commission was not adopted by the European Council (of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs) until December 6 PthP, 1993, after two rounds of exploratory discussions 
that reportedly left Moroccan officials disappointed that the European offer – especially 
in agriculture – fell far short of the ambitions of the agreement (Taarji 1993, in the 
Moroccan economic daily l’Economiste). This disappointment appears to have been 
exacerbated by the visit to Morocco of Manuel Marin, the European Commissioner 
responsible for non-member Mediterranean States, on December 16 PthP and 17 PthP, 1993. Mr. 
Marin, who had come to launch the formal phase of negotiations, was personally 
criticized in a l’Economiste report in extraordinarily direct terms: 
 
“The meetings have been somewhat rough. This was because the Moroccan 
side was ‘disappointed’ in the negotiating mandate, but also because of Mr. 
Marin’s stormy nature. His reputation is well established within the 
European Community bureaucracy, and during the two days of his visit to 
Rabat, every effort was made not to provoke this aspect of his personality” 
(Triki and Salah 1993). 
 
Obtaining a mandate for negotiations from the European Commission is never easy, and 
the case of the Maghreb was no exception. As one EU official said, the most difficult task 
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is not negotiating with the external party but settling the terms of the negotiating mandate 
within the Commission:  
 
“You spend months and months getting the mandate, because everyone 
defends their specific little interests… In Europe, there is not yet an 
acceptance that what’s good for Europe is good for you as a matter of 
principle… People want a measure to be good for their particular interests, 
then they say ‘OK, then this is for the general good’… It becomes very 
complicated to get the mandate, and then the mandates are very limited. 
There’s no flexibility.”  
 
The phenomenon of divergent interests underlying a theoretically unified EU negotiating 
position was also noted by a Moroccan official. He contrasted the official single 
negotiating partner, the European Commission, with the 15 member States that formed 
the Commission and of which the sometimes disparate interests did influence the talks – 
in parallel to the Commission mandate, and sometimes even in contradiction with it. As a 
result, a number of issues in the negotiations with the Commission were in fact dealt with 
on a bilateral basis: 
 
“Quite often, when there was a problem, there were bilateral consultations 
with certain capitals, the President of the Union, Paris, Madrid, Rome, 
London, Berlin… because in any case, the problem had originated in one of 
these capitals… Rather than always go through the Commission, we 
sometimes went directly to the source of the problem.”  
 
The Moroccan government was also not monolithic in its approach to the negotiations, 
and the Finance Ministry in particular was known to be concerned about the loss of tariff 
revenue, which had been estimated at approximately $1 billion per year according to one 
official. Another Moroccan official described a process in which negotiators had 
considerable autonomy and periodically made progress reports on the main issues to 
King Hassan II, who followed the talks closely.  
 
“When a progress report was submitted to the King, we would say ‘this is 
the state of play, this is where we’re at, we think we can proceed on this 
basis… and he would give his benediction, he would say ‘OK’, for example 
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he would say ‘regarding this fisheries agreement, so long as you manage to 
protect such and such a species…’, and it was up to us to do it. Everything 
came back to the King, who followed developments very closely. He was 
very interested because he had a good grasp of the issues.”  
 
Once the mandate for negotiations with Morocco had been obtained, the formal 
negotiations undertaken by the Commission under the close supervision of the member 
States were supplemented by bilateral contacts between Morocco and Spain, France and 
Italy. The initial rounds of formal negotiations with Morocco were characterized, 
according to an EU official, by a Moroccan insistence that EU agricultural markets be 
opened to Moroccan produce. This was seen as a means of balancing, through 
agriculture, an agreement that would otherwise be lopsided given that EU industrial 
markets had long been open to Morocco. Moroccan negotiators were even described as 
“obsessed” by agriculture, especially citrus fruit and tomatoes, by a European 
interviewee who claimed that if Morocco had chosen its crop varieties more wisely, 
seasonal restrictions would be less of a problem. But a Moroccan private sector 
representative said that Moroccan producers had in fact adapted in exactly that way, only 
to see further restrictions applied to new varieties that were being harvested during what 
was supposed to be open season for exports to the EU.  
 
The tension in parallel negotiations over GATT agricultural provisions boiled over in late 
1994, and led to the first public statement by Morocco linking its access to EU 
agriculture markets with the renewal of the fisheries agreement between the two parties. 
New GATT provisions taking effect on January 1 PstP, 1995 standardized EU reference 
prices for imported agricultural products at the expense of Morocco, which had been 
exempted from the reference prices, and the EU offer of preferential access for tomatoes 
– intended to partially offset the Moroccan losses – was seen as inadequate. On 
December 22 PndP, 1994, European Commission President Jacques Delors received a letter 
from Moroccan Prime Minister Abdellatif Filali described by EU sources as “very 
undiplomatic”, in which agricultural access problems were directly linked to the fisheries 
agreement and to Morocco/EU relations more generally (de la Guerivière 1995a, in the 
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French daily Le Monde). The letter spoke of a European “diktat” and referred to the offer 
on tomatoes as a “proposition that undermines our dignity and our sovereignty” (El 
Banna 1995a, in Le Monde). The dispute led to talks in Brussels on January 11PthP, 1995, 
and an agreement – signed the following day – that brought limited improvements to 
Moroccan access to European agriculture markets. These improvements were presented 
as significant by Moroccan government officials but were criticized as minimal by the 
Fruit and Vegetable Producers and Exporters Association (APFEL) (Salah 1995, in 
l’Economiste). 
 
In addition to agricultural access, Association Agreement negotiators for Morocco 
sought, at the outset, a radical version of free trade, in a proposition that surprised even 
their EU counterparts, who were themselves hammering the theme of free trade as a 
catalyst for economic competitiveness.  
 
“We (EU negotiators) were confronted with a very strong position of 
principle… supported by the government… that was a quite radical position 
at the outset, and it was basically – I’m exaggerating the terms a little – 
‘subject us to the most comprehensive free trade possible in order to 
generate the strongest possible incentive for competitiveness’. The initial 
position was also very demanding of Europe in the sense that Morocco as an 
agricultural country was convinced… that agricultural exports were a motor 
of development, and we are not convinced of that, quite apart from the 
question of our contingents.” 
 
On an institutional level, the negotiations appear to have been influenced by a conflict 
regarding agricultural concessions between two directorates general of the European 
Commission: the External Relations Directorate and the Agriculture Directorate. The 
latter appears to have taken a more protectionist line, while the former was more focused 
on developmental objectives that would be well served by increased Moroccan exports, 
as this EU official testimony (from the External Relations Directorate viewpoint) 
indicates: 
 
“We believed that the danger to European agriculture was quite limited… 
The European position was often very restrictive on quantities… there was a 
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courgette quota that was ridiculously low in the initial offer, it was the 
equivalent production of 10 hectares, it was absurd. It was truly absurd in 
development terms, if you compare that mechanical limitation with the 
political objective of the agreement, which was the prosperity of Morocco 
and therefore the stability of rural areas. All that was absurd.” 
 
The dominance of protectionist considerations in the EU negotiating position appears to 
indicate that the Association Agreement was destined from the very beginning to 
disappoint Moroccan and European hopes of a genuine partnership for development. 
Those hopes were articulated clearly by Taieb Fassi Fihri, the Chief of Staff of the 
Moroccan Foreign Affairs Minister, just before the start of exploratory conversations in 
1992. According to the Moroccan economic daily l’Economiste, Mr. Fassi Fihri called 
for “an expression of political will in which calculations of quotas and tonnages must 
make way for a strategic commitment that transcends mere calculations” (Taarji 1992).   
 
European access to Moroccan fisheries was another key issue in the negotiations, since 
the renewal of a separate quadrennial fisheries agreement between the two parties was 
being negotiated simultaneously with the Association Agreement. The previous fisheries 
agreement expired on May 1 PstP, 1995, and Spanish fishermen, who found themselves 
barred from their zone of operation, began attacking and destroying Moroccan produce 
transiting via Spain in protest. In the fisheries talks, Morocco was seeking catch 
reductions of between 30% and 65% over three years, depending on the species, a 
measure that would have sidelined approximately 400 of the 650 to 750 EU vessels 
(Richard 1995, in Le Monde). The European counter-offer on catch reductions had risen 
from 17% to 22% and then to 25% before the negotiations appeared to fail altogether on 
August 28PthP, 1995 (de la Guerivière 1995b, in Le Monde). EU officials spoken to made no 
attempt to hide their irritation at the role played by the fisheries issue in the Association 
Agreement talks. One said: 
 
“It was a role of pollution! It was a subject of irritation for four years. We 
did the exploratory talks and the negotiations, and in the same period we did 
two fisheries agreements, which were horribly emotive subjects for very bad 
reasons related to the colonial experience with Spain. Fishing in Spain is a 
very important sector for historical reasons, and the attitude of the Spanish 
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fishermen was always one of established rights: ‘we’ve been fishing there for 
centuries, so it has to continue’… And the Moroccans had the exact opposite 
attitude of sovereignty over their waters. It was a point of political 
disagreement so violent that it obstructed the agreement. Moreover, in 
September, October, November 1995, the two negotiations were proceeding 
in parallel and the conclusion of the Association Agreement was on hold 
pending conclusion of the fisheries agreement… In September 1995, the 
President of the Commission sent a letter to the King guaranteeing a 
reduction in the Spanish fleet, and the King told us: ‘make it clear to the 
President that if these commitments are not respected, this will be the last 
fisheries agreement’. And after that, the negotiations for the subsequent 
accord (in 1999) did in fact fail.” 
 
Another EU official confirmed that Spain did not restructure its fishing fleet in a timely 
manner, despite having committed to do so in an internal EU agreement, and that as a 
result, the fisheries issue had continued to “hang like a dark cloud over the relationship” 
well beyond the 1995 talks. While the political interaction between the fisheries and 
Association Agreement negotiations in 1995 is obvious, they were dealt with separately 
in administrative terms by the European Commission, and this appears to have yielded a 
quite narrow commercial perspective on the fisheries issue, according to one EU official:  
 
“The fisheries agreements were always separate from the EU/Morocco 
cooperation framework and were managed by the Fisheries Directorate 
General in Brussels, which had a representative in the European 
Commission Delegation in Rabat who reported directly to that DG. I 
thought… that we should have increasingly seen… the fisheries agreement in 
its wider context, which would have required greater awareness of the need 
to move beyond a narrow vision of securing fishing licenses for mainly 
Spanish boats, which was the thinking of the Fisheries Directorate General, 
at least initially. The Spanish fishermen lost access to Moroccan waters, 
partly due to their inability – and that of their mainly Andalousian political 
representatives – to move towards greater integration with the Moroccan 
industry.”   
 
Most Moroccan officials interviewed confirmed the trade-offs between the association 
and fisheries agreements, and all emphasized the role played in resolving the impasse by 
a Royal announcement that the 1995 fisheries accord would be the last. That 
announcement was also echoed at a press conference by European Fisheries 
Commissioner Emma Bonino. One Moroccan negotiator described the fisheries 
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agreement as the only bargaining chip Morocco had had in seeking increased agricultural 
quotas and more favorable rules of origin for industrial exports. He said that Morocco 
had obtained significant concessions thanks to the fisheries agreement, including, with 
respect to earlier accords, the facilitation of Moroccan export transit via Spain. His 
account of the 1995 Association Agreement talks is revealing and confirms the 
intertwined nature of the issues: 
 
“I was very clear with them: ‘this is my only bargaining chip to bring you to 
your knees in negotiation’. I often said to them: ‘it’s either that or I take off 
boats’. Just like that! Clearly! I used the Anglo-Saxon negotiating style, that 
way it’s clear. And I was facing… the French, the Italians, and so on, and as 
soon as they took something away from me, I said ‘I’m removing 10 boats’.” 
 
A Moroccan private sector representative highlighted the EU tactic of playing Tunisia off 
against Morocco with respect to the Association Agreement: 
 
“To compel Morocco to sign, they went and signed with Tunisia very 
rapidly. That was a show of force by the Europeans, who were saying ‘if 
you’re not interested, well look, Tunisia is going to benefit from X’. Morocco 
would have signed the Association Agreement a year before Tunisia, but 
Morocco preferred to first discuss other outstanding problems, including 
fisheries and agriculture, and the European Union refused to yield.” 
 
In September 1995, a number of Moroccan business leaders publicly and privately called 
for a speedy resolution to the deadlock over the fisheries and association agreements, for 
fear of losing market share to Tunisia, which had already signed its Association 
Agreement with the EU (El Banna 1995b, in Le Monde). These concerns were also 
evident in comments by a Moroccan government official, who suggested that Morocco 
would have “lost practically everything” to Tunisia and other competitors had it not 
moved to sign the Association Agreement. The tactical decision by the European Union 
to sign with Tunisia before Morocco appears to have cost Morocco its potential first-
mover advantage: 
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“We based our approach on the Tunisian agreement. We tried to make 
changes relative to the Tunisian deal, some items were changed… but there 
was a baseline that had to be followed.” 
 
One EU official identified two contrasting phases in the negotiations, the first lengthy 
and “rather sterile,” focusing on exemptions and transition periods, and the second, 
which was extremely rapid, precipitated by Royal intervention: 
 
“I would say that they stopped negotiating at all at a certain point, after the 
King’s edict, they stopped negotiating. They signed everything. It took six 
weeks, two months maximum, between the King’s decision and the initialing 
of the agreement. We wrapped everything up in one or two sessions, only 
very trivial issues came up”.     
 
Another EU official confirmed this version of events, tracing it to the success of efforts to 
resolve the fisheries impasse and the political imperative of the then imminent Barcelona 
conference: 
 
“The sequence was that beginning in June or July, the fisheries negotiations 
went into crisis. In July, Tunisia signed its association and free trade 
agreements, and in September we tried to eliminate the obstacles. The fact 
that the External Relations Commissioner was Spanish didn’t help the 
situation, in addition to the fact that the King had a difficult relationship with 
him, so we got around the problem by bringing in Emma Bonino (the 
Fisheries Commissioner, an Italian, on September 14 PthP, 1995) to talk to the 
King about fisheries, and in the end she also discussed the Association 
Agreement. And the fact that the King had the letter from Santer, the 
European Commission President, on the reduction of the fleet – an 
honorable exit strategy for the fisheries agreement – meant that he wanted 
no more delays on the Association Agreement. It was important to wrap it up 
and avoid a long period of crisis. You mustn’t forget that at the end of 
November there was the Euro-Mediterranean Conference (the Barcelona 
Conference), which was THE launch of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, and it would have been difficult to proceed with a dispute 
unresolved. These are political considerations. To have a Barcelona process 
with Morocco… not having obtained the fisheries agreement and the 
Association Agreement was unthinkable. It would have looked very bad.”  
 
One Moroccan official confirmed the impact on the talks of the intervention by Hassan 
II: 
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“We left to negotiate and we were told: ‘don’t come back without initialing 
the agreement’. I can’t tell you how much pressure we were under. The 
Ambassador with the negotiating team had His Majesty on the telephone, 
and he said: ‘initial it!’ There was real political pressure. Most of the work 
had been done… but we were planning to refine it further… but we had 
instructions…” 
 
Another Moroccan official flatly denied that Moroccan Association Agreement 
negotiators had at any point ceased to negotiate and begun “signing everything,” and 
suggested that the EU officials making the claim did not have a good grasp of the issues. 
But another Moroccan negotiator related an incident that may explain the European 
perception of a “cave-in”. According to him, one of the Moroccan negotiators had 
become concerned that the conclusion of the agreement would result in the loss of his 
regular access to the King, which was necessary to discuss progress in the talks, and he 
therefore deliberately prolonged them. The King had been informed of this situation and 
had also been provided with a document setting out the EU negotiating strategy in detail, 
drafted by a Moroccan negotiator based on a combination of solicited leaks from 
European capitals and analytical deductions. The King then decided to replace the 
allegedly stonewalling negotiator by two others, one from the Royal Palace, one from the 
government, and both aligned with the author of the document describing EU strategy, 
according to the interviewee. The result was a greatly increased pace in the final phase of 
the talks, although any suggestion of unreasonable concessions by Morocco is 
emphatically denied. The change in the composition of the lead negotiating team, three 
months before the initialing of the Association Agreement and the Fisheries Agreement, 
took place as both parties to the talks were becoming increasingly frustrated with the lack 
of progress, according to this source. It was a psychological watershed that improved the 
atmosphere and prompted several extra concessions from EU negotiators, and these, 
along with the letter from the European Commission President regarding Spanish fleet 
reductions, greatly facilitated the resolution of the fisheries impasse and the completion 
of both treaties. The imminence of the Barcelona Conference did not influence the 
Moroccan negotiators, according to the interviewee.     
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When the draft agricultural provisions negotiated by the Commission reached the 
European Council, Spain withheld its approval and insisted that the terms be renegotiated 
in favor of Spanish farmers. An EU official described the Spanish position as 
procedurally legitimate but “not very reasonable”, and suggested that Morocco signed the 
final agreement – despite that additional setback – because of its political importance, 
and because the lengthy delay over agriculture and fisheries had allowed Tunisia to sign 
its own association and free trade deal ahead of Morocco, the regional originator of the 
concept. The Tunisian agreement had been signed on July 17PthP, 1995.  
 
At the same European Council meeting of October 30PthP, 1995, the German and Dutch 
Foreign Ministers – usually free trade champions – refused to accept the proposed 
increase in the Moroccan cut flower import quota from 2000 tons to 5000 tons, and 
Belgium rejected a 15,000 ton increase in the Moroccan tomato quota. Both Belgium and 
Holland accused the European Commission of exceeding its negotiating mandate, and 
another Council meeting had to be called for November 10 PthP in order to resolve the issues 
(Lemaître 1995, Bourgaux 1995b). A revealing paragraph from the account of the French 
daily Le Monde gives the peculiar flavor of the last days of the process. 
 
“The Germans are accusing the Moroccans of ‘blackmail’. The French 
consider the behavior of the Germans to be ‘abnormal’ and that of the 
European Parliament to be ‘scandalous’. The European Parliament, acting 
on one of those irrational impulses that seem to be its specialty, has just 
passed a motion denouncing the overly generous concessions made to 
Morocco. The French Foreign Affairs Minister finds the whole episode 
‘mediocre’ and is ‘irritated’. And the message of the European Union to the 
outside world remains hopelessly confused.” (Lemaître 1995).   
 
Following the conclusion of the association and free trade agreements between the 
European Union and Morocco in November 1995, parliamentary ratification 
(unanimously, on July 5 PthP, 1996) and Royal approval by Morocco came relatively swiftly, 
but not so ratification by the EU member States. Indeed, long delays in ratification by the 
Italian parliament pushed back implementation of the agreement by two years, such that 
the date for full implementation of 2010, which is still often cited in public debate, is in 
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fact now 2012. The Italian brinksmanship left a sour taste in many mouths, as one EU 
official attests: 
 
“The agreement was ratified late, it took almost three years, I believe… and 
it seems that the Italians used their power as a ratifying country to obtain a 
few bilateral concessions… and I find that scandalous”. 
 
 
 
The negotiations: winners, losers, and interest groups 
 
The Moroccan and European interviewees, asked to identify the winners and losers of the 
free trade agreement, gave a wide variety of responses. One Moroccan official claimed 
that “everyone” would benefit from increased EU market access, be it in agriculture, 
textiles, or fisheries, or from the aid package accompanying the Association Agreement. 
But he quickly pointed to losers as well: a certain number of large, heavily indebted 
fishing companies that were counting on non-renewal of the fisheries agreement to evict 
Spanish competitors; and small-scale industry: 
 
“And then there was small-scale industry, which could be overwhelmed by 
quality products and forced to close down. In that regard, we requested 
what’s known as business upgrading (la mise à niveau) for some industries, 
but… what is business upgrading anyway? It was just a name, it was only on 
paper! How am I going to… determine that such and such a number of 
industries are below standard…? Based on what criteria? So it was an 
invention, we talked about business upgrading, but it was really an 
invention. Business upgrading is a vague expression!” 
 
Moroccan officials and private sector representatives agreed that beneficiaries would 
include the consumer, due to lower import prices and increased purchasing power, and 
companies for which lower imported raw material prices would offset increased 
competition. Other firms capable of responding to increased competition with higher 
quality and productivity were also seen as winners. Several Moroccan officials felt that 
the losers of free trade would not be confined to particular sectors of the economy, but 
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would be all those companies that had been sheltered by trade barriers and did not 
succeed in the transition to competitiveness in a liberalized environment. One of them put 
it more bluntly: 
 
“The bourgeois minority built on privileges inherited from the French 
protectorate. But they’re not going to be unfairly disadvantaged, they’re 
simply going to stop profiting from the consumer.” 
 
Another pointed to protected, undiversified and poorly structured family businesses in 
which one person occupied all the key roles despite, in many cases, having no relevant 
formal training.  
 
One Moroccan official claimed that all interest groups had been regularly consulted, 
including farmers, exporters, and the fishing and textile industries, and that during the 
final phase of the talks he had personally been in contact with all agricultural producers 
and had received their benediction for the negotiated quotas. Nevertheless, he 
acknowledged that the institutional culture of the Moroccan government had caused 
some friction: 
 
“There was a lot of contact, but in Morocco we have an administrative style 
that doesn’t release all the available information. And you know, when you 
don’t release all the information, that upsets the producers a little, and yes, 
go figure, they came knocking at the door of the Ministry because there was 
no frankness. But then, there was a negotiation in progress, so there was a 
certain secrecy. But there was no openness. Still, very often they got all they 
wanted. They were a little bit lost because they weren’t informed. But 
Minister Fassi Fihri very often called them in and briefed them, and they left 
genuinely very happy and satisfied with what we were seeking. In any case, 
the new generation of negotiators… we were working for those people, so we 
had to have as much information from them as we could. But one thing was 
that these pressure groups, these federations, lacked the intellectual 
firepower to draft thoroughly prepared submissions, so for agriculture it was 
the Ministry of Agriculture that did the work, for fisheries it was the Ministry 
of Fisheries, for financial issues it was the Finance Ministry, and then the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry organized all this data… into memoranda of 
negotiation.” 
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Another Moroccan official also said that the negotiations had been transparent, and that 
three main interest groups were involved: the CGEM (Employers Federation), the 
farmers, and the government. He said that the tariff elimination schedule had been 
negotiated with the CGEM, that a negotiating platform had been signed with all branches 
of agriculture, and that regular meetings had been held with the government and 
Members of Parliament. 
 
“We negotiated the rules of the game… line by line, product by product… 
and everyone signed. I had a negotiating mandate that was clearly 
established with the farmers well before the end of the negotiations… they 
were all informed, without exception… before, during and after the deal was 
done.” 
 
A third Moroccan official echoed the statements of his colleagues regarding the close 
consultation of the industrial and agricultural sectors, and described farmers as having all 
but participated in the negotiations. While acknowledging that agricultural exporters 
were unhappy with the agreement, he attributed that discontent to the Common 
Agricultural Policy rather than the quality of the Moroccan negotiating effort or any lack 
of consultation. Some industry associations were more effective than others, according to 
the same interviewee: 
 
“In Morocco, some sectors are better organized than others. The textile and 
clothing industry, for example, is very well organized thanks to a very 
efficient and dynamic association, and that means a lobbying of the 
negotiating team that is more effective and better researched than when it’s 
simply a company taking a position almost on an individual basis… But in 
general, businesses did lobby the government… to influence the course of 
events in their favor, through the industry associations, the CGEM, and the 
Chambers of Commerce.”   
 
A fourth Moroccan official confirmed the predominant role of the CGEM as a channel of 
consultation in the eyes of the government, and raised concerns about its effectiveness, 
assigning the blame to a lack of participation by the CGEM membership: 
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“When we started holding meetings to explain our position to industry, no-
one came. No-one came. Because for them, it was death… Europe was 
going to walk all over us, the factories were going to be closed down… The 
private sector didn’t want to be involved, and said ‘so long as we’re not 
involved, they won’t do anything’… so we held meetings at the CGEM with 
only five or six people. But there was no going back… I… did a tour of the 
regions to explain what we intended to do, but participation was not so 
high… people were saying: ‘it’s not going to happen’. We signed the 
agreement, and people thought it wouldn’t be implemented, that’s the 
extent to which they didn’t expect implementation… The private sector was 
there… to provide us with information, but the decisions were taken by the 
Ministry of Industry and the CGEM, which represented all the sectors… A 
lot of people say the CGEM was involved but wasn’t very representative. 
It’s not surprising, because the member firms didn’t participate. And at a 
certain point, the President of the CGEM had no choice but to follow the 
government.” 
 
The view of Moroccan officials that the private sector, including farmers, was fully 
consulted remains highly controversial, and is flatly rejected by many private sector 
operators. One interviewee, in the agriculture sector, was asked who represented the 
various interests affected by the Association Agreement before and during the 
negotiations. He replied: “No-one! For Morocco, for agriculture, no-one!,” and suggested 
that Moroccan interests suffered dramatically as a result: 
 
“The European Union was trying to protect its agriculture under essentially 
Spanish pressure, and for us, there was no-one to exert pressure, because at 
the time we were not involved in the negotiations. By the time we were 
involved, it was too late, the major decisions had already been taken. There 
was no going back. The tomato issue, which was crucial for Morocco, was… 
overlooked. I don’t think it was done deliberately, but the result was that we 
were neither consulted nor defended. During all these negotiations, we had a 
feeling of despair and abandonment. I’m convinced that we would have had 
a much better agreement if the sector had been involved from the 
beginning… but they didn’t even bother to inform us. As a sector, we believe 
our interests have been damaged.” 
 
This interviewee reported that the producers of his sub-sector had hired a lobbying firm 
in Brussels over a period of several years, because the Moroccan agricultural attaché in 
Brussels was severely limited by budget restrictions and was competing against a large 
Spanish presence. He said that the lobbying in Brussels had been useful, and had shown 
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the Moroccan government that producers were prepared to put cash on the table and 
make a commitment. 
 
Complaints over a lack of consultation by Moroccan negotiators were also rife at a joint 
meeting held on February 9 PthP, 1994, by the industry associations representing citrus fruit, 
early fruit and vegetables, and flower producers, as well as a cooperative fruit marketing 
agency. The meeting had been called in response to concerns over the European Union 
offer in the GATT round, which was perceived as a severe threat to Moroccan access to 
European markets, and the participating firms expressed a lack of confidence in 
Moroccan trade negotiators. They claimed that the Moroccan response to the EU GATT 
proposal had been slow and timid, that it did not reflect their concerns, and that their 
active involvement in the talks was essential. One participant said that producers had a 
better grasp of the issues than the negotiators, while another, a Member of Parliament, 
claimed that the government was completely detached from the concerns of farmers 
(Berraoui 1994, in l’Economiste). These criticisms were repeated by agriculture sector 
representatives nearly two years later, after the completion of Association Agreement 
negotiations: 
 
“We regret not having participated in the negotiations between Morocco and 
the EU, as technical experts and as the most heavily affected operators in the 
sector, despite the agreement in principle by the government that we would 
do so and despite our active involvement in preparing the technical papers 
regarding the various classes of product. Even without sitting at the 
negotiating table, we could have provided technical support behind the 
scenes or even from our hotel rooms. We don’t understand why we’ve been 
somewhat forgotten” (Oudghiri 1995, in l’Economiste).  
  
A former president of the Industry Section of the Moroccan Employers Federation 
(CGEM), Abdellatif Bel Madani, had told l’Economiste three weeks earlier that no real 
debate had taken place: 
 
“We are now obliged to proceed; but the debate has been avoided and has 
never been opened. In Europe, the accession of a country has always been 
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preceded by studies, major discussions, and even a referendum” (Belyazid 
1995). 
 
A Moroccan official indicated that the input of the trade unions had largely occurred at 
the final stage of the process, during the ratification of the accord in Parliament, where 
unions were represented. Their input was less significant during the negotiation phase, 
because the Moroccan political system was less well adapted to civil society lobbying at 
the time of the agreement than it is today, and the interest groups themselves were less 
well prepared for the task, he said. One trade union, the UGTM (aligned with the 
conservative Istiqlal Party), staked out its position in November 1995, days before the 
Barcelona Conference, in an article published by l’Economiste: 
 
“Unfortunately, the ‘partnership’ offered by the European Union carries, as 
in the past, the same connotations of exploitation of the southern countries 
by those of the North. This shows that Europe does not, for the moment, want 
to envisage a partnership. It instead prefers to expand its market through 
competition based on a very lopsided balance of power… This escalation (in 
the European battle against American and Asian competition) is dragging us 
towards an increasingly savage liberalism that is devoid of all humanity and 
is worsening the social divisions of the Maghreb countries. It runs counter to 
the security interests of Europe… Remember how much had to be spent on 
the economic upgrading of Spain and Portugal: our own upgrading process 
will not be taken care of by the European Union. The ‘partnership’, as 
proposed, is nothing other than the destruction of our businesses in order to 
ensure total control of North Africa by the EU” (Afilal 1995). 
 
According to a Moroccan official, most interest group lobbying occurred through formal 
channels, as opposed to informal opportunities such as cocktail receptions and dinners, 
and especially via Members of Parliament aligned with particular interests, the relevant 
Ministries, the professional associations, the news media, and, above all, seminars: 
 
“I especially remember the upsurge in the number of colloquia and seminars 
that were organized around the negotiations, mostly in Casablanca. And I 
think that that was perhaps part of the birth of civil society in Morocco, not a 
week would go by without a seminar or colloquium at the Royal Mansour or 
the Hyatt or the Sheraton, and that ultimately… paved the way for a 
smoother preparation of future negotiations…”  
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A private sector representative said that trade unions initially opposed the FTA, along 
with the Socialist Party (USFP), but he felt that the latter position was motivated by 
ideological considerations rather than the national interest. Businesses were not opposed 
to free trade in principle, but were concerned about the level of support that would be 
provided for economic and company upgrading, he said. The Employers Federation 
(CGEM) worked closely with the government, participating in “pre-meetings” with 
negotiators and serving on various consultative committees, as well as raising awareness 
of the issues among trade unions. The CGEM also lobbied counterpart organizations in 
Europe and EU officials for the elimination of European agricultural subsidies that 
prejudice Moroccan market access, he said. 
 
The CGEM position on free trade with the EU was stated clearly in a report submitted to 
the government in late 1992 and published in its entirety in the local press: 
 
“We have consistently affirmed our support for all policies of liberalization 
while drawing the attention of officials to the extreme vulnerability of some 
sectors. We have above all sought a coherent policy to evaluate, with the 
sectors concerned, the negative consequences for them of liberalization and 
the measures required to prepare them for foreign competition… There is no 
doubt that the EEC and the Maghreb Arab Union represent considerable 
opportunities for growth” (L’Economiste 1992). 
 
European Union officials identified the European winners of free trade as the 
manufacturers of small-scale industrial and household equipment, vehicles and consumer 
goods, given that exports of heavy machinery and infrastructure were already occurring 
prior to the agreement. France was also cited as a winner, due to its heavy commercial 
presence in Morocco and well-developed bilateral trade flows. Potential losers on the 
European side included southern European farmers likely to be hurt even by the limited 
agricultural concessions ultimately granted. One EU official described those concessions 
as having been imposed through political will in the face of stiff opposition from farmers, 
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and with lukewarm support for the agreement from the industrial sector, which had many 
potential markets other than Morocco. 
 
Another group of potential European losers were Spanish fishermen facing reduced 
catches under the renewed EU/Morocco fisheries agreement. Francisco Mayor Parede, of 
the Almeria Fishermen’s Guild, told l’Economiste in 1995 that neither the Spanish 
government nor the European Union were defending his members. He expressed an 
uncompromising view of the divergent interests at stake: 
 
“If the Moroccans want to keep their waters and their fish for themselves, 
then let them, and we’ll keep our market to ourselves! Everyone will stay 
home. If that’s what they want, Europe will have to close its borders to all 
Moroccan products and give us the financial compensation instead of giving 
it to Morocco!” (Bourgaux 1995a).  
 
May 1995 was the first month in which Spanish and Portuguese fishing vessels were 
excluded from Moroccan waters, after the expiry of the previous fisheries accord and in 
the absence of a new deal, despite ongoing talks. Spanish fishermen in the various 
southern ports imposed an embargo on all Moroccan exports arriving by sea, attacked the 
trucks and destroyed the merchandise (Richard 1995, in Le Monde). One year later, and 
six months after the conclusion of the fisheries and association agreements, European 
Commissioner Manuel Marin accused “certain” agricultural groups of having mounted 
campaigns intended to spread panic and convince the public that the agreement would 
lead to disaster in the Spanish countryside. He said that this had resulted in a climate of 
tension in which dialog had been replaced by lies and insults, making the negotiations 
extremely difficult (Bourgaux 1996, in l’Economiste). 
 
European officials recalled approaches from federations of chambers of commerce rather 
than from any more specific groups, as well as the direct protest actions of Spanish 
farmers who, like the fishermen, attacked and obstructed trucks carrying Moroccan 
produce, and demanded financial compensation for lost income. EU officials noted a 
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generalized fear within the Moroccan private sector that centered on the free trade 
agreement but in fact stemmed, in their view, from globalization in general and an 
increasingly competitive world economy. This fear was muted in its expression given that 
the negotiation of the accord was a Royal priority. Moroccan private sector 
representatives met with EU officials, in Rabat and in Brussels, and conveyed their views 
in seminars and private meetings. The Moroccan government position was put in the 
formal negotiations, but the official talks were also supplemented by bilateral contacts 
with Madrid, Paris and Rome, according to EU interviewees.  
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
The Politics of the Lowest Common Denominator in Europe and 
Democracy Deficits in the Maghreb 
 
 
The picture of Morocco that emerges from the interview data is that of a country that saw 
no alternative to the European Union in generating new foreign trade and investment 
flows, because of the overwhelming EU dominance of existing flows, its geographic and 
linguistic proximity, and the close bilateral political ties that link Morocco with a number 
of EU member States. This situation of path dependency appears to have reinforced the 
conservatism of decision-makers in a political system that is naturally conservative, and 
precluded serious consideration of options for diversification until many years later. Yet 
in contrast to this early failure to think beyond the obvious in choosing partners for 
deepened economic relations, Morocco was strikingly bold in its degree of commitment 
to the deepening process itself and to the higher level of integration with Europe that it 
implied. The initial Moroccan enthusiasm for free trade as a motor of economic reform 
and competitiveness that should be adopted in a radical version to maximize benefits, 
although clearly excessive, does show a remarkable desire to innovate within the main 
traditional commercial relationship. The regrettable failure to apply that same innovative 
spirit to the diversification of trade flows away from that primary relationship is 
exemplified by the fact that the Moroccan-American free trade agreement, signed nearly 
10 years later, was to be initiated by the United States, although the Moroccan 
government has become much more pro-active in recent years with respect to other 
partners. The Moroccan commitment to free trade with the EU appears to have been 
driven by the convictions of a handful of top officials and Royal advisors rather than by 
any domestic political constituency or by any specific external factors, apart from the 
general process of globalization and trade liberalization; for the European Union, 
however, the willingness to negotiate trade liberalization and a strengthened Association 
Agreement with Morocco (or other partners) seems to have resulted from a number of 
geopolitical imperatives as opposed to the policy agendas of activist EU officials. 
119 
 120
 
The European Union of the early to mid 1990s, as described by the officials interviewed 
and the various secondary sources, was already contemplating the dramatic 
transformation of eastwards expansion in the post-Soviet era. There was a natural 
diplomatic desire to find some way of signaling to Southern Mediterranean countries that 
they would not be forgotten in the new European order, and this diplomatic need was 
given a sense of urgency and policy substance by the questions of illegal immigration and 
drug trafficking, and by several terrorist incidents with North African connections. As a 
result, European declarations about a vast zone of economic prosperity stretching from 
Morocco to Israel were not entirely empty rhetoric, even though the resources devoted to 
the plan were inadequate and the results have been disappointing. On a bilateral level, the 
Moroccan free trade proposal proved a timely vehicle for reconciliation with the EU after 
European Parliament criticism of the Kingdom’s human rights record, although renewed 
EU interest in the proposal appears to date from the previous year and so cannot be 
considered a response to that episode. The Moroccan free trade proposal subsequently 
evolved into the Euro-Med partnership heralded by the Barcelona Declaration and the 
new generation of Association Agreements: the Moroccan initiative became the core of a 
much broader Euro-Mediterranean response to the economic and political challenges of 
the moment. 
 
The interview data can be analyzed on the basis of two main approaches, the negotiation 
perspective (drawing on negotiation and game theory, and especially Putnam) and the 
interest group perspective (drawing on general theories of economic interests such as 
Rogowski and analysis of the Moroccan elite structure). 
 
Putnam (1988) conceived of international negotiations as a two-level game. The national 
level is characterized by intense competition between political actors who seek power by 
building coalitions of domestic interest groups, while at the international level, in 
negotiations, governments seek to satisfy domestic pressures and obtain the best possible 
deal on the issue at hand, given the state of international relations. The national political 
leader interacts, on the international level, with his foreign counterparts and his own 
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advisors, and on the national level with party and parliamentary actors, interest group 
representatives, and again with his own advisors. An action that may be rational for the 
national leader at the international level may be dangerous to his political survival at 
home, and in that case he/she is caught between the desire for a more favorable 
international agreement (or the avoidance of negotiation failure) and the need to maintain 
domestic political support. But as Putnam says, “on occasion, clever players will spot a 
move on one board that will trigger realignments on other boards, enabling them to 
achieve otherwise unattainable objectives” (p. 434). The instrument by which the 
national political leader triggers this realignment and reconciles the two levels of 
interests, national and international, is the process of agreement ratification.  
 
Even assuming that initial Level II (domestic) discussions take place to determine the 
Level I (international) negotiating position, as well as broad parameters for compromise, 
and further, that consultation with domestic interests occurs throughout the negotiations, 
any Level I agreement must ultimately be ratified (without amendment) at Level II. 
Putnam defines ratification as “any decision-process at Level II that is required to 
endorse or implement a Level I agreement, whether formally or informally” (p. 436); he 
stresses that ratification may include, in addition to parliamentary approval, the accord of 
bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social classes, or public opinion, and that this need 
not occur in a democratic context. The need for Level II ratification requires that any 
Level I agreement fall within the Level II “win-set”, defined as “the set of all possible 
Level I agreements that would gain the necessary majority among the constituents when 
simply voted up or down” (p. 437).  
 
Putnam holds that win-set size is determined by:  
(1) Level II preferences and coalitions (as a function of actors’ perceived cost of no-
agreement, their relative influence and propensity to lobby, and their willingness 
to trade-off across multiple issues),  
(2) Level II institutions (the difficulty of ratification requirements as reflected in 
minimum majorities, the level of party discipline and authoritarianism, etc.), and  
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(3) Level I negotiator strategies (the use of side-payments and general domestic 
political popularity [“generic good will”] to increase the possibility of ratification) 
(pp. 441-452). 
 
The fact that Level I negotiators often have a poor knowledge of the domestic politics of 
other parties (and thus the size of their win-set) allows those parties to exaggerate the 
smallness of their win-set in hopes of getting a better deal, but it may also lead to fears 
that they will be unable to deliver on the agreement reached (pp. 452-453). Governments 
may also try to “restructure” each other’s win-sets through lobbying and aid packages, or 
by creating international pressures (such as the policy momentum generated by a summit 
meeting) that “reverberate” in domestic politics and allow an agreement to be ratified 
where before it could not have been (assuming that there is no backlash against the 
international pressure) (pp. 454-456). Synergistic linkages (trade-offs across different 
issue areas) are thought likely to multiply with increased economic interdependence, 
which in turn increases the range of possible trade offs (pp. 447-448). 
 
The Moroccan case clearly brings a new twist to the Putnam framework. The range of 
level II preferences and coalitions appears to have been extremely limited, due to a 
longstanding authoritarian tradition based on submission to the Monarchy and its 
representatives. Moroccan civil society, which by 2005 was relatively well-developed, 
albeit far from wielding decisive influence, was barely nascent in the early to mid 1990s 
and was in no position to obtain a significant role in the negotiation and ratification 
processes. Civil society groups ranging from industrial associations to trade unions to 
NGOs both organized and participated in informational seminars and debates, and some 
industry groups were occasionally consulted and briefed by public officials in general 
terms during the negotiations, but their only specific and detailed input seems to have 
been sectoral data used by negotiators in preparing position papers. The general 
sentiment of non-governmental actors, especially in the agriculture sector, appears to be 
that they were denied the intensive and detailed involvement in the Morocco/EU talks to 
which they aspired, and which they believed would have better safeguarded their 
interests and those of their country. 
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Yet in striking contrast to this viewpoint, several Moroccan government officials insisted 
that industry representatives were fully involved in the negotiations and in some cases 
even approved the negotiating mandate “line by line, product by product.” Even the 
Moroccan official who acknowledged the prevailing government tradition of information 
retention and secrecy also claimed that all interest groups had been regularly consulted. 
At the same time, Moroccan officials spoke of a lack of openness and consultation on the 
part of the government, and identified the weak institutional capacity of economic 
interest groups as a factor that led negotiators to regard those groups as sources of 
information rather than full partners in the negotiating process. This testimony suggests a 
complete contradiction between those Moroccan government officials who believe that 
full consultation occurred, and those Moroccan government officials and private sector 
representatives who believe that very little consultation took place at all. The likely key 
to this apparent contradiction is a narrow government definition of “consultation” that 
mostly involved only general and occasional briefings for economic interest groups and 
the gathering from them of sectoral data that was subsequently incorporated into formal 
negotiating positions – usually without their involvement at that crucial stage. This 
approach was encouraged, if not justified, by the very real lack of institutional capacity 
within many economic interest groups. To the extent that any industry representatives 
saw and approved detailed negotiating positions, they are likely to have represented a 
small group of players chosen by the government and Palace rather than any broad-based 
consultation exercise. In Morocco in the 1990s, government consultation with industry 
mostly took place through the leadership of the Employers Federation (CGEM), an 
organization that itself suffered from a tradition of authoritarianism and inadequate 
consultation, and which has since embarked on an internal restructuring program 
intended to eliminate such problems. 
 
It is clear, then, that Moroccan economic interest groups had little influence on the 
negotiations with the EU, and the role of Parliament and the political parties was even 
less consequential given the subservience of these institutions to the Royal Palace, a 
fortiori on an issue that was a priority of the King. The latter point is of critical 
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importance, given that Parliamentary ratification, a mere formality in this authoritarian 
context, was the only institutional mechanism by which economic interest groups might 
have threatened approval of the negotiated agreement after realizing that they would be 
unable to sufficiently influence its content. The government, having failed to adequately 
involve such groups in the talks, might at least have capitalized on their discontent as a 
threat to ratification tending to reduce the Moroccan win-set, but the absence of a 
credible ratification process eliminated even this possible advantage at Level I. Neither 
level II interest group coalitions nor level II institutions were in a position to threaten 
ratification, to such an extent that level I negotiators were not obliged to implement 
strategies intended to promote ratification. In a very real sense, the win-set of the 
domestic interest groups was replaced by that of a handful of top government officials 
and the King, and it can be supposed that the latter win-set was relatively large, given the 
strong – and initially excessive – commitment of that group to free trade as a motor of 
reform and competitiveness. The ideological nature of that commitment may have 
insulated it from the concerns of interest groups and further discouraged the government 
from involving them closely in the negotiations.  
 
Given their large win-set, the Moroccan negotiators might have been tempted to 
misrepresent it as relatively small in an effort to extract concessions from the European 
Union, but the long historical relationship between the two parties and the heavy 
presence in Morocco of the EU and its member States meant that the European 
negotiators had a very good understanding of the Moroccan polity. Morocco did attempt, 
with some degree of success, to widen the EU win-set in the Association Agreement 
negotiations by linking concessions in those talks to renewal of the fisheries agreement, 
but the EU was successful in containing the phenomenon. 
 
Within the European Union, the mathematics of the win-set were infinitely more 
complicated than on the Moroccan side. Level II interest group coalitions included the 
North/South split between member States favorable to a large aid package as part of the 
Association Agreement but hostile to agricultural concessions that would damage their 
farmers, and other member States unwilling to approve heavy expenditure and unaffected 
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by possible Moroccan agricultural exports. Other critical interest groups were Spanish 
farmers, Spanish fishermen, protectionist EU institutions (the Agriculture Directorate 
General), economically liberal EU institutions (the External Relations Directorate 
General), and the governments of the three member States most involved in 
Mediterranean affairs: Spain, France, and Italy. All of the member State governments 
were fully aware of their ability to block any agreement containing unacceptable 
provisions when it reached the European Council, or to delay subsequent ratification by 
their domestic parliament in an effort to obtain unrelated concessions, and several of 
them exercised that power. Spanish farmers and fishermen proved to be active and 
persuasive lobbyists: European Commissioner Manuel Marin publicly stated that 
agricultural groups had created a climate of tension that had obstructed the negotiations, 
and angry protests by fishermen – including the destruction of Moroccan produce – 
forced side-payments from the European Commission in the form of compensation for 
lost earnings during the period of exclusion from Moroccan waters. Regardless of the 
rights and wrongs of the tactics employed, both groups succeeded in making their sectors 
critical to the outcome of the talks and in narrowing the EU win-set.  
 
Protectionist EU institutions reinforced the position of Spanish farmers and fishermen: 
the Agriculture Directorate General through its direct involvement in the negotiations, 
the Fisheries Directorate General by choosing to interpret its mandate in parochial terms 
(licenses for the Spanish rather than development of the industry by Morocco and Spain 
in partnership), and the European Parliament by denouncing the “generosity” of 
concessions made to Morocco. The Spanish government also threw its weight behind its 
agriculture and fisheries sectors, and the resulting “grand coalition” was too powerful to 
be overcome by the External Relations Directorate General, which saw increased 
agricultural access for Morocco and the growth of the Moroccan fishing industry as 
critical to the development objectives of the emerging EuroMed partnership. The EU 
found itself offering Morocco a relatively unattractive set of proposals on agriculture and 
fisheries, but tried to “restructure” the Moroccan win-set with a substantial aid package, 
by signing with rival Tunisia while the Moroccan talks were ongoing, and by playing on 
the imminence of the Barcelona Conference – a major international summit to consecrate 
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the EuroMed partnership in which Morocco naturally wished to participate with full 
Association Agreement status. Because the Moroccan win-set was relatively large, and 
because free trade and the wider strategic partnership apparently on offer was so 
important to the Moroccan leadership, Morocco ultimately signed an Association 
Agreement of which the free trade component was so unfavorable that even European 
Union officials believed it should have been rejected.  
 
The application of the two-level game model to the EU/Morocco negotiations yields 
greater insights on the Moroccan side, in the sense that the Morocco of the mid 1990s did 
not correspond to the liberal democratic context common to most previous applications 
of the model. It appears that in Morocco, a significant proportion of domestic interests 
did diverge from those of political leaders and negotiators: the concerns of fruit and 
vegetable growers anxious to protect EU market access, those of manufacturers 
vulnerable to European competition, and those of trade unionists wary of neo-colonialist 
exploitation all contrast starkly with the ideological commitment of leaders and 
negotiators to free trade as a motor of economic reform and competitiveness. 
Nevertheless, the highly autocratic nature of the Moroccan polity and the underdeveloped 
state of Moroccan civil society at that time seems to have prevented interests opposed to 
the free trade and association agreement from exerting significant influence over the 
bilateral talks. The resulting frustration among groups that felt their voices had been 
ignored may well have played a key role in accelerating the growth of the lobbying 
culture and civil society in Morocco. Within the European Union, domestic interests 
clearly had a direct and decisive impact on the EU negotiating position and therefore on 
the provisions of the final agreement. Spanish farmers and fishermen were able to 
instrumentalize the electoral weight of their communities, the cost to Brussels of 
compensation payments for exclusion from Moroccan waters, and the diplomatic fallout 
from the obstruction and destruction of Moroccan produce shipments. The agriculture 
and fisheries issues were intense: they affected relatively few people but they affected 
them greatly. The Spanish farmers and fishermen were a well-organized, bold, and 
sometimes violent and patently unreasonable minority, and in the European Union 
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political system their concerns could not be ignored, as those of many Moroccan interest 
groups appear to have been in Morocco. 
 
The ratification process for international treaties is relatively easy to define in liberal 
democratic polities such as the European Union and its member States, partly because it 
is highly codified and formalized, and partly because even the informal aspect of the 
process is made more accessible given that the various State and private interests tend to 
be well-known and publicized, and their representatives familiar to the public, journalists, 
and researchers. This high degree of exposure creates a sort of “road map” for analysts 
and commentators that had no equivalent in countries such as Morocco. The formal 
ratification process in Morocco, involving Cabinet approval of the final agreement and a 
vote in Parliament, was essentially meaningless, since both institutions were without 
popular legitimacy and were subservient to the Royal Palace (the party seeking 
ratification). The “real” ratification process took place between the King, his top advisors 
and negotiators, and a very limited number of interest group representatives who may 
have been genuinely consulted rather than simply briefed. With respect to the free trade 
and association agreement talks between Morocco and the European Union, 
informational briefings for economic interest groups appear to have been scarce, and 
even a Moroccan official who insisted that the government did engage in full 
consultation also admitted that “there was no openness” and that producers “weren’t 
informed”. This sort of confusion and contradiction among government officials, and 
between government officials and interest group representatives, reflects a fundamental 
gulf of understanding about the nature of consultation. Consultation seems to have been 
defined variously as (1) simply providing information, (2) providing information and 
seeking feedback, and (3) engaging in a dialog to arrive at a joint position. To the extent 
that the latter form of consultation took place at all, the main partner appears to have 
been the Moroccan Employers Federation (CGEM), and the CGEM appears to have 
adopted a position of full support for the principle of free trade while focusing its anxiety 
on the question of company and business environment upgrading funds. Given the large 
and diverse membership base of the Moroccan Employers Federation, such a position 
seems unlikely to have been fully representative of the organization’s constituency. 
 
 128
Indeed, the internal tension created by the CGEM role in the Morocco/EU free trade and 
association agreement may have contributed to several membership revolts against the 
Federation leadership in the ensuing decade; the rallying cries of the dissidents have 
usually included charges of autocracy, information retention, and a low priority for small 
and medium-sized businesses. In 2003, the latest such campaign brought together an 
eclectic alliance of small businesses and large corporations that fell 20 votes short (out of 
2200 cast) of unseating incumbent CGEM President and former Cabinet Minister Hassan 
Chami.  
 
 
The weight of evidence, then, appears to support Putnam’s contention that “entrenched” 
authoritarian regimes are often in a weaker negotiating position due to their perceived or 
actual greater ability to obtain ratification. Although Evans et al. found that ratification 
was actually more difficult when a small authoritarian elite was opposed to an agreement, 
or was composed of only a small number of discordant factions offering little margin for 
coalition building, the Moroccan case – a process controlled by a handful of officials 
with an ideological commitment to the agreement and backed by the King – seems to be 
the exception to this logic. Authoritarianism in Morocco UdidU facilitate ratification, 
because the tiny core elite in a position to harness that authoritarianism was unified 
behind the agreement. It was neither divided nor opposed to the accord. If we were to 
conceive of a spectrum of ease of ratification, one extreme would be occupied by small 
authoritarian elites (divided or opposed to ratification), the other extreme would be 
occupied by small authoritarian elites unified behind ratification, and the middle ground 
would be taken up by liberal democracies differentiated by the extent to which factional 
diversity made coalition building in favor of the agreement a realistic possibility.  
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A Spectrum of Ease of Ratification of International Agreements (IA) 
 
Probable 
ratification 
 
(no potential for 
coalition building) 
 
Uncertain  
ratification 
 
(significant potential for coalition building/win-set restructuring) 
Improbable  
ratification 
 
(limited/no potential for coalition 
building) 
Authoritarian elite 
unified behind IA 
Pluralistic liberal 
democracy with 
majority of interest 
groups favoring IA  
Pluralistic liberal 
democracy with no 
clear majority of 
interest groups 
for/against IA  
Pluralistic liberal 
democracy with 
majority of interest 
groups opposing IA  
Authoritarian 
elite divided 
over IA  
Authoritarian 
elite unified in 
opposition to IA 
 
It is probable that Morocco paid a high price in the Association Agreement talks for the 
absence of a democratic culture that would have given a voice to threatened domestic 
interests, made ratification more difficult, and strengthened Moroccan bargaining power. 
In that case, Morocco may have been able to negotiate a more favorable tariff elimination 
schedule and a more comprehensive aid package for business environment improvements 
and company upgrading, although any gains on agriculture and fisheries would have been 
limited given the critical status of these sectors in the EU political landscape. The 
implication is clear: the Moroccan position in future international negotiations would be 
strengthened if Morocco evolved into a credible Parliamentary democracy and fully 
integrated critical interest groups into its negotiating efforts. Alternatively, it would also 
be possible for Morocco to attain a greater level of difficulty of ratification, and therefore 
improved negotiating power, by somehow restructuring its elite to create a balance of 
opposing factions relative to a given agreement. However, this approach would be very 
difficult to engineer, and it would deprive the country of broad interest group 
participation that would guarantee a hearing for the full range of perspectives and the 
involvement of a maximum of skilled individuals in reaching an optimal solution. 
 
The behavior of European Union bureaucratic and private sector interest groups tends to 
undermine rational theories of negotiation in which States act according to autonomous 
national interests unrelated to the preferences of any particular group or officeholder. 
Instead, the EU negotiating position seems to have resulted from the interplay of the 
competing interests of different public institutions and agencies, private interest groups, 
and public opinion, just as Hopmann suggested. The Agriculture Directorate General of 
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the European Commission and Spanish farmers were strong voices for protectionism, the 
External Relations Directorate General took a less protectionist approach focused on 
socio-economic development objectives, the Fisheries Directorate General adopted a 
commercial perspective that failed to incorporate joint Spanish/Moroccan development 
of the industry, the European Parliament led a campaign against alleged human rights 
abuses in Morocco and “overly generous” trade concessions, and various member States 
used their influence in the European Council to block unwanted provisions in the 
agreement. Far from representing the autonomous “national interest” of the European 
Union, the European negotiating position in talks with Morocco reflected the lowest 
common denominator of conflicting member State interests and was largely driven by 
only three of the then 15 members. It seems to have resulted not from any real process of 
compromise – which implies dialog and mutual sacrifices among member States – but 
from a series of vetoes exercised by various member States against proposals deemed 
unacceptable. As one European official reported, the Commission had “caved into 
Spanish political pressure, and the result was a minimal offer.” Kaarbo’s distinction 
between power and influence in bureaucratic politics is also relevant to the European 
Union case, as one key EU negotiator had considerable formal power but had so little 
influence with the Moroccans due to personality conflicts that another EU official had to 
be dispatched to Rabat to overcome a period of deadlock. In terms of Habeeb’s model of 
power in negotiations, the EU clearly had a massive advantage in aggregate structural 
power over Morocco, and held considerable tactical power (the ability to use power 
resources to attain objectives). The latter category includes power plays such as the early 
signing of an Association Agreement with Tunisia, the use of the Barcelona Conference 
as a critical deadline, and the refusal to sign the Association Agreement before the 
fisheries agreement. Although Morocco held issue-specific structural power on such 
questions as fisheries access, illegal immigration and drug flows, it lacked the tactical 
power to capitalize on them because its perceived need for the Association Agreement 
was intense; the EU aggregate structural power advantage therefore prevailed by default. 
 
The Moroccan negotiating position was, in a sense, perhaps closer to the rationalist idea 
of autonomous national interest than that of the EU: the Moroccan position was driven by 
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an ideological commitment to trade liberalization, and factional interests appear to have 
played a limited role. Nevertheless, this formulation of the national interest resulted not 
from compromises among interest groups, citizens, and public stakeholders striving for a 
consensus, but from a small group of public officials; in other words, the Moroccan 
position may have been genuinely motivated by a desire to advance the national interest 
(and this appears to be so), but it had no popular legitimacy. Indeed, had full public 
consultation occurred, the resulting position may in fact have been much less coherent 
and heavily influenced by competing factions and interests. The distinction between 
bureaucratic power and influence was also evident in Morocco, with certain negotiators 
acting by virtue of their association with powerful officials despite holding no formal 
position, and others using privileged personal access to the King to achieve a change in 
the composition of the negotiating team. Ultimately, though, the political power of the 
King was the lynchpin of the entire process. 
 
The data on the negotiation of the free trade and association agreement on the Moroccan 
side shows that the technocratic elite was in full control of the process and involved the 
business and political elites to the minimum extent possible, an approach facilitated by 
the norms of consultation prevailing at the time. A handful of senior civil servants and 
Royal advisors were the driving force behind the Moroccan quest for free trade, and the 
subsequent negotiations with the European Union in the context of the Barcelona 
process, and they were able to protect their policy agenda from the restraining influence 
of sectoral concerns through a highly restrictive form of consultation. The leadership of 
the Moroccan Employers Federation (CGEM) appears to have had considerable input 
into the Moroccan position, although there are questions regarding its representativeness 
and therefore its effectiveness as a conduit for the various sectoral interests within its 
membership. The influence of other industry associations and groups (many of which are 
also members of the CGEM) appears to have been limited to media coverage of their 
information seminars and debates, technical data supplied to the relevant Ministries, and 
occasional meetings with the negotiators that were more informational briefing than 
policy dialog. In summary, there appears to have been a limited flow of information in 
both directions between government negotiators and private sector interest groups, but 
 
 132
not an in-depth policy dialog leading to a negotiating position fully informed by 
professional expertise. Trade unions, civil society groups and parliamentarians seem to 
have been even further removed from involvement in the process. 
 
It does not appear that Moroccan government officials adopted an approach of limited 
consultation out of any desire to exclude or damage the interests of a given group or 
groups. Instead, their behavior seems to be consistent with a longstanding political 
culture of authoritarianism that was still very prevalent in the early 1990s and has been 
only slowly diminishing since that time. This slow progress has been accompanied by 
setbacks. On one hand, the relatively extensive consultation surrounding the 
Morocco/U.S. free trade agreement, eight years after the European Union talks, shows 
that at least some Moroccan trade negotiators have come to better understand the value of 
private sector input into their work. On the other hand, the conclusion in 2005 of a 
scaled-down fisheries agreement with the European Union – the first since the 1995 
treaty expired – caught the Moroccan fisheries industry by surprise: the Secretary 
General of the Moroccan Deep Sea Fishing Officers and Seamen’s Union told a local 
newspaper, Le Journal Hebdomadaire, that “although the accord was publicly debated in 
Europe, in Morocco it was subject to a total blackout” (Tounassi 2005, pp. 62-63). 
 
Moroccan export farmers appear to have been extremely active in attempting to protect 
and extend their access to EU markets under the Association Agreement, as Rogowski’s 
red/green coalition analysis would suggest, but there is no evidence that the mass of 
workers was active in the debate over free trade with the European Union, and the 
leadership of at least one major trade union was ideologically opposed to the Association 
Agreement as an instrument of neo-colonial domination. The lack of worker enthusiasm 
for “free trade” with the EU is logical, given that Morocco had long since obtained access 
to EU industrial markets and therefore the potential benefits of the arrangement, whereas 
the extension of the principle to the Moroccan domestic market raised the prospect of a 
significant contraction in the workforce in the short to medium-term as competing 
European products gained access. The prospect of more jobs in the medium to long-term 
thanks to lower input costs and competition-generated productivity increases is of little 
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appeal to the worker who becomes a casualty of the transition. The capitalist (CGEM) 
leadership – the business elite – supported free trade in principle and was primarily 
concerned about financial support for company upgrading, although the CGEM position 
may have omitted the concerns of the companies most vulnerable to European 
competition, concerns that would be more consistent with Rogowski. The Rogowski 
model is of marginal applicability to the Moroccan context, partly because of the limited 
nature of the trade liberalization measures adopted, and partly because of low interest 
group power in the Moroccan political system of the time. 
 
The expected research findings stated at the outset were: 
 
1. That the European Union proposed a free trade agreement that was unnecessarily 
disadvantageous to Morocco under the influence of sectoral pressure groups seeking 
to protect their interests, and. 
 
2. That Morocco accepted an unnecessarily disadvantageous free trade agreement under 
the combined influence of:   
(1) an elite/business coalition that stood to gain from the deal and had extraordinary 
influence over the decision-making process, and  
(2) a generalized belief among the political elite that Morocco could not afford to be 
excluded from the longer-term development benefits of trade liberalization – 
whatever the short-to-medium term costs – and that existing patterns of trade and 
cultural relations made Western Europe the inevitable partner.   
 
The first expected finding appears to be correct, since the data indicates clearly that 
inadequate participation in the EU negotiation and ratification process by member States 
allowed narrow sectoral interests to take precedence over the objectives of economic 
development for Morocco and the Maghreb set out in the Barcelona Declaration. 
 
The first statement of the second expected finding appears to be correct, since the data 
indicates that the Moroccan position was determined and pursued by a small group of 
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senior officials and business leaders that was unified behind substantial trade 
liberalization. Opposing viewpoints seem to have carried little weight because they 
originated in groups that are generally disenfranchised by the authoritarian Moroccan 
political tradition. The second statement also appears to be confirmed by the data: the 
political elite (in fact, the technocratic elite, according to Benhaddou’s typology) did 
clearly see the longer-term development benefits of trade liberalization as outweighing 
the costs (which will fall disproportionately on non-elite sections of the population). 
Their calculations were, however, based on full implementation of the moribund social 
and political provisions of the Association Agreement, and it is interesting to speculate as 
to whether they would have been so enthusiastic had the free trade agreement alone been 
on the table. The choice of Western Europe as the main partner for trade liberalization 
seems to be clearly explained by the initial path dependency supposition. 
 
  
CHAPTER NINE 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The decade that began in 1995 and ended in 2005 was a period of enormous challenge 
and change for the Kingdom of Morocco. It straddled the last years of the reign of Hassan 
II and the advent of Mohammed VI; it covered the first ten years of the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership arising from the Barcelona Declaration; and it coincided 
exactly with the progressive elimination of the Multifiber Agreement, which had 
protected the Moroccan share of EU textile and clothing markets. That decade also saw 
the signing of a free trade agreement between Morocco and the United States, and 
increasing turbulence in international geopolitics as nations sought to respond to an 
upsurge in terrorism and other forms of extremism. 
 
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership had germinated from the seed planted by the 
Moroccan quest for bilateral free trade, and it went on to become the European Union 
policy vehicle for achieving stability and prosperity in North Africa and the Middle East, 
even as the primary focus of attention shifted to accession in Eastern Europe. The 
recomposition of global alliances in the post-Soviet era and growing fears related to 
terrorism, drug flows, and uncontrolled immigration were clearly important factors 
driving this regional initiative, which is an integral part of worldwide economic and 
political developments. The Euro-Mediterranean plan was highly ambitious, particularly 
given the resources that would have to be devoted to the expansion eastwards, and it may 
well be, as one commentator recently suggested in a French academic journal, that the 
European Commission lacked the imagination to rise to the challenge: 
 
“Europe has appeared to lack confidence in its Mediterranean partners in 
implementing the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The European 
Commission… makes the rules, which are often draconian, imposes 
conditions… sets the agenda and monitors the process. In that sense, the 
arrangement is hardly a partnership. The point is not to stigmatize the 
European Commission, without which the Barcelona process would certainly 
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have been stillborn, but to make the observation that the Commission 
employed standard methods and operating procedures that were inadequate 
for an unprecedented political and institutional experiment” (Morin 2005, p. 
164). 
 
Ten years after the Barcelona Declaration, the overwhelming sentiment of those most 
closely involved with the Euro-Mediterranean partnership – on both sides of the pact – is 
one of disappointment. In Morocco, financial assistance is seen as woefully inadequate, 
business upgrading as a failure for which the partners bear joint responsibility, and the 
social and political clauses of the Association Agreement as never having been honored. 
Within the European Union, there is regret that a strong mechanism to promote European 
direct investment in the Southern Mediterranean partner countries was not created – and 
this is perceived as a strategic error on the part of the European Union – but there is also 
frustration that corruption, inefficiency, and resistance to change has made 
implementation of vital reforms in the Maghreb extremely difficult. 
 
With respect to the terms of the Association Agreement between Morocco and the EU, a 
central finding of this study is that a truly democratic polity in Morocco, including a 
broad-based ratification process for international treaties encompassing the full range of 
interest groups, may have considerably improved the outcome for the Kingdom. Such an 
open, broad-based process would have created a perception that ratification in Morocco 
could well prove difficult, encouraging the European Union to make supplementary 
concessions to ensure the adoption of its new vehicle for regional stability and prosperity. 
An “open, broad-based ratification process” could take a number of different forms, 
including a referendum or an up-or-down vote by a credible and representative national 
parliament.  
 
The use of referenda seems unlikely to find favor with the governments of the Maghreb, 
even assuming that they become fully committed to the introduction of a credible 
ratification process, because of the risk that a given treaty might be rejected not on its 
merits but on the basis of a constellation of unrelated grievances and popular 
misconceptions instrumentalized by pressure groups. Many commentators perceived 
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exactly this scenario in the failure of the French referendum on the European Union 
constitution in 2005, and the subsequent dramatic weakening in the political position of 
French President Jacques Chirac, who campaigned for a yes vote, has not gone unnoticed 
in the Maghreb. Political elites in the region may feel that such an outcome is 
considerably more likely in North Africa than in Western Europe, given relatively high 
rates of illiteracy and the presence of religious movements enjoying mass support that 
may choose to stigmatize a proposed agreement and seek its rejection as a show of 
political force. This perspective, which boils down to the idea that the people are not 
ready for democracy, may be valid in certain contexts and at certain moments in time, but 
it should not serve as a justification for the absence of determined moves to progressively 
introduce a democratic process. If it is misused in that way, it becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy: the people are deemed unready for democracy and so are denied the chance to 
participate in any democratic process, and they therefore continue to lack the skills 
needed to do so (analytical reflection on public policy options, research skills, the 
evaluation of the achievements of incumbent officials seeking reelection, etc.).  
 
In the case of an up-or-down vote by a credible and representative national parliament, an 
effective model would be the United States Congress, where the separation of the 
legislative and executive functions and the eclectic nature of political party constituencies 
reduces party discipline and allows a relatively full range of interest groups to wield 
influence. Members of Congress can vote against bills sponsored by the President and 
administration without fear of bringing down the government, since the government 
derives its legitimacy from a Presidential election and not from Parliamentary votes of 
confidence. This freedom is not much limited by discipline within the Parliamentary 
caucuses, since with only two major parties representing a very diverse electorate, 
frequent defections from the party line are essential to the survival of party 
representatives in constituencies that may be vehemently opposed to it on certain issues. 
As a result of this very fluid legislative process, interest group power is considerable. 
Unfortunately, the adaptation of this model to a region characterized by a highly 
fragmented political scene, based on regional and clan affiliations and other cleavages, 
would be very problematic. Constitutional amendments providing for the separation of 
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the executive and legislative branches would be a simple task compared to the challenge 
of building a small number of “big tent” political parties able to survive in an 
environment of lax party discipline. Not only would there be a constant risk of schism 
based on a kaleidoscope of discordant factions, but history suggests that such schisms 
would periodically be encouraged by the central source of power in order to ensure that 
competing institutions with strong popular legitimacy did not emerge. In that sense, the 
construction of broad-based parties able to brook dissent implies a powerful Parliament 
that cannot be manipulated or cowed by the executive branch. Despite all these pitfalls, 
the adoption of some form of genuine ratification process, against a backdrop of greater 
democracy across the board, would logically strengthen the hand of Morocco, Algeria 
and Tunisia in international negotiations. 
 
The European Union negotiation and ratification process was very open and democratic 
in contrast to the Moroccan case, but its effectiveness as a vehicle for the partnership and 
development objectives at the heart of the Barcelona process was neutralized by an 
extraordinary lack of participation. Only three EU member States – France, Italy, and 
Spain – were intensively involved in the development of relations with the Maghreb, 
either during the negotiation and ratification process or over the longer term, and all were 
nations that had significant interests to protect in the region. Had there been a similar 
degree of participation by other member States with relatively little to lose by making a 
more generous offer to the Maghreb countries, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership might 
have come much closer to meeting expectations. In Europe as elsewhere, open and 
democratic processes that are skewed by a lack of participation can be likened to an 
empty shell – the process itself functions correctly but is deprived of critical input – and 
such a mechanism is very unlikely to yield a balanced and representative outcome. 
 
Since 2003, the European Commission has been developing a new concept known as the 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) that offers post-enlargement border nations – 
including the EuroMed countries – participation in the single European market (free 
movement of goods, services, capital and workers) and increased financial aid in return 
for harmonization with EU laws and regulations. The Barcelona process would be 
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subsumed in this much broader initiative, but the extent of participation in the single 
European market by ENP partner countries has not been defined (it would not necessarily 
include agriculture or services), and the degree of economic and political reform needed 
to qualify for any such participation is vast indeed. What is interesting about the proposal 
is the fact that it has been explicitly cast by the European Commission as a means of 
achieving the unrealized potential of the Barcelona process with respect to the EuroMed 
countries. It is at once an admission of failure and a reaffirmation of the original 
objectives in the form of a new initiative (Escribano 2005). One can but hope for the 
success of the new proposal, which will require major resource commitments and bold 
new investment promotion mechanisms from the European Union, as well as an appetite 
for radical economic and political reform among the Maghreb countries, all elements that 
were singularly lacking during the first decade of the Barcelona process. 
 
Among the Maghreb countries, Morocco has shown by far the greatest capacity for 
economic and political reform, Tunisia has maintained a strong economic performance 
while making no real progress towards democratization, and Algeria has belatedly 
embarked on a promising agenda of macro-economic reform and infrastructure 
investment that was delayed by the upheaval of the 1990s. Since the signing of its free 
trade agreement with the United States, Morocco has been on the verge of occupying a 
privileged position as an export platform for the European Union and United States 
markets. American firms will be able to locate production facilities in Morocco, benefit 
from cheaper local labor and duty-free inputs from the E.U. and the U.S., and then export 
their finished products duty-free to either market provided that minimum local value-
added requirements (at least 35%) are satisfied. The same logic applies to European 
Union and other firms. The platform effect is strengthened by existing free trade 
agreements with Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Turkey, and if it proves to be a decisive 
factor in boosting FDI flows to Morocco, then it may be the key to further business 
environment improvements there. A substantial increase in foreign investment would 
reinforce existing private sector pressure for continued reform, in addition to European 
Union and United States pressure exercised through the European Neighborhood Policy 
and the U.S./Morocco free trade agreement. This particular aspect of the Moroccan 
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experience suggests that leveraging European Union FTAs by the addition of treaties 
with other economic powers could do much more to translate the FDI benefits of trade 
liberalization into reality in the Maghreb than any European Commission attempts to 
encourage investment in a given Maghreb country as an isolated market. The ultimate 
success of such an approach, however, depends not only on duty-free access to large and 
attractive markets but also on open, democratic governments in the Maghreb that listen 
and respond to expressed needs and desires: not only those of investors, but also those of 
ordinary citizens.  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
The Questionnaires 
(English and French versions) 
 
 EUROPE, MOROCCO, AND FREE TRADE: NEGOTIATING EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION ON THE SOUTHERN PERIPHERY 
 
UResearch Questionnaire 
(EU Respondents) 
 
Carl Dawson, Ph.D. candidate 
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs 
University of Pittsburgh 
 
 
Confidentiality: Interviews will be confidential. They will be tape-recorded and 
transcribed, with subjects identified only by sectoral affiliation in the dissertation. 
 
 
USECTION A: The Role of the Interviewee 
 
1. What UformalU role did you play in the decision to seek an Association Agreement with  
Morocco? 
 
2. What UinformalU role did you play in the decision to seek an Association Agreement 
with Morocco? 
 
3. What UformalU role did you play in the negotiations over the free trade component of 
the 1996 Morocco/EU Association Agreement? 
 
4. What UinformalU role did you play in the negotiations over the free trade component of 
the 1996 Morocco/EU Association Agreement? 
 
 
USECTION B: The Personal Perspective of the Interviewee 
 
5. In your opinion, what does the free trade agreement mean? 
 
6. What are the strengths of the free trade agreement? 
 
7.  What are the weaknesses of the free trade agreement? 
 
 
USECTION C: The Motivations of the Two Parties 
 
8.  Why did the European Union decide to seek a free trade agreement? 
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9. Why did the European Union decide to seek a free trade agreement with Morocco? 
 
10.  Why did the European Union offer a free trade agreement excluding agriculture and 
services, and why did Morocco accept that exclusion? 
 
11. Why did Morocco accept a free trade agreement, given its disadvantages? 
 
12. What role did the question of the Morocco/EU fisheries agreement play in the free 
trade agreement? 
 
 
USECTION D: The Role of Interest Groups 
 
13. Who in the European Union stood to gain from free trade? 
 
14. Who in the European Union stood to lose from free trade? 
 
15. Which individuals and groups represented each of these interests prior to and during 
the negotiations? 
 
16. What formal and informal procedures were used in decision-making and negotiating 
relative to the free trade agreement? 
 
17. How did each interest group representative attempt to promote its point of view? 
 
18. What impact did each interest group representative have on the negotiations? 
 
19. What constraints were faced by the negotiators as they sought an agreement that was 
acceptable to the European Union and Morocco and also acceptable to domestic 
interests on both sides? 
 
20. On each side, whose approval was required for changes in negotiating position and 
for the signature of the final agreement? 
 
 
USECTION E: Wrap-Up 
 
21. Is there anything that you would like to add? 
 
22. Who else should I interview regarding this subject? 
 
23. Can you direct me to any documents relevant to this topic? 
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L’EUROPE, LE MAROC, ET LE LIBRE-ECHANGE : LA NEGOCIATION DE 
L’INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE A LA PERIPHERIE SUD 
 
UQuestionnaire de recherche 
(Sujets de l’Union Européenne) 
 
Carl Dawson, Candidat doctoral 
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs 
University of Pittsburgh 
 
 
La Confidentialité : Les entretiens resteront confidentiels. Ils seront enregistrés par 
magnétophone et transcrits, mais les personnes interviewées ne seront identifiées dans la 
thèse doctorale que par leur affiliation sectorielle. 
 
USECTION A: Le Rôle de l’interviewé 
 
1. Quel rôle UformelU avez-vous joué dans la décision de solliciter un accord 
d’association avec le Maroc ? 
 
2. Quel rôle UinformelU avez-vous joué dans la décision de solliciter un accord 
d’association avec le Maroc ? 
 
3. Quel rôle UformelU avez-vous joué dans les négociations portant sur le volet libre-
échange de l’Accord d’association entre le Maroc et l’Union Européenne de 1996 ? 
 
4. Quel rôle UinformelU avez-vous joué dans les négociations portant sur le volet libre-
échange de l’Accord d’association entre le Maroc et l’Union Européenne de 1996 ? 
 
USECTION B: La Perspective personnelle de l’interviewé 
 
5. A votre avis, que signifie l’accord de libre-échange ? 
 
6. Quels sont les points forts de l’accord de libre-échange ? 
 
7.  Quels sont les points faibles de l’accord de libre-échange ? 
 
USECTION C: Les Motivations des deux parties 
 
8.  Pourquoi l’Union Européenne a-t-il décidé de solliciter un accord de libre-échange ?  
 
9. Pourquoi l’Union Européenne a-t-il décidé de solliciter un accord de libre-échange 
avec le Maroc ? 
 
10.  Pourquoi l’Union Européenne a-t-elle proposé un accord de libre-échange excluant 
l’agriculture et les services, et pourquoi le Maroc a-t-il accepté ces exclusions ? 
 
 145
 
11. Pourquoi le Maroc a-t-il accepté un accord de libre-échange, compte tenu de ses 
inconvénients ? 
 
12. Quel rôle a été joué dans la négociation de l’accord de libre-échange par le dossier de 
l’accord de pêche entre le Maroc et l’Union Européenne ? 
 
USECTION D: Le Rôle des groupes de pression 
 
13. Qui, dans l’Union Européenne, devait profiter du libre-échange ? 
 
14. Qui, dans l’Union Européenne, devait être lésé par le libre-échange ? 
 
15. Quelles personnes et quels groupes représentaient chacun des ces intérêts avant et 
pendant les négociations ? 
 
16. Quelles procédures formelles et informelles ont été employées dans la prise de 
décision et dans la négociation relatives à l’accord de libre-échange ? 
 
17. Comment est-ce que chaque représentant de groupe de pression a tenté de 
promouvoir le point de vue de son groupe ? 
 
18. Quel impact est-ce que chaque représentant de groupe de pression a eu sur les 
négociations ? 
 
19. Auxquelles contraintes les négociateurs ont-ils dû faire face lorsqu’ils cherchaient un 
accord qui serait acceptable à l’Union Européenne et au Maroc et également 
acceptable aux intérêts politiques internes des deux parties ? 
 
20. En ce qui concerne chaque partie, qui avait le pouvoir d’autoriser des modifications 
dans l’offre de négociation ainsi que la signature de l’accord définitif ? 
 
USECTION E: La Conclusion de l’entretien 
 
21. Avez-vous d’autres commentaires à propos du sujet de cet entretien ? 
 
22. Qui sont les autres personnes avec lesquelles je devrais m’entretenir à ce sujet ? 
 
23. Pourriez-vous me recommander des documents pertinents à ce sujet ? 
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EUROPE, MOROCCO, AND FREE TRADE: NEGOTIATING EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION ON THE SOUTHERN PERIPHERY 
 
UResearch Questionnaire 
(Moroccan Respondents) 
 
Carl Dawson, Ph.D. candidate 
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs 
University of Pittsburgh 
 
 
Confidentiality: Interviews will be confidential. They will be tape-recorded and 
transcribed, with subjects identified only by sectoral affiliation in the dissertation. 
 
 
USECTION A: The Role of the Interviewee 
 
1. What UformalU role did you play in the decision to seek an Association Agreement with 
the European Union? 
 
2. What UinformalU role did you play in the decision to seek an Association Agreement 
with the European Union? 
 
3. What UformalU role did you play in the negotiations over the free trade component of 
the 1996 Morocco/EU Association Agreement? 
 
4. What UinformalU role did you play in the negotiations over the free trade component of 
the 1996 Morocco/EU Association Agreement? 
 
 
USECTION B: The Personal Perspective of the Interviewee 
 
5. In your opinion, what does the free trade agreement mean? 
 
6. What are the strengths of the free trade agreement? 
 
7.  What are the weaknesses of the free trade agreement? 
 
 
USECTION C: The Motivations of the Two Sides 
 
8.  Why did Morocco decide to seek a free trade agreement? 
 
9. Why did Morocco decide to seek a free trade agreement with the European Union? 
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10.  Why did the European Union offer a free trade agreement excluding agriculture and 
services, and why did Morocco accept that exclusion? 
 
11. Why did Morocco accept a free trade agreement, given its disadvantages? 
 
12. What role did the question of the Morocco/EU fisheries agreement play in the free 
trade agreement? 
 
 
USECTION D: The Role of Interest Groups 
 
13. Who in Morocco stood to gain from free trade? 
 
14. Who in Morocco stood to lose from free trade? 
 
15. Which individuals and groups represented each of these interests prior to and during 
the negotiations? 
 
16. What formal and informal procedures were used in decision-making and negotiating 
relative to the free trade agreement? 
 
17. How did each interest group representative attempt to promote its point of view? 
 
18. What impact did each interest group representative have on the negotiations? 
 
19. What constraints were faced by the negotiators as they sought an agreement that was 
acceptable to the European Union and Morocco and also acceptable to domestic 
interests on both sides? 
 
20. On each side, whose approval was required for changes in negotiating position and 
for the signature of the final agreement? 
 
 
USECTION E: Wrap-Up 
 
21. Is there anything that you would like to add? 
 
22. Who else should I interview regarding this subject? 
 
23. Can you direct me to any documents relevant to this topic? 
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L’EUROPE, LE MAROC, ET LE LIBRE-ECHANGE : LA NEGOCIATION DE 
L’INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE A LA PERIPHERIE SUD 
 
UQuestionnaire de recherche 
(Sujets marocains) 
 
Carl Dawson, Candidat doctoral 
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs 
University of Pittsburgh 
 
 
La Confidentialité : Les entretiens resteront confidentiels. Ils seront enregistrés par 
magnétophone et transcrits, mais les personnes interviewées ne seront identifiées dans la 
thèse doctorale que par leur affiliation sectorielle. 
 
USECTION A: Le Rôle de l’interviewé 
 
1. Quel rôle UformelU avez-vous joué dans la décision de solliciter un accord 
d’association avec l’Union Européenne ? 
 
2. Quel rôle in UformelU avez-vous joué dans la décision de solliciter un accord 
d’association avec l’Union Européenne ? 
 
3. Quel rôle UformelU avez-vous joué dans les négociations portant sur le volet libre-
échange de l’Accord d’association entre le Maroc et l’Union Européenne de 1996 ? 
 
4. Quel rôle in UformelU avez-vous joué dans les négociations portant sur le volet libre-
échange de l’Accord d’association entre le Maroc et l’Union Européenne de 1996 ? 
 
USECTION B: La Perspective personnelle de l’interviewé 
 
5. A votre avis, que signifie l’accord de libre-échange ? 
 
6. Quels sont les points forts de l’accord de libre-échange ? 
 
7.  Quels sont les points faibles de l’accord de libre-échange ? 
 
USECTION C: Les Motivations des deux parties 
 
8.  Pourquoi le Maroc a-t-il décidé de solliciter un accord de libre-échange ?  
 
9. Pourquoi le Maroc a-t-il décidé de solliciter un accord de libre-échange avec l’Union 
Européenne ? 
 
10.  Pourquoi l’Union Européenne a-t-elle proposé un accord de libre-échange excluant 
l’agriculture et les services, et pourquoi le Maroc a-t-il accepté ces exclusions ? 
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11. Pourquoi le Maroc a-t-il accepté un accord de libre-échange, compte tenu de ses 
inconvénients ? 
 
12. Quel rôle a été joué dans la négociation de l’accord de libre-échange par le dossier de 
l’accord de pêche entre le Maroc et l’Union Européenne ? 
 
USECTION D: Le Rôle des groupes de pression 
 
13. Qui, au Maroc, devait profiter du libre-échange ? 
 
14. Qui, au Maroc, devait être lésé par le libre-échange ? 
 
15. Quelles personnes et quels groupes représentaient chacun des ces intérêts avant et 
pendant les négociations ? 
 
16. Quelles procédures formelles et informelles ont été employées dans la prise de 
décision et dans la négociation relatives à l’accord de libre-échange ? 
 
17. Comment est-ce que chaque représentant de groupe de pression a tenté de 
promouvoir le point de vue de son groupe ? 
 
18. Quel impact est-ce que chaque représentant de groupe de pression a eu sur les 
négociations ? 
 
19. Auxquelles contraintes les négociateurs ont-ils dû faire face lorsqu’ils cherchaient un 
accord qui serait acceptable à l’Union Européenne et au Maroc et également 
acceptable aux intérêts politiques internes des deux parties ? 
 
20. En ce qui concerne chaque partie, qui avait le pouvoir d’autoriser des modifications 
dans l’offre de négociation ainsi que la signature de l’accord définitif ? 
 
USECTION E: La Conclusion de l’entretien 
 
21. Avez-vous d’autres commentaires à propos du sujet de cet entretien ? 
 
22. Qui sont les autres personnes avec lesquelles je devrais m’entretenir à ce sujet ? 
 
23. Pourriez-vous me recommander des documents pertinents à ce sujet ? 
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